The defaults are designed so a fresh install isn't trivially compromised, but production deployment requires a few extra steps. Read this whole file before exposing the BBS to the internet.
- Random initial admin password. First start generates a 16-byte
URL-safe token, hashes it for the
adminuser, writes it plaintext todata/admin_password.txt(created mode0600). The startup log only says the account was created and names that file; the password is never written to any log. No moreadmin/admin123. Change it on first login. - CSRF on all WTForms POSTs. Every
FlaskForm-backed route gets a CSRF token automatically. AJAX endpoints (/api/vote,/imsg/*) read the token from a<meta name="csrf-token">tag injected into every page. - Open-redirect guard on
/auth/login. The?next=parameter is rejected unless it's a same-origin path (urlparse().netloc == '', not protocol-relative, not Windows-path-tricks). - Rate limits (sliding window, in-memory):
/auth/login— sysop-configurable via Admin → IP Bans (default 10 attempts / 5 min / IP); exceeding it auto-bans the source IP for a sysop-configurable duration (default 1 hour, 0 = permanent)- Telnet/SSH/rlogin/PETSCII login — the same IP-ban list and
auto-ban threshold above apply here too, not just the web login.
Found missing entirely in a full auth-security audit; every
terminal transport shares one
UserManager.authenticate()call, so this closes it for all of them in one place, including SSH (whose ownvalidate_password()always accepts by design, to capture the password for the "client sent credentials with the connection" convenience flow — it was never a real auth boundary on its own). - FTP login — same models, its own
ftp_login:<ip>bucket. Found missing in the same audit's follow-up pass over the FTP server; the FTP login path also only checkedUser.is_active, neveris_locked/is_verified(unlike every other login surface) — a locked-out or not-yet-approved account could still fully authenticate over FTP. Both fixed. - SSH public-key login attempts — same IP-ban/auto-ban check as every other login path above, applied before a candidate key is even evaluated against the database.
/auth/forgotand/auth/forgot/verify(10 / 5 min / IP each) — the security-question recovery flow. Also found and fixed in the same audit: a wrong guess no longer lets the same question be retried indefinitely (capped at 5 attempts per recovery session), and the flow no longer reveals whether an account exists via its redirect target — every submission lands on the same verify page, with a random, unanswerable decoy question for an account that doesn't exist (or has no security questions on file)./imsg/send— 30 messages / hour / user/api/vote— 60 votes / min / user
/auth/registerrate limit (3 attempts / hour / IP) — unlike the in-memory limits above, this one is backed by a DB table (RegistrationAttempt), not the sharedrate_limitdecorator. It persists across restarts — the in-memory-only caveat under Known limitations below does not apply to registration.X-Forwarded-Foris untrusted by default. IP bans, country blocking, and every rate limiter above key off the realrequest.remote_addr, not a client-supplied header — found in a full auth-security audit that the header was previously trusted unconditionally, letting a direct connection spoof it to dodge a ban or (worse) make the login auto-ban land on an arbitrary victim IP instead of the attacker's own. If you run behind your own reverse proxy (e.g. the nginx configinstall.shsets up), setTRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=truein.envso the real visitor IP is used instead of the proxy's own loopback address — only enable this if Flask is never directly reachable from the internet, since it tells the app to trust whatever the nearest hop claims.- Path traversal mitigated — uploads stored under UUID filenames; the
downloadroute usessend_from_directoryagainst the configured uploads dir. - Per-area file upload permission — each
FileAreacarries aupload_permissionofusers/sysop/none. The upload route enforces it before writing. The FTP server now enforces the same permission onDELE/RNFR/RNTO/MKD/RMDtoo, not justSTOR— found in a full FTP-server audit that regular FTP users had a flat read/write grant over their whole session, letting them delete/rename inside areas they had no upload permission to. - FTP uploads are virus-scanned too, matching every web upload route — found in the same audit that this was the one upload path that skipped it entirely.
- QWK node public-form path traversal closed. The public,
unauthenticated network-join application form's
qwk_packet_idfield used to accept any 8-character string with no charset check, and that value flows straight into the FTP server's per-node home directory path once a sysop approves the request —"../../.."would have escapeddata/qwk-hub/outward with full read/write/delete permission. Now regex-validated at both the public form and the approval handler (defense in depth). - Message-board access control now enforced on writes and interactions,
not just reads. A full audit found
reply_post()had no board-access check at all (any authenticated user could reply into a restricted board's thread by guessing a post_id), and the same missing-check pattern onsubscribe(),react(), saved-message bookmarking, the/api/voteendpoints,@mentionnotifications, and/sitemap.xml. Terminal (telnet/SSH/rlogin/PETSCII) board posting also checked neither the board's configured posting level nor a moderator-locked thread at all. All now consistently gated the same way the read paths already were. - SECRET_KEY guard. If
SECRET_KEYis the dev default and the app is started in production mode (FLASK_ENV=productionorconfig_name='production'), it raisesRuntimeErrorand refuses to boot. In development it just logs a loud warning. - Session cookie
HttpOnly+SameSite=Laxby default.Secure(cookie only sent over HTTPS) is not set automatically by production mode — it defaults to off everywhere, HTTP-only installs included, and only turns on when you explicitly setSESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=truein.env(see "What you MUST do for production" below). Deploying behind HTTPS without setting this leaves the session cookie sendable over a plain HTTP connection too. - Optional virus scan on uploads if
clamav-daemonis installed — infected files are deleted before the DB row is created. - Anonymous visitors default to access_level 0. Found and fixed in a
full auth-security audit: the shared
evaluate_access()gate (boards, echomail areas, QWK, RSS, file areas — everything with a configurablemin_access_level) fell through to level 10 ("registered") for a logged-out visitor instead of 0, silently granting anonymous access to anything gated at the standard "registered users only" level. - Admin
lock_user()now refuses to lock the acting admin's own account, matching the self-lock guardedit_user()/delete_user()/toggle_ban()already had — found missing specifically fromlock_user()in a security audit; an admin could otherwise lock themselves out with no separate account to undo it from. - Door-game session ownership is now checked, not just presence. An IDOR found in a security audit let a user interact with another user's in-progress door-game session by guessing/supplying its id — every session-scoped action now confirms the session actually belongs to the requesting user first.
- Private netmail no longer leaks via the public echomail RSS feed.
/feed/echomail.xmlused to apply only an area's ordinarymin_access_levelcheck, which a NETMAIL-tagged area (QWK-routed 1-on-1 private mail, not broadcast echomail) typically leaves permissive — any visitor meeting that level could read any user's private netmail subject/body/sender. NETMAIL-tagged areas are now excluded from that feed entirely. See16-rss-reader.mdfor the full writeup of ANetBBS's outbound feeds. - Terminal-output escape-sequence sanitization, closed across ~8 surfaces in one audit pass. User-supplied text that ends up echoed into another user's or the sysop's terminal — oneliners, MRC chat identity fields, wall posts, echomail/netmail sender fields shown in the terminal UI, the RSS reader and ebook reader's CP437 rendering, ZMODEM upload filenames, PETSCII fields, and IRC nick/channel fields — is now stripped of raw ANSI/terminal control sequences before display, closing a recurring terminal-escape-injection bug class found independently in each of those surfaces (a malicious sender field could otherwise rewrite another user's screen, hide/spoof text, or manipulate their terminal's title/clipboard depending on the client). A CRLF-based real IRC command-injection variant of the same bug class was also closed in the MRC↔IRC bridge specifically (a crafted MRC-side message could otherwise inject a second raw IRC command via an embedded CRLF).
- Inbound rlogin handshake is now bounded. The rlogin listener used to read the handshake's variable-length fields with no upper bound — a connection that never sent the expected terminator could hold a slot indefinitely, an unauthenticated denial-of-service. Now capped at a sane maximum with a hard timeout.
- Multinode chat's per-node message queue is now bounded. Found in the same audit pass: a node that stopped reading its own chat output (a stalled/hung client) let its queue grow without bound, an in-process memory-exhaustion path. Now capped, with the oldest buffered lines dropped once a node falls behind rather than the queue growing forever.
- BinkP echo-area subscriptions are isolated per downstream node, as doc 6 — Echomail already describes — a cross-tenant leak found in a security audit let one hub-hosted node's AreaFix subscription change affect another node's subscriptions under some conditions. Fixed to match the per-node isolation the feature was always meant to have.
- BinkP inbound file receiving is now bounded per session, not just per file. A single anonymous, unauthenticated peer connection could previously offer an unlimited number of files each just under the existing per-file size cap, accumulating without any overall limit for that session — an in-process memory-exhaustion path reachable with zero authentication (an unrecognized peer is accepted as ordinary anonymous crash-mail, per real FTN convention, before this point is ever reached). Now capped by total session bytes as well.
- FREQ (file request) rate-limiting is now keyed on the real connecting IP, not a self-reported address field an anonymous peer controls — closing a gap where the per-IP throttle could be trivially bypassed by claiming a different address on every connection. FREQ request parsing is also now bounded by request-line count, matching every other peer-suppliable command parser in this codebase.
- QWK network packet downloads are now size-capped, matching the cap BinkP's own inbound file receiving already had — an admin- configured QWK hub's response at poll time is still remote, foreign data, and was previously buffered fully into memory with no limit.
- Disconnecting a door-game session now works correctly even when it's running in a different ANetBBS process than the one you're viewing it from. ANetBBS runs web, telnet, and SSH as separate systemd services, each tracking its own live sessions in memory; every admin surface that lists sessions to disconnect reads the shared database instead, so a sysop routinely disconnects a session actually owned by a different process. This used to silently fail to kill the real subprocess while still marking the session finished and freeing its node number for immediate reuse by a new session — found and fixed in a security/performance audit; disconnecting now signals the real process directly regardless of which service owns it.
- Door-game per-node working-directory paths are now sanitized against the same class of path-traversal issue found and fixed in ANetCraft's own save-path handling — a sysop-templated per-node path could otherwise be walked outside its intended directory via unsanitized characters in a player's display name.
- A background network-health thread now has the same start/stop guard every sibling background thread in that package already had — found missing from one specific module in a security/performance audit; without it, re-initializing the app in one process could spawn an extra, un-stoppable daemon thread with no way to tell the duplicates apart.
- Background polling loops (MRC bridge, SYSTAT responder) are now protected against a misconfigured near-zero interval turning them into a busy loop that hammers an upstream service, and a real N+1 query pattern in the SYSTAT responder (reachable by any unauthenticated UDP peer) was closed so its per-request cost no longer scales with the number of online users.
- A maintenance tool no longer prints a live door password to its own
output, and a user-migration tool's report file (which intentionally
contains plaintext temporary passwords, by design, for the sysop to
relay to migrated users) is now created already-locked-down rather
than world-readable at birth — both found in a security/performance
audit.
install.sh/update.shalso close a race window where the generated sudoers fragment briefly sat world-readable before its final permission lockdown, the same class of gap already fixed elsewhere in those same scripts for.envand the database file. - Several unguarded, sysop- or peer-suppliable URL fields rendered as
clickable links have been hardened against
javascript:-URI and script-injection payloads across the profile, RSS, peer-directory, ANSI/postcard editor, and IRC web-client pages — found in a security audit; one of these was reachable by any registered user against a reviewing sysop's own browser session. Fixed at render time with the same scheme-allowlist pattern already used elsewhere in the codebase. - A revoked account's already-open web session now loses access immediately, matching the existing behavior for a banned or locked account — previously only checked at the moment of login.
- Two data-integrity/performance gaps found in a security/performance audit were closed: a missing foreign-key constraint on one message-tracking column, and missing database indexes on two columns queried on every leaderboard view and door-game launch attempt, with an automatic backfill for existing installs.
- Dependency vulnerability scanning now covers every requirements file this project ships, not just the runtime one — closing a gap where the Docker-image and developer-tooling dependency sets were unaudited by CI.
- The MRC web chat client now caps the size of an inbound message it will parse, matching the same cap already applied server-side to the BinkP network listener — the browser-side half of the same unbounded-network-buffer class this project's audits have repeatedly closed elsewhere.
- The web app now sends standard hardening response headers on every
page —
Content-Security-Policy,X-Frame-Options,X-Content-Type-Options,Referrer-Policy, andPermissions-Policy— found missing entirely in a security/performance audit. The public "Watch It Live" embed page (/watch) is deliberately exempted from the framing restriction, since its whole purpose is to be embeddable off-site.Strict-Transport-Securityis sent only when a request actually arrives over HTTPS, so it never locks out an install that hasn't set up TLS yet. The CSP currently allows inline scripts/styles ('unsafe-inline') rather than fully blocking them — a real sweep found this in wide, legitimate use across the template tree, and migrating every one of those to a nonce scheme is a much larger, separate undertaking. Even with that allowance, the policy still blocks a future XSS payload from pulling in a remote script or exfiltrating to an unexpected origin, and restricts framing/object embedding — real defense-in-depth over having no CSP at all, with room to tighten further in a future round. - A few more real database/query gaps found in a systematic FK/index audit were closed: one more missing index on a column filtered on a routine per-user page view, plus an eager-loading fix for a file gallery listing that was issuing one extra query per row instead of a single joined query.
- Response compression and static-asset cache headers were added
where they were missing — nginx-level gzip for the reference deploy
template, and a Flask-level
Cache-Controlfallback for installs running the app's own static file serving directly. - The new native
umrc-clientsupport on the MRC bridge (mrc_tcp_enabledinmrc/bridge/config.json, seedocs/27-mrc-chat.md) is off by default, and its listener (mrc_tcp_listen_host) defaults to127.0.0.1— loopback-only, same posture as the bridge's own WebSocket listener — even when enabled. It accepts a raw TCP connection from any process able to reach that port; the connecting client isn't authenticated against a BBS account (MRC's own network-level/identify/Trust is the real authority, matching the existing web/terminal MRC clients' trust model exactly). A security review of this new listener found and fixed one real gap — the newline-delimited packet read loop had no cap on buffered bytes while waiting for a line terminator, an unbounded-buffer DoS shape this project has closed in several other network listeners over past audits — now capped (MRC_TCP_MAX_LINE_BYTES). Only setmrc_tcp_listen_hostto0.0.0.0if you deliberately wantumrc-clientreachable from outside this box (a LAN or the internet); the firewall guidance indocs/PORTS.mdcovers opening port 5010 for that case. - Built-in docs browser (
/docs/) can now be fully gated, not just publicly readable.DOCS_PUBLIC_ENABLED(defaulttrue, unchanged existing behavior) controls whetheranetbbs/web/docs.py— which had no access control at all — is reachable by a logged-out visitor; set itfalseto require an admin account for every page under/docs/(and/tutorial). Editable at Admin → Settings. - Who's Online IP display now has a real off switch.
show_ipon/whowas already admin-only (never shown to an ordinary logged-in user), but there was no config flag to disable it even for admins.WHOS_ONLINE_SHOW_IP(defaulttrue, unchanged existing behavior) lets a privacy-conscious sysop turn it off entirely. Editable at Admin → Settings.
- Set
SECRET_KEY. Generate once, set in your systemd unit'sEnvironment=orEnvironmentFile=:python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))' - Change the admin password from the random one — and
rm data/admin_password.txtonce you've memorized / vaulted it. - Front the web app with TLS. nginx + Let's Encrypt is the easy
path. The
deploy/anetbbs-nginx.conf.templateis a starting point. Without a TLS terminator, every login posts plaintext over HTTP. - Set
FLASK_ENV=productionso the prod config kicks in (stricter SECRET_KEY check). Separately, also setSESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=truein.envonce you're behind HTTPS — production mode does not turn this on for you. - Pick one privileged-port option for MSP/SYSTAT (see
docs/INSTALL.md§6). Leaving the default ports unbound silently degrades inter-BBS messaging — peers will getconnection refused. - Run as a non-root user (the systemd templates already do —
User=anetbbs). UsesetcaporAmbientCapabilitiesfor the privileged ports rather than running the whole process as root. - Back up
data/— that's where the SQLite DB, uploads, configuration, and admin-password-on-first-install all live.
- Rate limiter is in-memory and resets on restart. ANetBBS's web
app runs as a single eventlet process (
deploy/serve.py—socketio.run(), not gunicorn or any multi-worker WSGI server; seedocs/00-overview.md), so there's noN × workersbypass to worry about. The real caveat: every process restart (deploy, crash,systemctl restart anetbbs-web) zeroes all counters, and if you ever ran more than one instance behind a load balancer — not a supported or documented topology today — each instance would keep its own independent counters. For durability across restarts, replace with a Redis- or DB-backed store (therate_limitdecorator is the only call site to change). This does not affect/auth/register, which is already DB-backed and correctly shared across restarts (see above). - No 2FA. Single password for both web and terminal logins.
- The site-wide Content-Security-Policy allows inline scripts and
styles (
'unsafe-inline') rather than fully blocking them, since a real sweep found both in wide, legitimate use across the template tree. Migrating to a nonce-based CSP that blocks inline script/style entirely is real future work, not done in this pass. - No per-account lockout — the auto-ban above works on the source IP, not the targeted username, so a distributed brute-force attempt from many IPs against one account isn't slowed by this mechanism.
- Uploads are not sandboxed beyond ClamAV if you have it installed. Don't run the BBS on a host where executable uploads matter.
- Synchronet
.jsdoors without realjsexecget a Node.js shim that is best-effort — a malicious door script can do anything Node.js can. Same trust model as any door game: only install ones you trust.
Security reports: please email the sysop privately rather than open a public issue.