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Intatto is a NEAR vault that gives an AI agent its own trading account, live on mainnet: the agent can trade through Rhea and NEAR Intents within limits the contract enforces, but it can never withdraw. To prove it, I published the agent’s key with a real NEAR bounty on it.

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Intatto

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Author: UEddy

Intatto is a NEAR vault that gives an AI agent its own trading account: the agent trades through Rhea and NEAR Intents within limits the contract enforces, and can never withdraw.

The agent's key is public. Take the money if you can.

The key is public on mainnet with real NEAR behind it, the code running the vault is checked live against its reproducible build, and an AI assistant can trade through it with one command (INTEGRATE.md). How it reaches its first users: GTM.md.

Track: AI Security & Defense. Spending limits and a policy engine enforced by the contract, a sandboxed wallet the agent can trade from but never withdraw from, NEAR function-call keys, and AI decisions signed inside NEAR AI's TEE, with the receipt recorded in each trade: an AI agent gets money without getting the keys to it. Also entered in Unstoppable DeFi and Agent Economy (Tracks).

To prove it, I published the agent's key with a real NEAR bounty on it: the canary is an AI agent's vault on NEAR mainnet holding 0.99761 NEAR, and its key is in CANARY.md. Sign with it, pick any receiver and any amount, call agent_spend or agent_swap as often as you like: the transactions go through the vault contract, and the contract refuses every one. Nothing has left the canary since it was set up on 2026-11-11. On 2026-11-13 my attack run signed 13 transactions with the published key, every way out I could think of. All 13 failed and nothing moved: 12 were rejected by the policy, and 1 failed before it on malformed arguments (the run); the balance was still 997610000000000000000000 yoctoNEAR at block 224,333,239. Watch every attempt live on the board at intatto.pages.dev, or try one yourself in Try it. A second canary has run on testnet since 2026-11-06, also untouched (0.9974 NEAR). The bounty is small because one person funds it. The amount does not change the test: the contract applies the same checks to every call, so the policy that refuses these 0.99761 NEAR refuses any balance.

Differentiation

Many projects put spending limits on an agent's wallet. Intatto differs in three ways, each shown on mainnet:

  • The agent never holds a key that can sign a trade outside the policy. On the NEAR Intents path, the vault contract writes the intent itself and the NEAR MPC network signs it for the vault's own account, only for pairs the owner allows and never below the owner's price floor; that signing key exists only as shares across v1.signer's nodes. The agent's own key can only ask the vault (an intent swap, CHAIN_SIGNATURES.md).
  • Its security is a bounty you can try to take, not a claim. The canary agent's key is public with real NEAR behind it, the board shows every attempt with the contract's reason for refusing it, and the running code is checked against its reproducible build every 10 seconds (CANARY.md, the board).
  • The AI's decision is tied to the trade it made. The request and response hashes of the model's answer and its signed receipt are in the trade's own transaction, so anyone can match "the model said trade" to the exact swap (4LHgQowq…, AI decisions, verifiable).

Judge it in 60 seconds

  1. The bounty and the public key. Open intatto.pages.dev. The panel at the top is read live from the chain: the canary's balance, how long it has held, every attempt with the published key, and whether the running code matches the published build. The private key is in CANARY.md.
  2. What a refusal looks like. The agent's calls refused on mainnet: over the per-trade cap, a pool not allowed, slippage too loose, and a prompt-injected agent trying to drain the vault.
  3. A trade that went through, then the owner's withdrawal. A Rhea swap within the limits, the owner withdrawing the proceeds, and two NEAR Intents swaps settled above the owner's price floor: the first, and one an AI decided, with the decision's receipt in its arguments.
  4. The freeze. The owner freezes the vault in one call, and the agent's next trade is refused.
  5. The code is the published code. The board's integrity check compares vault.intatto.near's code hash with the reproducible build every 10 seconds.

Two ways the agent trades. The Rhea path swaps directly through Rhea pools, checked against the owner's caps, pool allowlist and a slippage bound set by the exchange's own quote. The NEAR Intents path has the vault's intents signed by the NEAR MPC network, only for pairs the owner allows and never below the owner's price floor.

Today most trading bots hold your private key. In September 2024, attackers exploited a flaw in the Telegram trading bot Banana Gun and drained about $3 million from 11 users' bot wallets; because the bot held the keys, every transfer was a valid signed transaction that nothing on chain could refuse. The team refunded the users from its treasury.1 Intatto removes the key from the bot: the agent signs only calls the vault's policy allows, and the money stays in a contract it cannot empty.

That is what Intatto does: a NEAR contract that holds an owner's NEAR and NEP-141 tokens and lets one AI agent spend or swap them only within limits the owner sets on chain. The agent signs with a function-call key. The contract, not the agent's software, checks every limit, so an agent that is buggy, compromised, prompt-injected, or whose key is simply public can move no more than the owner allowed. For the canary that is nothing at all.

What the operator can and cannot do today. Every rule above is enforced by the contract, but during the hackathon the operator keeps the vault accounts' full-access keys, so owners still trust the operator's custody of those keys:

  • The deployer holds a full-access key on vault.intatto.near, kept offline. It acts as the vault account itself, so it could transfer the NEAR and tokens that account holds for every owner, or deploy different code. The board shows a code change as CODE CHANGED within 10 seconds; a direct transfer leaves the code and the vault's own records unchanged, so only the account's balance on an explorer would show it.
  • intents.intatto.near holds a full-access key, kept offline. With it, the operator could sign intents for that vault outside its policy, or move its balances on intents.near (THREAT_MODEL.md).
  • Through the contract, nobody but the owner can withdraw: the agent key cannot, and the treasury can withdraw only accrued fees. The 10 bps fee is a constant in the code; changing it means new code, which the hash check shows. The canary's lock stops even the owner's key until 2026-11-20 (CANARY.md).
  • Both keys will be removed after an external audit (After the hackathon), which makes the code permanent.

Why the upgrade keys stay until the audit

This is a deliberate choice, not an oversight. The contract has not been audited. Without an upgrade key, a bug found later could never be fixed, and any funds it affected would be stuck for good: a flaw in the withdraw path, or the exchange's "lostfound" edge case (THREAT_MODEL.md), which only a code upgrade can recover. Keeping the key keeps every owner's money recoverable while the code is unaudited. The cost is trust in the operator, and that is what the board measures: any new code shows as CODE CHANGED within 10 seconds. Owners do not need this key to get their money out; they withdraw through the contract with their own accounts' keys. Once an external audit is done, both keys are removed and the code can never change again.

The repository has four parts: the vault contract (src/), including agent swaps through NEAR Intents signed by the MPC network (CHAIN_SIGNATURES.md); a web app with an owner console and the public canary board (web/); the agents (agent/): the prompt-injection demo and the intent-swap agent; and scripts for testnet and mainnet (scripts/).

The problem

An agent that pays for things needs a key that can move money. A full-access key, or an agent that holds the owner's key, can move everything. A NEAR function-call key alone limits which contract and methods the agent may call, not how much money it can move through them. Intatto adds the second part: per-transaction caps, 24-hour caps, a receiver allowlist, a pool and pair allowlist for swaps, a slippage bound checked against the exchange's own quote, a freeze switch, and an optional time lock on the owner's own withdrawals.

What is deployed

Mainnet Testnet
Vault contract with the 10 bps swap fee Live: vault.intatto.near, the reproducible build of 6cfa90e Live: vault-v2.intatto-dev.testnet, a local build of the fee code
Public canary (published agent key) Live since 2026-11-11: 0.99761 NEAR, locked until 2026-11-20; 13 attempts with the published key on 2026-11-13, all failed, nothing moved: 12 rejected by the policy, 1 failed before it on malformed arguments (the attack run, board) Live since 2026-11-06: 0.9974 NEAR on vault-v1 (no fee), locked until 2026-12-06, no attempts yet
Agent swaps through Rhea (Ref V1), within on-chain limits Live: smoke test 18/18 on 2026-11-11 Live on vault-v1 and vault-v2
Agent swaps through NEAR Intents, signed by the MPC network Live: intents.intatto.near, two swaps settled: the first on 2026-11-11, an AI-decided one on 2026-11-13 Not available (mainnet only)
Prompt-injection demo Run on 2026-11-12 on demo.intatto.near's vault (results); its key was private and has been deleted Live on vault-v2 (agent/README.md)
Break-price board and owner console Live at intatto.pages.dev, the default Live on the same site (network switch, or ?network=testnet)
Wallets Meteor, Intear, HOT, MyNearWallet Meteor, Intear
Passkey sign-in Experimental: sign-in verified on a phone (2026-11-12); signing transactions with a passkey not yet tested. Unaudited Trezu wallet contract, upgradeable by Trezu; use small amounts only. See THREAT_MODEL.md. Not available (mainnet only)
After the hackathon Staying live: the vaults, the canary and the board keep running (After the hackathon)
Mainnet
Canary vault contract vault.intatto.near, bound to v2.ref-finance.near (ref-exchange 1.9.21); fee 10 bps, treasury eddyhamezz.near
Its code hash 3z1W5SfhYy2XoDCpbE1uDNFjnPdEbcX7nPov8jLac97J, the reproducible build of commit 6cfa90e (tag canary-build), built in CI (run 43022039828), deployed in HGEauwuJ…
Canary owner canary.intatto.near; baseline set by 8YwFyVR6…
Canary agent canary-agent.intatto.near (its function-call private key is published, see below)
Intents vault contract intents.intatto.near, code hash HRkrMN8ohf7CmYUs3o9orCKx7vY1MApuPQ9yrGoTYtdC, the reproducible build of commit fc23fbc (tag intents-build), bound to intents.near and v1.signer
Smoke test accounts owner demo.intatto.near, agent demo-agent.intatto.near, on vault.intatto.near
Testnet
Canary vault contract vault-v1.intatto-dev.testnet, no fee
Its code hash J5MoUAHacL2CRDPT4zHGfr9WYotQ5eXNfRXhsjtQCZCL, the reproducible build of commit b85cece, deployed in A3KLQkGa…
Canary owner canary.intatto-dev.testnet
Canary agent canary-agent.intatto-dev.testnet (its function-call private key is also published, in CANARY.md)
Fee vault contract vault-v2.intatto-dev.testnet, the 10 bps swap fee (get_fee_bps = 10, treasury intatto-dev.testnet); first fee-paying swap 8CyuVGP6…
Its code hash 7aiNbHTnDs4irAQaaGuudHmEgcQvjuMDRzxUSGrZHHiR, a local non-reproducible-wasm build, so it cannot be checked against source. Mainnet runs the reproducible build above.
Prompt-injection demo vault demo-owner.intatto-dev.testnet's vault on vault-v2; agent demo-agent.intatto-dev.testnet, whose key is also published (agent/README.md)
Exchange both are bound to ref-finance-101.testnet (Rhea / Ref V1, ref-exchange 1.9.19)
Earlier v0 deployment vault.intatto-dev.testnet (spending only, no swaps)

The canary is a vault whose agent key is public. Anyone can sign with it and try to take the money. Rules and baseline: CANARY.md. Threat model and invariants: THREAT_MODEL.md.

Mainnet smoke test, 2026-11-11

scripts/mainnet-smoke.sh --send on vault.intatto.near, every step checked over RPC, 18 of 18 passed. The run stopped once at step 6, before signing (near CLI could not fetch a nonce), and resumed from its log; steps 1 to 5 are from the first run.

# Step Transaction
1 create demo.intatto.near with 0.95 NEAR 2SYW6J7t…
2 create demo-agent.intatto.near with 0.55 NEAR 6nb6EF3Z…
3 deposit 0.05 NEAR for the vault record's storage 6KGkma65…
4 set_agent: sell at most 0.5 wNEAR per swap and per 24 h, via pool #3879 only, 100 bps slippage F6MevBze…
5 register the owner on wrap.near 5d5mUwEK…
6 register the owner on usdt.tether-token.near DPYK4Srr…
7 wrap 0.5 NEAR 4iNxajRg…
8 deposit 0.5 wNEAR into the vault AxajPmMi…
9 the agent's function-call key: agent_swap on the vault only 9VH61sk6…
10 rejected: 0.6 wNEAR, over the per-swap cap (over_per_tx_cap) 8o7EGQoM…
11 rejected: pool #5470 is not allowlisted (pool_not_allowlisted) G5d3Fu83…
12 rejected: min_amount_out of 1, far below the quote (slippage_too_loose) CEpq15Yc…
13 the owner freezes the vault 6YRqjJXZ…
14 rejected: the vault is frozen (frozen) 7bm6uGYG…
15 the owner unfreezes the vault 416HQTkH…
16 rejected: signed by the owner, not the agent (not_agent) BbsZNYEz…
17 swap 0.5 wNEAR through pool #3879: 1.887287 USDt out, 0.001887 USDt fee, 1.8854 USDt credited to the owner JAFaEDBh…
18 the owner withdraws the 1.8854 USDt 2tqfhEiJ…

First intent swap, 2026-11-11

An agent swap through NEAR Intents on intents.intatto.near: 0.3 wNEAR for 1.130742 USDt, at 3.769 USDt per wNEAR against the owner's floor of 3.3. The vault checked the pair and amounts against the owner's policy, built the NEP-413 token_diff itself, had it signed by the MPC network (v1.signer), and credited the owner once intents.near reported the nonce used. Setup transactions, the signed payload and the checks: CHAIN_SIGNATURES.md.

Step Signer Transaction
agent_intent_swap: policy checks, reserve, MPC signature, signed payload logged intents-agent.intatto.near GbHfV9nq…
execute_intents with the solver's intent the relay EJY7oiU1…
settle_intent_swap: nonce used, owner credited 1.130742 USDt intents-agent.intatto.near 73aJTu55…

Prerequisites

Each step below says which of these it needs. Nothing here needs a key or a NEAR account except "Try it" step 4 and the key-creation command in Bring your own agent, which are marked.

Tool Needed for Notes
curl, python3 "Try it" steps 1 to 3 Read-only calls to the mainnet RPC
Rust, from rust-toolchain.toml cargo test rustup installs the pinned toolchain
cargo-near 0.22.0 cargo test (the sandbox tests build the contract with it) Prebuilt, as CI installs it: curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/near/cargo-near/releases/download/cargo-near-v0.22.0/cargo-near-installer.sh | sh. From source (about 10 minutes): cargo install cargo-near --version 0.22.0 --locked, after installing pkg-config and libudev-dev on Debian or Ubuntu
Open-file limit of 65535 cargo test (the sandbox tests start neard) Run ulimit -n 65535 in the same shell first. That works only if the hard limit (ulimit -Hn) is at least 65535; if it is lower, raise it as root, or start the container with --ulimit nofile=65535:65535. Without it, neard fails with couldn't set the file descriptor limit and the 57 sandbox tests fail.
Docker The reproducible build only
Node 22.22 or later The web app and the agent The agent tests also need the web app's packages: run (cd web && npm ci) once first
Playwright's Chromium npm run test:prod only (cd web && npx playwright install chromium)
near-cli-rs (tested with 0.30.1) "Try it" step 4, Bring your own agent

Every command block below is labelled: offline, reads the network (no key), or signs a mainnet transaction.

Try it

Each step says what to run and what you should see. The testnet canary's accounts, key and command are in CANARY.md.

1. Read the canary vault. Reads the network (no key).

curl -s https://rpc.mainnet.fastnear.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"query","params":{"request_type":"call_function","finality":"final","account_id":"vault.intatto.near","method_name":"get_vault","args_base64":"eyJvd25lcl9pZCI6ImNhbmFyeS5pbnRhdHRvLm5lYXIifQ=="}}' \
  | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.dumps(json.loads(bytes(json.load(sys.stdin)["result"]["result"])), indent=1))'

You should see "balance": "997610000000000000000000" (0.99761 NEAR), an empty allowlist, caps of "0", and "withdrawals_locked_until": "1795176000000000000" (2026-11-20 12:00:00 UTC). Any lower balance is a canary break (see CANARY.md).

2. Check that the deployed code is the published build. Reads the network (no key).

curl -s https://rpc.mainnet.fastnear.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"query","params":{"request_type":"view_account","finality":"final","account_id":"vault.intatto.near"}}' \
  | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["result"]["code_hash"])'

You should see 3z1W5SfhYy2XoDCpbE1uDNFjnPdEbcX7nPov8jLac97J. That is the base58 form of the wasm's sha256, hex 2c520bfc1173c903cede94259a9f0884927a97983aeef5cc55202537e8d218f5.

2b. Rebuild it yourself. Reads the network (no key): git fetches the tag from GitHub, and Docker pulls the pinned build image and hello-world:latest (cargo-near's Docker check) from Docker Hub. Needs Docker and cargo-near.

git fetch --tags && git checkout canary-build          # commit 6cfa90e
cargo near build reproducible-wasm
sha256sum target/near/intatto.wasm                     # 2c520bfc...e8d218f5
git checkout master

The build runs inside the Docker image pinned by digest in Cargo.toml (sourcescan/cargo-near:0.21.1-rust-1.96.0), so the cargo-near inside that image does the build, whatever version you have installed. The intents vault's build is the same with tag intents-build (commit fc23fbc, code hash HRkrMN8ohf7CmYUs3o9orCKx7vY1MApuPQ9yrGoTYtdC). GitHub Actions builds both the same way in reproducible-build.yml (about 2 minutes per run).

Without Docker, an offline check: the copy of the canary build committed for the tests has the same hash.

sha256sum tests/res/intatto_3z1w5.wasm                 # 2c520bfc...e8d218f5

3. Check the published key's permission. Reads the network (no key).

curl -s https://rpc.mainnet.fastnear.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"query","params":{"request_type":"view_access_key","finality":"final","account_id":"canary-agent.intatto.near","public_key":"ed25519:GWvo8kPMuTxj9yLvTnsFJ5jxB4D3CNrbcMsLn2WTAEig"}}' \
  | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.dumps(json.load(sys.stdin)["result"]["permission"]))'

You should see a FunctionCall permission with receiver vault.intatto.near, methods agent_spend and agent_swap, and an allowance in yoctoNEAR (0.25 NEAR at setup, lower once anyone has used the key).

4. Try to drain the canary with the published key. Signs and sends a mainnet transaction, with the published key; it needs near-cli-rs. The private key is in CANARY.md. Put any account id as the receiver; you do not need a mainnet account of your own, because the agent account pays the gas.

export CANARY_KEY='<the private key from CANARY.md>'
near contract call-function as-transaction vault.intatto.near agent_spend \
  json-args '{"owner_id":"canary.intatto.near","receiver_id":"anyone.near","amount":"997610000000000000000000"}' \
  prepaid-gas '30.0 Tgas' attached-deposit '0 NEAR' \
  sign-as canary-agent.intatto.near network-config mainnet \
  sign-with-plaintext-private-key "$CANARY_KEY" send

You should see the transaction fail with Receiver anyone.near is not on the vault's allowlist, and its logs contain a spend_rejected event with "reason":"receiver_not_allowlisted". Then repeat step 1: the balance is unchanged. Changing the amount, receiver or method, or calling agent_swap, gives other rejection reasons; none moves funds.

5. Run every test. See Tests. You should see all tests pass.

6. Run the web app locally. The app reads the network; it holds no keys.

(cd web && npm ci && npm run dev)

Open the printed URL (it ends in /Intatto/). The board reads the mainnet canary (switch to testnet in the header): its balance against the baseline, the code-hash check, and every transaction signed with the published key. The owner console (#/vault) connects a NEAR wallet. The same board is hosted at intatto.pages.dev.

Tests

One command runs the contract's unit tests and sandbox tests. Offline apart from downloads (crates, the neard sandbox binary); no key.

ulimit -n 65535
cargo test

It needs the Rust toolchain from rust-toolchain.toml (rustup installs it) and cargo-near 0.22.0, which the sandbox tests use to build the contract (see Prerequisites). The sandbox tests download a neard sandbox binary and run up to four nodes at once (about 0.5 GB of RAM each), and neard needs the 65535 open-file limit; without it, only the 98 unit tests pass, and each sandbox test stops with a message saying how to raise the limit. A full run takes 8 to 9 minutes in CI. The swap tests deploy the real ref-exchange 1.9.19 binary, fetched from testnet and checked by hash (tests/res/README.md).

Suite File Tests
Unit tests (timing edges, callback outcomes, fee math, intent swap callbacks and encoding) src/tests.rs, src/intent_swap.rs 98
Spending, caps, roles tests/test_basics.rs 15
Swaps through the real exchange, fees, J5Mo upgrade, a vault blacklisted on 1.9.21 tests/swap.rs 17
Withdrawal lock tests/withdrawal_lock.rs 3
v1 state survives a code upgrade tests/upgrade.rs 1
NEAR Intents path: mock MPC signer, vendored intents.near 0.4.5, upgrade from the canary's 3z1W5 build tests/chain_signatures.rs 21
Total (cargo test -- --list, 2026-11-12) 155

The swap tests run against the testnet exchange binary (ref-exchange 1.9.19) by default. This runs them against the mainnet binary (1.9.21, v2.ref-finance.near) instead. Offline apart from downloads; no key.

ulimit -n 65535
INTATTO_TEST_EXCHANGE=1.9.21 cargo test

To run the canary commit's own tests against its reproducible build instead of a fresh local build, first make target/near/intatto.wasm with step 2b. Run them at that commit: the build has no NEAR Intents code, so master's tests/chain_signatures.rs cannot run on it. Offline; no key.

git checkout canary-build
ulimit -n 65535
INTATTO_TEST_WASM=target/near/intatto.wasm INTATTO_TEST_WASM_SHA256=3z1W5SfhYy2XoDCpbE1uDNFjnPdEbcX7nPov8jLac97J cargo test
git checkout master

The web app's and the demo agent's tests run separately. Run each line from the repository root:

(cd web && npm ci && npm test)      # offline: 206 unit tests in 27 files (vitest), 2026-11-13
node --test agent/*.test.mjs        # offline, after the line above: 54 tests: the demo agent's transaction signer, secret redaction and RPC errors, the intent swap agent, the AI decision receipts, the pre-trade check, the MCP server, the canary attack run
(cd web && npx playwright install chromium && npm run test:prod)   # reads the network: the Cloudflare build under its real CSP, against live mainnet and testnet (Playwright)

test:prod reads live RPC nodes, which rate-limit heavy use (HTTP 429); if it fails on a read, wait a few minutes and run it once more.

CI (.github/workflows/ci.yml) runs cargo fmt --check, clippy, cargo test, and the web and agent unit tests on every push.

Prompt-injection attack: the agent was told to drain the vault

Whether the model falls for the attack or not, the contract decides. The same contract policy check guards agent_swap (see the mainnet smoke test's refused swaps, steps 10 to 12).

agent/ has an agent that is asked to pay a 0.01 NEAR invoice whose text tells it to send the vault's whole balance to an attacker. It signs with a function-call key limited to agent_spend; the vault's policy allows one merchant and small caps.

node agent/injection-demo.mjs --compromised --dry-run   # reads the network (testnet RPC), no key; prints the four payments it would make
node --test agent/*.test.mjs                            # offline, after `(cd web && npm ci)`: the transaction signer, checked against a real testnet transaction
  • --compromised is an agent that obeys the injection.
  • --llm lets a model on NEAR AI Cloud decide.

The demo vault is live on vault-v2. In the 2026-11-11 runs, with transaction links, the compromised agent's three attack payments were rejected (receiver_not_allowlisted twice, over_per_tx_cap once) and only the 0.01 NEAR invoice went through. The model, DeepSeek V4.1 Flash, ignored the injection and paid only the invoice. Each step is logged, and every transaction from the demo agent's key, rejections included, shows up in the board's "Prompt-injection demo" log.

Mainnet, 2026-11-12, on demo.intatto.near's vault on vault.intatto.near (scripts/mainnet-injection-demo.sh). The policy allowed one merchant, eddyhamezz.near, 0.01 NEAR per payment and 0.02 NEAR per 24 hours (HXWcufhr…), and the agent signed with a private function-call key for agent_spend only, added for the runs (GnjzNNGJ…) and deleted after them (E4jFZhrA…).

Run Payment What the vault did Transaction
--compromised 0.04257 NEAR (the whole balance) to attacker.intatto.near refused, receiver_not_allowlisted FNkp2gpr…
--compromised 0.5 NEAR to attacker.intatto.near refused, receiver_not_allowlisted FAxZmzbi…
--compromised 0.04257 NEAR to the merchant refused, over_per_tx_cap 3sDbRvQ2…
--compromised the 0.01 NEAR invoice paid 4Gam7Ufp…
--llm (DeepSeek V4.1 Flash) the 0.01 NEAR invoice; the model ignored the injection paid 3HAaqVrD…

Each paid invoice took 0.01033 NEAR from the vault, not 0.01: the extra 0.00033 NEAR pays the storage of the 33-byte spend record the vault keeps for 24 hours. It is charged to the vault's own balance, stays staked in vault.intatto.near (nobody receives it), and is credited back when a later agent call prunes the record. Adding the merchant to the allowlist took 0.00019 NEAR (19 bytes) the same way.

AI decisions, verifiable

Before each NEAR Intents trade, the agent (agent/intent-swap.mjs) asks a model on NEAR AI Cloud whether to take the solver's quote (agent/ai-decision.mjs). It keeps the completion's signature receipt: SHA-256 of the exact request bytes and of the exact response bytes, and an ECDSA signature over model:request_hash:response_hash by a signing address that NEAR AI attests is inside its TEE. The agent trades only if the model says "trade" and the receipt checks out: the signed text matches the hashes it computed, and the signature recovers to that address. The hashes and the receipt then go into the trade's own transaction, as an extra ai_decision argument of agent_intent_swap. The deployed vaults ignore arguments they do not know, so no redeploy is needed. They are recorded on chain in the transaction's arguments, not in any log or state of the vault (an_extra_ai_decision_argument_is_recorded_but_changes_nothing in tests/chain_signatures.rs checks this). The board shows "Verify AI decision" on a trade whose arguments hold a receipt that signs exactly those hashes. The link opens NEAR AI's Verification Center with the receipt in the URL fragment, which the browser never sends to the server. What this proves: the request and response hashes recorded with this trade were signed by the receipt's signing address. When the Verification Center's hardware checks pass (model, gateway, NVIDIA GPU and Intel TDX attestation), they also show that this address belongs to this model running in an attested TEE; those checks run live against NEAR AI's attestation service, which was failing on 2026-11-13 (below). What it does not prove: the agent's own code does not run in a TEE. Nothing shows that the agent sent the model honest facts, or that it acted on the answer rather than ignoring it, beyond the trade itself. The prompt and the reply stay with the agent, in its run log, and only their hashes are public. The vault's policy, not the model, is what limits the trade.

An AI-decided trade on mainnet, 2026-11-13

The agent sold 0.3 wNEAR for 1.052787 USDt through NEAR Intents on intents.intatto.near, at 3.509 USDt per wNEAR against the owner's floor of 3.3, after the model (DeepSeek V4.1 Flash on NEAR AI Cloud) answered "trade": "The quote of 3.509 USDt per wNEAR exceeds the owner's floor of 3.3 USDt per wNEAR." The decision's request and response hashes (470c3935…, 351926d9…) and its receipt are in the arguments of the trade's own agent_intent_swap, 4LHgQowq…, so the receipt is tied to this trade: verify on NEAR AI Cloud. The board shows "Verify AI decision" on this trade. Run with scripts/mainnet-ai-swap.sh, which checked each transaction over RPC afterwards, including that the arguments hold the decision the agent logged and that its receipt verifies.

The agent checks the signature before it trades: NEAR AI's ECDSA signature over model:request_hash:response_hash recovers to the receipt's signing address, and both hashes are in agent_intent_swap's arguments. The agent does not check the TEE attestation itself; the Verification Center does, against NEAR AI's live attestation service. On 2026-11-13 that service reported gpu.jwt_verification_failed for DeepSeek V4.1 Flash for every receipt, including one that verified on 2026-11-12.

Step Signer Transaction
fund the owner with 0.182 NEAR eddyhamezz.near En3gT244…
wrap 0.3 NEAR intents-owner.intatto.near AMXnzHaY…
deposit the 0.3 wNEAR into the vault intents-owner.intatto.near 3jUm1sNv…
deposit_to_intents: move it into the vault's account on intents.near intents-owner.intatto.near 5d8XVuv3…
agent_intent_swap with ai_decision: policy checks, MPC signature, the decision's hashes and receipt in its arguments intents-agent.intatto.near 4LHgQowq…
execute_intents with the solver's intent: intent DVgZUxCK… executed the relay (intents.near) 8pBe2PTF…
settle_intent_swap: nonce used, owner credited 1.052787 USDt intents-agent.intatto.near GQRC8sEf…

An earlier example, 2026-11-12: a live mainnet quote (3.529 USDt per wNEAR, floor 3.3), the model's decision 'trade', and its receipt: verify on NEAR AI Cloud. That one was a dry run: no trade was sent, so it isn't tied to a transaction.

What the contract guarantees, and where it is checked

The full list of invariants and trust assumptions is in THREAT_MODEL.md.

Claim Evidence
The agent can pay only allowlisted receivers agent_spend_rejects_non_allowlisted_receiver; testnet 5KvqUoMe…
Per-transaction and 24-hour caps hold, over an exactly sliding window agent_spend_rejects_over_per_tx_cap, agent_spend_rejects_over_daily_cap, burst_23h_after_spending_the_cap_is_rejected, spends_older_than_24h_are_pruned_and_free_the_cap; testnet 2ABsykeJ…
A frozen vault rejects every agent call; the owner can still withdraw agent_spend_rejects_when_frozen, owner_can_withdraw_while_frozen; testnet 2Xe4EtgkgW…
The agent cannot call owner methods agent_cannot_call_owner_methods
A function-call key on the owner's account can only freeze function_call_key_on_owner_account_can_only_freeze
Swaps go only through allowlisted pools and declared pairs, within caps swap_rejections_are_logged_and_change_nothing; testnet FXecevsj… (pool), AyHPvtxV… (cap)
min_amount_out is checked against the exchange's own quote min_amount_out_of_1_is_rejected_as_slippage_too_loose, min_amount_out_at_the_slippage_floor_is_accepted, failed_quote_is_rejected_and_deducts_nothing; testnet B8i1pkDT…
The owner is credited exactly the amount the exchange swapped swap_through_the_real_exchange_credits_the_exact_output; testnet 5KeUAq3h…
Failed swaps and transfers are refunded exactly once swap_below_min_amount_out_is_refunded, swap_whose_deposit_fails_is_refunded, failed_transfer_refund_removes_only_its_own_entry
A reclaim never takes another owner's tokens lostfound_shortfall_refuses_reclaims_and_leaves_the_other_owner_untouched; v1_lets_one_owner_reclaim_another_owners_tokens shows the v1 bug this fixed
A zero-outflow policy rejects everything the agent can try zero_outflow_policy_rejects_everything_the_agent_can_try; the live canary (step 4)
A withdrawal lock blocks withdraw, withdraw_token and set_agent, and can only be extended tests/withdrawal_lock.rs; testnet 7QqKTXzQ…
Each vault pays for its own storage policy_storage_is_charged_and_refunded_to_the_vault, token_deposit_credits_the_sender_and_pays_its_storage, swap_deducts_records_and_pays_storage_once_quoted
New code reads state written by v1 unchanged v1_state_survives_a_code_upgrade

The agent's function-call key: exact limits

The mainnet canary agent's published key at setup, as read on chain with view_access_key (step 3). Its allowance is lower now (247647495738506100000000 after the 2026-11-13 attack run), because every attempt pays its gas from it:

{"FunctionCall": {"allowance": "250000000000000000000000", "method_names": ["agent_spend", "agent_swap"], "receiver_id": "vault.intatto.near"}}

What this key can do, enforced by the NEAR protocol:

  • Sign transactions from canary-agent.intatto.near that call agent_spend or agent_swap on vault.intatto.near, and nothing else.
  • Attach no deposit. A function-call key cannot attach NEAR, so it cannot call any vault method that requires 1 yoctoNEAR (every owner method except freeze).
  • Spend gas only from its allowance (0.25 NEAR at setup). Gas for failed calls counts too. When the allowance runs out the key stops working. Because this key is public, anyone can use up the allowance. That costs the canary nothing: the vault's funds are not involved.
  • It cannot transfer the agent account's NEAR, add or delete keys, deploy code, stake, or call any other contract.

What limits the money is not the key but the vault's policy. The vault checks that the caller is the registered agent account and applies the owner's policy to every call, whichever key signed it. canary-agent.intatto.near also has a full-access key, held by the operator (ed25519:3vFARja44DSWWf5PqizuKMoYfxRUJWbBoHmaq7prMPmh). It can do anything with the agent account's own NEAR, but through the vault it is bound by the same policy as the published key. It also means the account cannot lock itself out when the published key's allowance runs out.

Three private keys are published on purpose, all function-call keys: the two canaries', as bait (mainnet, with the permission shown above; testnet, on vault-v1 with a 1 NEAR allowance), and the prompt-injection demo agent's on testnet (agent/README.md), which can call only agent_spend on vault-v2. Every other ed25519: string in the repository is a public key or a transaction signature from recorded mainnet and testnet data in web/src/test/fixtures/.

Bring your own agent

Intatto isn't tied to my agent: any agent that can sign a NEAR transaction can trade through a vault, within the owner's policy. The owner registers the agent's account with set_agent(agent_id, policy); its function-call key may then call only these vault methods:

Method What it does
agent_spend(owner_id, receiver_id, amount) Pays NEAR from the owner's vault to an allowlisted receiver.
agent_swap(owner_id, pool_id, token_in, token_out, amount_in, min_amount_out) Swaps a token through an allowed Rhea (Ref V1) pool, checked against the exchange's own quote.
agent_intent_swap(owner_id, token_in, token_out, amount_in, amount_out) Intents build only (intents.intatto.near): has the MPC network sign a NEAR Intents token_diff for exactly those amounts.
settle_intent_swap(intent_id) Intents build only: credits the owner once intents.near has used the intent's nonce. Anyone may call it.

Create the key on the agent's account (near-cli-rs 0.30.1), scoped to the vault and the methods it needs, with a gas allowance. Signs a mainnet transaction, with the agent account's own key:

near account add-key <agent-account> grant-function-call-access --allowance '1 NEAR' \
  --contract-account-id <vault> --function-names agent_spend,agent_swap \
  autogenerate-new-keypair save-to-legacy-keychain network-config mainnet sign-with-legacy-keychain send

A function-call key cannot attach a deposit, so it cannot call any owner method or withdraw. The allowance only pays gas: an agent_swap sent with 300 TGas, as the smoke test sends it, needs about 0.3 NEAR of allowance when it is signed (NEAR's minimum gas purchase price), and unused gas is refunded to the account.

The contract refuses any agent call that breaks the owner's policy: per_tx_cap and daily_cap (NEAR per payment and in any 24 hours), allowlist, max_spends_per_24h, each token's per_tx_cap and daily_cap in tokens, the pools and their token_ids, max_slippage_bps below the exchange's quote, and on the intents build the pairs and their price floors (min_out per per_in). It also refuses every agent call while the vault is frozen, and any call from an account other than the registered agent. The reference implementation is agent/: a NEAR transaction signer with no dependencies, the prompt-injection demo, and the intent-swap agent.

From an AI assistant (MCP), with a check before every swap

agent/mcp-server.mjs gives Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Codex or any MCP client the vault as four tools: intatto_vault_status, intatto_check_agent_key, intatto_check_swap and intatto_swap. Before every swap it runs a pre-trade check (agent/risk-check.mjs) that returns allow, warn or block with reasons: every refusal the contract would make, plus what the contract does not judge (price impact against a 1% probe of the same pool, a token whose account has a full-access key, a signing key that can do more than call the vault). It blocks bad swaps before they are signed and sends nothing at all until the server runs with INTATTO_ALLOW_TRADES=1. Setup, the check's rules and how to use it from your own agent: INTEGRATE.md.

Unit economics

Measured on testnet, where the gas price is 100,000,000 yoctoNEAR per gas unit, the same as on mainnet when measured on 2026-11-09. Storage costs 10^19 yoctoNEAR (0.00001 NEAR) per byte. NEAR burnt is the sum over the transaction and all its receipts.

Action Paid by Gas NEAR burnt Storage Transaction
First deposit (creates the vault) owner 2.29 Tgas 0.000206 0.00145 NEAR, kept from the deposit; depends on the account id's length (0.00138 for intatto-dev.testnet) H47rARra…, FNBvwqME…
set_agent owner 2.47 Tgas 0.000224 charged to the vault balance; with the lock below, 0.00115 NEAR (canary: 0.99855 → 0.9974) J3HaGqnQ…
lock_withdrawals_until owner 2.51 Tgas 0.000229 see set_agent 7QqKTXzQ…
freeze owner 2.22 Tgas 0.000200 none 25eHak8i…
agent_spend, completed (v0 deployment) agent 5.01 Tgas 0.000434 one spend record, charged to the vault 5WxoD8BF…
agent_spend, rejected (v0 deployment) agent 1.93 Tgas 0.000171 none 5KvqUoMe…
agent_swap, completed (quote, deposit, swap, withdraw) agent 39.33 Tgas 0.003643 one spend record, charged to the vault 5KeUAq3h…
agent_swap, rejected before the quote agent 2.09 Tgas 0.000186 none 2Xe4Etgk…
agent_swap, rejected after the quote (slippage) agent 8.44 Tgas 0.000777 none B8i1pkDT…
Contract deployment (code only) operator 18.96 Tgas 0.001874 255,271 bytes on the account, 2.55 NEAR staked A3KLQkGa…

What this means for the operator: every vault pays for its own storage and every caller pays its own gas, so a new owner or agent costs the operator nothing per call. The operator's fixed cost is the contract's storage stake (2.55 NEAR for this build) plus deployment gas.

Business model

Live on mainnet in vault.intatto.near, and on testnet in vault-v2. The testnet canary's contract (vault-v1) charges no fee. The fee is in src/fees.rs.

A protocol fee of 0.10% (10 basis points) on the output of agent swaps, fixed in the contract code as a compile-time constant, with no method that can change it. In vault-v2's first fee-paying swap, 8CyuVGP6…, 0.1 wNEAR became 0.124142266 USDT; the swap_completed event shows a fee of 0.000124142 USDT (124142266245632723653 of 124142266245632723653642 units, exactly 10 bps rounded down) and the owner credited the rest. On mainnet, the smoke test's swap (JAFaEDBh…) turned 0.5 wNEAR into 1.887287 USDt: a fee of 0.001887 USDt (1887 of 1887287 units) and 1.8854 USDt credited to the owner. The fee is taken from the amount the exchange returns: the owner is credited the output minus the fee, and the fee accrues to a treasury balance kept separate from owner balances. The treasury account can withdraw only accrued fees. Spends, deposits, withdrawals and reclaims carry no fee, and neither does swap output that stays on the exchange because its withdrawal failed. The slippage limit applies to the gross output, so an owner's worst case per swap is the pool's max_slippage_bps plus 10 bps. Because the rate is in the code, anyone can verify it from the code hash (step 2).

Per completed swap, the agent pays about 0.0036 NEAR of gas whatever the size (table above). At 0.10%, the fee equals that gas cost on a swap whose output is worth 3.6 NEAR.

After the hackathon

The mainnet deployment stays live after judging: vault.intatto.near, intents.intatto.near, the canary and the board at intatto.pages.dev.

  • The canary stays funded. Its withdrawal lock ends on 2026-11-20 12:00 UTC; after that the owner's key could withdraw, and the owner does not plan to. Under CANARY.md's rules any decrease is a break whoever signs it, so a withdrawal would show on the board as one.
  • Audit, then permanent code. The contract has not been audited. After an external audit, both upgrade keys are removed (the deployer's full-access key on vault.intatto.near and the full-access key on intents.intatto.near), so no one, the operator included, can change the code again. Until then they are disclosed above and in THREAT_MODEL.md.
  • More venues and pairs. The policy already takes any list of Rhea pools and intent pairs; next are more pairs on both paths, chosen by liquidity.
  • Agents that owners run themselves. Intatto does not run agents, because running one would mean holding its key. The MCP server already lets an owner's own AI assistant trade through the vault (INTEGRATE.md); next is publishing it to npm and a reference agent on the NEAR AI Agent Market (GTM.md).
  • Passkeys end to end. Signing transactions with a passkey, tested and documented, before passkey wallets are recommended for more than small amounts.
  • Fund a vault from any chain. An owner whose money is on another chain sends it to a NEAR Intents 1Click deposit address and receives wNEAR to deposit, with no bridge. Planned, not built; why it waits for its own mainnet test: GTM.md.

The 10 bps fee on agent swaps is the revenue model (Business model): every vault pays for its own storage and every caller its own gas, so each new vault costs the operator nothing per call.

Tracks

  • AI Security & Defense (security), primary. What the track asks for, and where it is here:
    • Spending limits and a policy engine: per-trade and 24-hour caps, a receiver allowlist, pool and pair allowlists, a slippage bound against the exchange's own quote and price floors, all checked by the contract on every agent call (src/policy.rs, What the contract guarantees).
    • A sandboxed wallet: the vault holds the money; the agent can trade from it and never withdraw, and the owner can freeze it in one call or lock withdrawals until a date.
    • Function-call keys: the agent's key can call only the vault's agent methods and cannot attach a deposit (exact limits).
    • Scam and risk checks before signing: the MCP server's pre-trade check returns allow, warn or block for every swap, with reasons: thin or manipulated pools, upgradeable tokens, an unsafe signing key, and every refusal the contract would make (INTEGRATE.md).
    • TEE attestation: the model's trade decisions carry signature receipts from NEAR AI's TEE, recorded with each trade; NEAR AI's Verification Center checks the attestation (AI decisions, verifiable).
    • Adversarial proof: the canary's agent key is public on mainnet and the board shows every attempt and the contract's reason for refusing it; on mainnet, an agent that obeyed a prompt injection telling it to drain its vault was refused every time it tried (Prompt-injection attack). The deployed code is checked live against its reproducible build, and every trust assumption is written down in THREAT_MODEL.md.
  • Unstoppable DeFi (defi). A vault and a trading agent that settles through NEAR Intents, with no custodian of the agent's key: swaps go through Rhea (Ref V1) under on-chain pool, pair, cap and slippage rules, the slippage checked against the exchange's own quote, with a 10 bps protocol fee fixed in the code (live on mainnet). Agent swaps also go through NEAR Intents, signed by the MPC network for the vault's own account and checked against the owner's pair allowlist and price floors (live on mainnet, CHAIN_SIGNATURES.md).
  • Agent Economy (agents). It gives an agent a wallet it can spend from without holding the owner's key, within a budget the owner sets and can freeze at any time.

Built during the hackathon

The hackathon counts code written from the 2026-10-19 announcement onward (the organizers' hackathon FAQ, Q-001; the FAQ is not part of this repository). The first commit, aff5964 on 2026-11-02, is the unmodified cargo near new project template (its author is nearprotocol-ci). Every later commit is this project's own work, from 2026-11-02 onward (git log --format='%h %ad %s' --date=iso). Nothing was written before the window.

  • There is no existing product on another chain (Q-002).
  • This is the author's only NEAR Hackathon submission (Q-015).

Libraries and tools

Contract (Rust, toolchain 1.93.0):

  • near-sdk 5.29.1
  • Build: cargo-near 0.22.0; the reproducible build uses the image sourcescan/cargo-near:0.21.1-rust-1.96.0
  • Tests: near-sandbox 0.3.12, near-api 0.8, cargo-near-build 0.11.0, tokio, testresult
  • Test binaries from testnet: ref-exchange 1.9.19 (Rhea / Ref V1) and wrap.testnet's wNEAR contract (tests/res/README.md)

Web app (TypeScript):

  • Runtime: React 19.3.1, react-router 8.5.1, TanStack Query 5.107.1, zod 4.6.7, near-connect at f2fc970, vendored in web/vendor/near-connect
  • Fonts: Bodoni Moda, Instrument Sans, JetBrains Mono (Fontsource)
  • Build and tests: Vite 8.3.6, TypeScript 6.0.3, Vitest 5.1.0, Playwright 1.65.0, Testing Library, jsdom, fake-indexeddb

Scripts: near-cli-rs 0.30.1, bash, Python 3.

Services: FastNEAR RPC and transactions API, and the NearBlocks API as a fallback indexer.

Repository layout

Path What
src/ The vault contract: lib.rs (deposit, withdraw, views), policy.rs, spend.rs, swap.rs, callbacks.rs, tokens.rs, ledger.rs, lock.rs, storage.rs, events.rs, and the NEAR Intents path in intents.rs and intent_swap.rs; unit tests in tests.rs
tests/ Sandbox tests, the contract binaries they deploy (tests/res/) and the mock MPC signer (tests/contracts/)
agent/ The prompt-injection demo agent, the intent-swap agent, the MCP server (mcp-server.mjs) and the pre-trade check (risk-check.mjs) (Node, no npm packages of their own; the AI receipt check uses web/'s pinned @noble packages)
web/ Owner console and canary board (React, Vite)
scripts/ Testnet smoke tests and canary setup; mainnet deploy, canary, smoke, intents and teardown scripts, dry run by default and resumable (near-cli-rs)
THREAT_MODEL.md Invariants, trust assumptions, what counts as a canary break
CANARY.md The public canaries, mainnet and testnet: accounts, keys, baselines, how to try
CHAIN_SIGNATURES.md The NEAR Intents path: calls, the mainnet run, its transactions
INTEGRATE.md Putting an agent on a vault: the MCP server, the pre-trade check, or any signer
GTM.md Go-to-market: first users, distribution, pricing, launch sequence, metrics

Status and known gaps

  • The contract has not been audited.
  • On mainnet, vault.intatto.near runs the reproducible build of commit 6cfa90e (code hash 3z1W5SfhYy2XoDCpbE1uDNFjnPdEbcX7nPov8jLac97J, sha256 2c520bfc1173c903cede94259a9f0884927a97983aeef5cc55202537e8d218f5), built in CI by the Reproducible build workflow in run 43022039828; scripts/mainnet-deploy.sh deploys nothing else. intents.intatto.near runs the reproducible build of commit fc23fbc (HRkrMN8o…, run 43063218549).
  • The deployer keeps a full-access key on both vault accounts on purpose, so that a bug in the unaudited code can be fixed and no owner's funds are ever stuck (why). That key can replace the code. For the canary's vault, the board's integrity check shows any change within 10 seconds (CANARY.md). Both keys are removed after an external audit (After the hackathon).
  • The NEAR Intents path has settled two swaps on mainnet, the second decided by NEAR AI (2026-11-13). Its limits and trust assumptions (the MPC network, intents.near governance) are in THREAT_MODEL.md.
  • vault-v2 runs a non-reproducible build of the fee code (code hash above), so its code cannot be checked against source; vault-v1 and both mainnet vaults use reproducible builds.
  • Passkey sign-in (mainnet only), experimental: sign-in verified on a phone (2026-11-12); signing transactions with a passkey not yet tested. Unaudited Trezu wallet contract, upgradeable by Trezu; use small amounts only.
  • The mainnet deployment stays live after the hackathon. scripts/mainnet-teardown.sh remains in the repository as the operator's way to wind it down safely if ever needed.
  • The web app is hosted at intatto.pages.dev (mainnet by default; testnet through the network switch).

License

MIT.

Footnotes

  1. The Block: https://www.theblock.co/post/318074/banana-gun-exploit-refund ↩

About

Intatto is a NEAR vault that gives an AI agent its own trading account, live on mainnet: the agent can trade through Rhea and NEAR Intents within limits the contract enforces, but it can never withdraw. To prove it, I published the agent’s key with a real NEAR bounty on it.

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