Please report security issues privately through GitHub Security Advisories rather than opening a public issue. You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days.
These are design characteristics of the current version, not undiscovered bugs. They are listed here so anyone deploying this knows what they are getting.
A player is identified only by a UUID that the browser generates and stores in
localStorage. The API accepts that UUID at face value. Concretely:
- Anyone who knows a player's UUID can read that player's guesses, hints and game status, and can submit guesses as them.
- Any UUID sent to the API creates a user row on first use, so an unauthenticated
caller can grow the
userstable. Rate limiting is the only thing bounding it.
This is acceptable for an anonymous daily puzzle with no accounts, no personal data and nothing to steal. It would not be acceptable if accounts, profiles or leaderboards were added. Signed anonymous sessions are on the roadmap for that reason.
RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED=true (the default) needs a reachable Redis. Setting it to
false disables limiting entirely, which is fine locally and unsafe in public.
Requests are bucketed by the IP uvicorn reports. The app does not read
X-Forwarded-For itself, because a client can set it freely. If you deploy
behind a proxy, set FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS to that proxy's address so uvicorn
resolves the real client address — otherwise every visitor shares one bucket.
Never set it to *. See docs/configuration.md.
Word selection currently assigns a word to each date at seed time, so whoever holds the seed file knows future answers. The seed file is therefore not in this repository. Decoupling selection from dates (so the answer is drawn at play time and nobody can know it in advance) is the first roadmap item. See docs/word-pool.md.