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NEAR: qualify client request origin and gateway signing-hash authority #77

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Description

@amiller

A valid NEAR model signature currently binds the reply to a declared request hash. It does not independently prove the client authored the actual model input when a trusted gateway can override that hash. This affects text-carried local tools as well as native tools.

Source-qualified observation at inference-proxy efd600a46c4327c8d8d038ab8b01c25a0e74b5bd:

  • RequireAuth accepts configured service tokens first and returns cloud_api_key: None; ordinary validated cloud keys return Some. Token rotation supports multiple configured tokens.
  • resolve_request_hash_for_signing accepts an arbitrary valid 32-byte X-Request-Hash on the trusted-token path, even if it differs from the received body.
  • Encryption to the public model key does not authenticate the sender. A privileged intermediary could substitute encrypted input while retaining the original declared hash and client response key.

This is a conditional source-level integrity dependency, not a demonstrated deployed exploit. No service token was obtained or used. PR #75 contains a synthetic signature-level regression and successful bounded native encryption checks; private-work enablement remains off. Parent #73; research amiller/awesome-private-inference#23.

Acceptance for this sprint:

  • Trace gateway forwarding and service-token provisioning/custody to reviewed deployment evidence, including rotation and who can obtain the token. Do not assume public proxy source equals deployed code.
  • Choose and document the claim: enclave-enforced client request origin, or explicitly qualified gateway code/credential custody in the integrity TCB.
  • For client-origin enforcement, verify a client-authorized envelope inside the model enclave before inference; bind exact bytes, recipient/model identity, response key and protocol version. Define freshness/replay handling. Signing a hash accepted from a gateway is insufficient.
  • Demonstrate refusal of changed content, tool schema/choice/history, swapped response key or recipient, wrong signer and replay under the chosen protocol. Model-signature reply tests alone cannot meet this criterion.
  • Verify the compose-manager quote, fresh nonce/report-data binding and canonical action-log digest. PR Qualify NEAR native encrypted tools and deployment evidence #75 includes genuine/modified-quote checks and seven offline tests.
  • Connect authenticated action/configuration history to actual running inner serving images and model artifacts. A recorded compose action can precede success; history is not active-state proof.
  • Obtain independent review and the applicable offline gate before integrating any runtime change. Keep native private-work enablement gated; do not merge or change policy merely because synthetic encryption works.

Offline/source work requires no further paid model calls. The existing six-POST qualification ledger remains intact; estimate $0.00022808 within the approved $0.25 cap. A provider-side protocol change is a dependency if gateway-independent request origin is the selected claim.

Activity

  1. amiller commented on Oct 14, 2026

    @amiller
    OwnerAuthor

    Source tracing confirms the configured-token auth branch and ordinary cloud-key exclusion. Offline inspection also found an evidence limitation: PR #75 writes parsed/reformatted attestation JSON, whereas upstream preserves the exact actions value as RawValue for its digest. Existing saved manager nonce matches model and gateway nonces; a prior local summary compared the wrong field and is corrected. No manager quote/actions binding is claimed. Future collection must preserve original response bytes. Documentation checks: 172 links/fragments and whitespace passed. No additional paid calls, integration or policy changes.

  2. amiller commented on Oct 14, 2026

    @amiller
    OwnerAuthor

    Completed the manager quote/nonce/action-digest check in a595caa (PR #75). Fresh manager TCB UpToDate, 186 authenticated actions, matching model MRTD/RTMR0–3; modified quote refused. Recorded compose file matches the public commit/hash. Correction to my earlier comment: current manager hashes a defined canonical sorted-key JSON encoding, so reformatting alone does not prevent verification. Exact responses are retained for review/legacy variants. Active-state/source/model-artifact closure remains open because actions can be recorded before successful deployment. Public gateway source forwards X-Request-Hash with its configured INFERENCE_API_KEY; deployed token custody is still unverified. No chat POSTs or policy changes. Research PR #24 and DevProof PR #5 updated.

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