| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 3.x | Yes |
| < 3.0 | No |
We take security seriously. If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly.
- Email: security@wyatt.au (PGP key available upon request)
- GitHub Security: Use GitHub Security Advisories
- Encryption: Please encrypt your report using the PGP key below
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- Suggested fix (if any)
- Your name/handle for credit (optional)
| Severity | Initial Response | Patch Release |
|---|---|---|
| Critical (RCE, auth bypass) | 24 hours | 72 hours |
| High (data exposure, privilege escalation) | 48 hours | 7 days |
| Medium (CSRF, XSS, information disclosure) | 72 hours | 14 days |
| Low (best practices, minor issues) | 1 week | Next release |
We follow responsible disclosure practices:
- Acknowledge receipt within 24 hours
- Communicate timeline and progress
- Credit researchers (unless anonymity requested)
- Request CVE assignment for critical issues
- Publish advisory after patch is available
No active advisories in the dependency tree as of 2026-07-14. The cargo-deny configuration in deny.toml is clean with no ignore entries.
| Decision | Rationale | ADR |
|---|---|---|
| Bcrypt cost factor 12 | ~250ms, resists GPU brute-force | ADR-001 |
| HMAC-SHA256 for HTTP sigs | Industry standard, FIPS-approved | ADR-002 |
| age for E2E encryption | Modern, audited, passphrase-based | ADR-003 |
| Federation requires signatures | Prevents spoofed activities | ADR-004 |
| SQLite WAL mode | Concurrent reads, crash recovery | ADR-005 |
- Simple auth: HTTP Basic authentication, bcrypt-hashed passwords (cost 12)
- OIDC: Enterprise SSO via OpenID Connect
- Authorization: Cedar policy engine
- Rate limiting: Token bucket, per-IP (not per-route)
- HTTP Signatures (draft-cavage-http-signatures-12)
- HMAC-SHA256 verification
- Actor keyId validation (must match activity actor)
- Empty federation secret = disabled (503)
- TLS 1.3 for all transport (rustls)
- age-based E2E file encryption (X25519, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- Bcrypt password hashing (cost factor 12)
- Constant-time string comparison for secrets
- Path traversal prevention (normalized paths,
..rejection) - Content-Type validation on uploads
- Request body size limits (configurable)
- XML entity expansion prevention in WebDAV
- Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS)
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- X-Frame-Options: DENY
- Content-Security-Policy (configurable)
- X-Request-ID for audit trail
- WebDAV endpoints (PROPFIND, PUT, GET, DELETE, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE)
- REST API endpoints (/api/*)
- CalDAV/CardDAV endpoints
- GraphQL endpoint
- WebSocket endpoint
- Federation inbox
- Denial of service (rate limiting is in place)
- Social engineering
- Physical access to infrastructure
- Third-party dependencies (see Known Vulnerabilities)
# Start test server with simple auth
ferro-server --admin-user admin --admin-password TestPass123!
# Admin credentials (HTTP Basic auth)
BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080
AUTH=admin:TestPass123!
# Create test user via admin API
curl -X POST $BASE_URL/api/admin/users \
-u "$AUTH" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"testuser","password":"TestPass123!","role":"user"}'# No auth header -- should return 401
curl -v $BASE_URL/api/files/
# Invalid credentials -- should return 401
curl -u "admin:wrongpassword" $BASE_URL/api/files/
# SQL injection in credentials
curl -u "' OR 1=1 --:password" $BASE_URL/api/files/# Try to escape root directory
curl -X PUT $BASE_URL/../../../etc/passwd \
-u "$AUTH" \
-d "test"
# URL-encoded traversal
curl -X PUT '%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd' \
-u "$AUTH" \
-d "test"
# Double encoding
curl -X PUT '%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd' \
-u "$AUTH" \
-d "test"# Entity expansion (billion laughs)
curl -X PROPFIND $BASE_URL/ \
-u "$AUTH" \
-H "Depth: 1" \
-H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
-d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ENTITY xxe "test">
<!ENTITY xxe2 "&xxe;&xxe;&xxe;&xxe;">
]>
<D:propfind xmlns:D="DAV:"><D:prop><D:all/></D:prop></D:propfind>'# Try to deliver activity without valid signature
curl -X POST $BASE_URL/federation/inbox \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"type":"Follow","actor":"https://evil.com/user"}'
# Try with wrong keyId
curl -X POST $BASE_URL/federation/inbox \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Signature: keyId=\"https://evil.com/keys/1\",headers=\"(request-target)\",signature=\"fake\"" \
-d '{"type":"Follow","actor":"https://evil.com/user"}'# Calendar query with malicious filter
curl -X REPORT $BASE_URL/dav/cal/default/ \
-u "$AUTH" \
-H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
-d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
<C:calendar-query xmlns:C="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:caldav">
<C:filter><C:comp-filter name="VCALENDAR">
<C:prop-filter name="VEVENT">
<C:time-range start="00000000T000000Z" end="99991231T235959Z"/>
</C:prop-filter>
</C:comp-filter></C:filter>
</C:calendar-query>'# Introspection (should be limited)
curl -X POST $BASE_URL/graphql \
-u "$AUTH" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ __schema { types { name } } }"}'
# Deep nesting (DoS attempt)
curl -X POST $BASE_URL/graphql \
-u "$AUTH" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ files { files { files { files { files { name } } } } } }"}'# Connect without auth
wscat -c ws://localhost:8080/api/ws
# Connect with invalid token
wscat -c "ws://localhost:8080/api/ws?token=invalid"# Burst requests
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" $BASE_URL/api/files/
done | sort | uniq -c## Vulnerability Report
**Title**: [Brief description]
**Severity**: Critical/High/Medium/Low
**Component**: [Which endpoint/module]
**Environment**: [OS, Rust version, Ferro version]
### Description
[Detailed description of the vulnerability]
### Steps to Reproduce
1. [Step 1]
2. [Step 2]
3. [Step 3]
### Expected Behavior
[What should happen]
### Actual Behavior
[What actually happens]
### Impact
[What an attacker could do]
### Suggested Fix
[Optional: how to fix it]- Weekly:
cargo audit(automated in CI) - Monthly: manual review of new dependencies
- On release: full dependency tree review
- No dependencies with known critical CVEs
- Dependencies must have a maintainer
- No dependencies with < 1.0.0 version (unless necessary)
- Minimize dependency tree depth
- Prefer pure-Rust implementations over C bindings
Run cargo tree --depth 1 for current count.
| Surface | Vector | Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| WASM Worker Upload | Malicious WASM bytecode | Denial of service (CPU/memory exhaustion) | Fuel limit (1B), memory cap (64MB), timeout (30s), sandboxed wasmtime runtime |
| WASM Worker Execution | Side-channel via WASM | Information leakage | Linear memory isolation, no shared memory, no network access in sandbox |
| Federation Inbox | Spoofed activities | Impersonation, spam | HTTP Signatures (HMAC-SHA256), actor keyId validation, federation_secret required |
| Federation Webfinger | Actor enumeration | Information disclosure | Public endpoint, only exposes actor URL (no private data) |
| OIDC Token Refresh | Stolen refresh token | Token replay | Token rotation on refresh, short-lived access tokens, provider-side revocation |
| LDAP Auth | LDAP injection | Auth bypass | Parameterized queries via ldap3 crate, group DN validation |
| Share Links | Token brute force | Unauthorized file access | UUID v4 tokens (122-bit entropy), per-token lockout (10 fails / 5 min), expiration |
| Content-Type Spoofing | Malicious file upload | XSS via HTML upload | Magic bytes verification, Content-Type mismatch logging, nosniff header |
| Audit Log Tampering | SQLite DB modification | Cover tracks | Chain hash verification (GET /api/admin/audit-chain), append-only design |
- Sandboxing: Wasmtime runtime with WASI capabilities disabled
- Resource limits: Fuel-based execution metering (1 billion units), 64MB memory cap, 30s timeout
- Upload validation:
.wasmextension required, WASM magic bytes verification, filename sanitization - Network isolation: Workers cannot make outbound network requests
- Filesystem isolation: Workers receive file content as input, cannot access storage directly
- Inbound: HTTP Signatures required on all POST to
/fed/inbox, actor keyId validated against activity actor - Outbound: Activities signed with server's federation_secret via HMAC-SHA256
- Discovery: Webfinger and NodeInfo are public read-only endpoints
- Rate limiting: Subject to global rate limiter
- Disable mechanism: Empty federation_secret = federation endpoints return 503