🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in transcribeAudio tool

[adihex]

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Command injection vulnerability in the binaryAvailable function inside apps/zettel/src/tools/transcribe.ts. The variable bin (which is sourced from the WHISPER_BIN environment variable) was interpolated into a shell command sh -c command -v ${bin} without sanitization.
🎯 Impact: If the environment variable contained shell metacharacters (e.g. whisper-cli; rm -rf /), it would be executed by the shell, leading to arbitrary command execution on the host machine.
🔧 Fix: Replaced the shell execution sh -c command -v with the safe argument array format using the which utility: execFileSync("which", [bin], { stdio: "ignore" }). This directly invokes which without invoking a shell parser, effectively eliminating the command injection vulnerability.
✅ Verification: Ran pnpm test in the apps/zettel directory, and reviewed the change.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 11319838458880066128 started by @adihex

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