| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x (latest rc) | ✅ |
| < 0.1.0 | ❌ |
Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email office@bulldog-adv.com with:
- A description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce or a proof-of-concept
- The potential impact as you see it
We will acknowledge receipt within 2 business days and aim to ship a fix or mitigation within 14 days for critical issues. We'll keep you updated as we work through it.
Employee001 runs entirely on your local machine and binds to 127.0.0.1 by default. The primary attack surfaces are:
- The shared-secret token — used to gate LAN-exposed installs (
EMPLOYEE001_TOKENin.env). Weak or leaked tokens let anyone on the same network impersonate the CEO. - The Anthropic and Composio API keys stored in
.env— exposure gives an attacker access to your LLM quota and connected tools. - The
data/directory — contains employee profiles, audit logs, and org knowledge in plaintext. Protect it with filesystem permissions (chmod 700 data/). - Prompt injection via employee profiles or org-brain documents — a malicious document could attempt to steer twin behavior.
- Issues that require physical access to the machine running Employee001
- Social engineering
- Vulnerabilities in Anthropic's or Composio's infrastructure (report those to them directly)
Once a fix is released, we will publish a brief advisory in CHANGELOG.md describing the vulnerability, its impact, and the fix — without disclosing details that would help attackers exploit unpatched installs before they upgrade.
We follow responsible disclosure and will credit reporters who want to be named.