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fix(shard-engine,container): bracket two control channels with the wire codec - #623
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The region read-replica control channel touched the wire codec in neither
direction, while both of its response bodies carry documents that came back out
of `decodeDocJson` — so a `v.bigint()` column is a real `bigint` there and
`v.bytes()` a real `ArrayBuffer`.
The bigint case is the severe one. `Response.json` throws
`TypeError: Do not know how to serialize a BigInt`, the owner answers a bare
non-2xx, and `request()` maps that to `undefined` — which `catchUp` reads as
"owner unreachable" and returns `unavailable` for WITHOUT latching `divergent`.
Every later read re-issues the identical doomed round trip for the life of the
DO. That is exactly the failure `servePull`'s own docblock says it moved the
floor check earlier to avoid; bootstrap has the same shape, so the replica never
holds a row either. For bytes and `Date` there is no throw: `{}` and an ISO
string are applied through `applyCdcChange`, so the replica's copy either fails
validation or stores the wrong type — silent divergence.
Bracket it the way the sibling admin plane already is (`adminResponse` in
`shard-do.ts`): `encodeWire` every control-channel body, `decodeWire` in
`ShardReplica.pull` / `bootstrap`. Both codecs are the identity on a pure-JSON
body, so a shard with no exotic column is byte-identical on the wire.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ
`createContainerBridge` speaks the same `/_lunora/rpc` protocol as
`LunoraClient` and `createShardClient`, but ran the wire codec in neither
direction — the third instance of this shape found in this sweep.
Outbound, `JSON.stringify({ args, … })` threw outright on a `bigint` argument
and handed the handler an ISO string for a `Date` and `{}` for an
`ArrayBuffer`, while the shard decodes every inbound arg
(`decodeWire(payload.args)` in `shard-do.ts`). Inbound, the bare
`body.result` read left a `v.bigint()` or `v.bytes()` column sitting in the
container as a raw `["$lunora.wire$", …]` tag, because the shard answers
`encodeWire(result)`.
Bracket both halves, the same one-line contract `shard-client.ts` states — and
the one the module docblock already promises a non-JS container can implement
directly. Identity for pure JSON, so an ordinary call is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ
`replicaResponse` was inserted between the "serve the owner half of the control channel" header and `serveBootstrap`, so a docblock describing the request handlers came to sit directly above a helper it does not describe. Demote it to a `/* */` band and say it is one, the way the header for a section rather than a member should read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ
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Thank you for following the naming conventions! 🙏 |
WalkthroughThe change applies the shared wire codec to container RPC and shard replica control-channel payloads. Requests and responses now preserve values such as ChangesWire codec transport
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to This change preserves non-JSON values across RPC and replica transport, but mixed-version deployments can misinterpret encoded values and cause incorrect RPC handling or replica divergence. Resolve or explicitly accept the rollout compatibility risk before merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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Inline comments:
In `@packages/container/src/bridge.ts`:
- Line 189: Gate the rollout so the sender using encodeWire in
packages/container/src/bridge.ts:189 cannot contact pre-codec receivers, and the
sender using replicaResponse in packages/shard-engine/src/replica.ts:324 cannot
contact pre-codec followers; alternatively add protocol negotiation with a
backward-compatible plain-JSON fallback. The decoder sites at
packages/container/src/bridge.ts:225-226 and
packages/shard-engine/src/replica.ts:619 and 660 require no direct change.
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packages/container/__tests__/bridge.test.tsis excluded by!**/__tests__/**,!**/*.test.tsand included bypackages/**packages/shard-engine/__tests__/replica.test.tsis excluded by!**/__tests__/**,!**/*.test.tsand included bypackages/**
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Merging this PR will degrade performance by 49.19%
|
| Benchmark | BASE |
HEAD |
Efficiency | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ❌ | low fanout — 5 sockets × 1 sub each, table match |
121.8 µs | 423.4 µs | -71.24% |
| ❌ | 1 after-insert no-op trigger |
292.2 µs | 325.5 µs | -10.25% |
Tip
Investigate this regression by commenting @codspeedbot fix this regression on this PR, or directly use the CodSpeed MCP with your agent.
Comparing fix/r30-replica-wire (2a7a71b) with alpha (a2faaaa)2
Footnotes
-
123 benchmarks were skipped, so the baseline results were used instead. If they were deleted from the codebase, click here and archive them to remove them from the performance reports. ↩
-
No successful run was found on
alpha(a08e390) during the generation of this report, so a2faaaa was used instead as the comparison base. There might be some changes unrelated to this pull request in this report. ↩
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## alpha #623 +/- ##
==========================================
- Coverage 80.52% 77.70% -2.82%
==========================================
Files 1584 1233 -351
Lines 83680 69276 -14404
Branches 20809 17120 -3689
==========================================
- Hits 67380 53830 -13550
+ Misses 15737 15013 -724
+ Partials 563 433 -130
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…ora/container [1.0.0-alpha.46](https://github.com/anolilab/lunora/compare/@lunora/container@1.0.0-alpha.45...@lunora/container@1.0.0-alpha.46) (2026-09-06) ### ⚠ BREAKING CHANGES * **observability,agent:** `SpanHandle.spanContext()` returns `SpanContextIds` (`sampled` alongside the ids); `ctx.trace` accepts an optional fourth `SpanIdentity` argument; `WorkerOptions.queue` receives a fourth `TriggerTrace` argument, and codegen emits it. The gates that hid all of this are rewritten to go through the real path: the bridge suite drives the real span factory instead of a fake that echoed back whatever id it was handed, and the agent suites drive `generateText`/`streamText` against a mock model instead of invoking the telemetry hooks by hand. Not fixed, deliberately: a `ctx.fetch` span still parents to the dispatch rather than an enclosing `ctx.trace` (no ambient span stack in the DO profile) — the docblock now says so instead of implying otherwise. The Sentry and Braintrust model-call spans still end at time-to-first-byte on a streamed turn, because their host span must wrap `execute()` to establish the parent context; both docblocks now state it and point at the OTLP bridge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * chore(api): accept the span-identity and trigger-trace surface The bridge now records under the id it publishes (SpanIdentity), SpanHandle reports the propagated sampled bit (SpanContextIds), and a queue consumer accepts the trigger's trace (TriggerTrace). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * fix(agent): close every telemetry bridge at the real end of a call The Sentry and Braintrust bridges wrapped `execute()`, which on a streamed turn resolves the instant `doStream` hands the stream back. Both reported every streamed generation as a ~1 ms, zero-token, always-OK call, and a stream that died mid-way never reached a span at all. Both now open the host span around `execute()` — still what parents the provider's own work — but keep it open past it. Sentry uses `startSpanManual` (present on every SDK built on `@sentry/core`, verified against 10.55.0) and ends the span from the terminal event; Braintrust parks its `traced` callback on a gate the terminal event releases, so the caller still gets `execute()`'s value immediately while the span covers the whole generation. Usage is read off the SDK's normalized end event, where a LanguageModelV4 provider's nested `{ inputTokens: { total } }` has already been flattened. The lifecycle all three share moves to `telemetry/in-flight-calls.ts`, and with it two fixes: - Aborts and errors now close the call they NAME. Every ai@7 terminal event carries the model call's `callId`, `onAbort` and `onError` included, but the close was indiscriminate — and a bridge built at module scope, which is the documented `defineAgent({ telemetry: { integrations: [...] } })` shape, shares one map across every concurrent run in the isolate. One run's barge-in reported a sibling's live generation as aborted and swallowed its real span. - A stream that rejects outright dispatches no telemetry callback at all, so its entry was never removed and pinned the call's prompt for the life of the integration. Entries older than ten minutes are now swept on the next open. The contradictory claim that the map "cannot grow" is gone. A throwing integration also no longer fails the user's tool. `traceToolExecution` runs inside the tool's durable `step.do`, so a host SDK throwing in `executeTool` made the step retry a tool that had already run, or report a successful one as failed — against that function's own promise that telemetry is never flow control. The tool's real outcome is recorded as it happens and always wins. `SpanIdentity`'s two ids become required: the sole caller always passes both, and `identity?:` already expresses "no adapter involved", so a partial object type-checked and meant nothing. The `version_metadata` object unwrap in `readerFromRecord` is keyed to `CF_VERSION_METADATA` alone. Applied to any object-valued binding it would export the internal `.id` of whatever a future probed key named as a resource attribute. Every model-call test now drives the real SDK through `generateText`/`streamText` rather than invoking the hooks by hand, which is what hid the streaming defect: called directly, `execute()` resolves with a finished result and the span looks perfect. Each new assertion was confirmed to fail against the pre-fix behaviour. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * fix(agent): release swept calls and stop the wrapper deciding tool outcomes Two findings from review, both real. **The abandoned-call sweep dropped the record but stranded the resource.** A swept entry was deleted without `onClose`, which is right — a span ending at "whenever the next call started" is worse than none. But two bridges carry something live in the host SDK: Sentry's `startSpanManual` span ends only when someone ends it, and Braintrust's `traced` callback is parked on a gate the terminal event releases. Dropping those entries left the span open and the callback parked for the life of the isolate — the same leak the sweep exists to prevent, one level down. `createInFlightCalls` takes an `onEvict`, and each bridge releases its own resource there without emitting anything. Both new tests fail without it ("expected undefined to be defined"). Writing the Braintrust one showed the abandonment has to be modelled precisely: with an `execute()` that never settles, the callback parks on `execute()` rather than on the gate, and nothing can release it. The real shape is a stream handed back at first byte that then dies — `execute()` resolves, the callback parks on the gate. **A telemetry wrapper could decide a durable tool outcome.** The ai@7 contract hands `executeTool` the tool's `execute` and trusts what it returns. This file guarded a wrapper THROW, but not a wrapper that skips `execute` entirely or returns a value of its own — so an integration could record a tool that never ran, or replace its result, inside the durable `step.do`. That contradicts the function's own promise that telemetry is never flow control. The wrapper's return value and its rejection are now both discarded, and the outcome is read from one memoized promise. Memoized rather than re-run: a wrapper that starts `execute` without awaiting it leaves no trace by the time it returns, and re-running would execute the tool twice. This also deletes the `ran`/`failed` bookkeeping — the promise already carries both. Five new cases; three fail against the previous flow (skip, replace, and the un-awaited start), while reject-after-success and the tool's own failure already behaved correctly. Also suppress the secret scanner on a fixture `Bearer admin-token` in `trigger-trace.test.ts`, matching how the e2e fixtures do it — `vis secrets` reports clean. 464 agent tests, repo `lint:types`, `api:check` (54 snapshots) and `vis secrets` all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * test(agent): floor the streamed-span assertions on the stream, not wall clock CI failed with `expected 94 to be greater than 96` on the Sentry streamed-span test. The assertion was `spanDuration > wallMs / 2`, but `wallMs` starts before the span does — so a runner slow enough to spend ~98ms getting from the timer to the first `doStream` call inflates the divisor past the span and the test fails on scheduling alone, with nothing wrong. All three bridge suites carried the same shape. Each now floors on the stream's OWN delay budget, which the fixture makes knowable: `streamingModel` waits `gapMs` per chunk, so `{ chunks: 3, gapMs: 30 }` is ~90ms regardless of how slow the runner is getting there. The floor still separates what it exists to separate. The defect being guarded is a span closed when `execute()` resolves — the instant `doStream` hands the stream back — which measured ~1ms. Verified by re-introducing exactly that close: the streamed test fails again, along with three others. 464 agent tests pass; `eslint --max-warnings=0` clean (the constant sits above the expect group rather than splitting it, which `vitest/padding-around-expect-groups` flags). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ ### Bug Fixes * **observability,agent:** make the trace say what actually happened ([#618](#618)) ([c07f788](c07f788)) * **shard-engine,container:** bracket two control channels with the wire codec ([#623](#623)) ([da5e903](da5e903)) ### Dependencies * **@lunora/errors:** upgraded to 1.0.0-alpha.33
…lunora/shard-engine [1.0.0-alpha.58](https://github.com/anolilab/lunora/compare/@lunora/shard-engine@1.0.0-alpha.57...@lunora/shard-engine@1.0.0-alpha.58) (2026-09-06) ### ⚠ BREAKING CHANGES * **shard-engine:** `aggregate`/`groupBy` now refuse a `v.any()` / `v.union()` / `v.from()` column instead of reducing it. Declare an `aggregateIndex` covering the `(by, field, op)`, or narrow the column's validator. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * refactor(shard-engine): drop readCdcChanges' inert table filter The `tables` option narrowed the page to a set of tables, and its docblock said the shape/poke path read one filtered page per flush. Nothing passed it: both production callers (`cdc-retention.ts`, `shard-do.ts`) pass `{ limit, sinceSeq }` only, and the shape/poke path goes through `readCdcChangeKeys`, which takes a single `table` and returns keys without post-images. The only thing exercising the option was its own unit test. It could not simply be wired up either. `tableInClause` binds one parameter per table name against workerd's cap of 100, unchunked — its sibling `cdcTouchesTables` chunks at 90 for exactly that reason. And chunking is not the same shape here: `cdcTouchesTables` is an existence probe that may answer from any chunk, while this is an ordered, LIMIT-ed page — chunks would have to be merged back into commit order with the cursor re-derived from the merge, or the page truncates at whichever chunk filled `limit` first. So the option goes, the docblock says what the reader actually does, and `tableInClause` now takes a non-empty set so the parameter cap stays one call site away rather than one argument. Its test asserts the interleaving a table-dropping reader would break — a single-table log looks right either way. * **shard-engine:** `readCdcChanges` no longer accepts `options.tables`. Read one table's changes through `readCdcChangeKeys`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * **errors,values,server:** `ERROR_CATALOG` gains six keys, so `LunoraErrorCode` widens, and a `CONFIG_INVALID` message is now redacted to "Internal error" on the wire. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * fix(shared): stop refusing SQLite's read-only `replace()` scalar `FORBIDDEN_KEYWORD` listed `replace` as a bare word, so a plain `SELECT REPLACE(name, 'a', 'b') FROM users` was rejected as "not read-only" — naming a rule the operator had not broken. `replace` is a write only in the `REPLACE INTO` statement form; as a scalar it is a core string function. The docblock's accepted trade covers a keyword inside a string literal, not a bare function call. The discrimination is a one-token negative lookahead — the write form is `REPLACE INTO`, never `REPLACE (`. Deliberately a lookahead rather than matching `replace\s+into`, so an inline block comment wedged between the two words (whitespace to SQLite's tokenizer, but not to `\s`) still fails the scan. Every other word on the list has no read-only meaning, so none of them moves. `VALUES (1)` stays refused, and that is left as-is: the diagnostic states exactly the rule enforced ("only SELECT / WITH / EXPLAIN"), widening the lead set buys nothing, and `INSERT … VALUES` is already caught by `insert`. Noted in the docblock so it is not re-litigated. The AI SQL assistant made a false refusal invisible: it retries once and then discards, and the caller only ever learns `unsafe-response` — which reads the same whether the model wrote a real `DELETE` or the gate misread a read-only shape. Each discard now warns to the server console with the gate's rejection code. Tests: the scalar form is allowed while `REPLACE INTO` — including from inside a CTE, which is why the keyword scan exists — is still refused; and the assistant logs the rejection code once per attempt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * fix(values): make the emitted JSON Schema agree with the runtime parser Four claims in the schema contradicted what `parse` actually does, so a client generated from the OpenAPI/OpenRPC spec rejected bodies the server accepts and could not express what the server requires: - `additionalProperties: false` on every object, while `v.object` STRIPS an unknown key rather than refusing it (only `.output()`'s `rejectUnknownKeys` refuses one, which is not what these schemas describe). Dropped — absent means allowed, which matches the parser. - `required` listed every key whose kind was not `optional`, so `v.any()` and a union with an optional member were required although `parse {}` succeeds for both. Requiredness is now decided by whether the parser accepts the field ABSENT. - bigint was described two incompatible ways — `{ format: "int64", type: "integer" }` for the scalar, `{ const: "5", type: "string" }` for `v.literal(5n)` — and codegen spelled the literal a third way (`{ const: "5n" }`, the IR's source text falling through the numeric branch). One lossless carrier for all three: an int64 decimal string. `type: "integer"` advertised the one JSON form the parser refuses, and truncated past 2^53 besides; a bigint already rides as its decimal string in the wire codec, and this is the treatment `bytes` already gets. - `v.record(v.string().pattern(…), …)` emitted no `propertyNames` — the reader read only the value child — while the runtime rejects a non-matching key. The reader gains `keyChild`. Regenerated: both codegen golden fixtures and all 13 examples' committed `_generated` trees. Also pins the ORDER-DEPENDENT `.check()`/`.nullable()` semantics that round 28 questioned. It holds as written: `.nullable().check(p)` refines the widened type, so `p` runs on null — and its parameter is typed `string | null`, so dereferencing it is a compile error, not a runtime surprise. `.check(p).nullable()` is the other reading and short-circuits. No behaviour change, a test so the pair is not "fixed" into agreement later. * **errors,values,server:** `SchemaNodeReader` gains a required `keyChild` member, and generated OpenAPI / OpenRPC documents change shape (no `additionalProperties: false` on argument objects, a narrower `required`, `propertyNames` on records, bigint as an int64 string). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * docs: correct two APIs the snippets taught with a shape they never had `useMutation` returns `{ data, error, isError, mutate, pending, reset, withOptimisticUpdate }`, but 13 snippets — the flagship realtime-chat tutorial, error handling, the React and reactive-loaders pages, both migration guides, three blog posts — wrote `const send = useMutation(...)` and then called `send(...)`. A reader following them gets `TS2349: This expression is not callable`, or `TypeError: send is not a function`. The React page was half-right, reading `send.pending`, which does exist on the object. Two prose sentences said "returns a callable with a `.pending` flag". `ctx.db.findMany("users")` exists on the untyped runtime writer but not on the generated typed `ctx.db`, so the masking and RLS snippets may run yet never typecheck in a user project. Replaced with the per-table facade (`ctx.db.users.findMany()`). `check-doc-imports.mjs` only validated import NAMES, so both classes were invisible to it. It gains a small deny-table of shapes found wrong in shipped docs, each entry carrying the correct form in its message, and now walks `content/blog` as well — two of the wrong snippets lived there. Not a type checker: doing this properly needs the packages installed in apps/docs plus synthesized `_generated` modules, which is noted in the file. Only tracked files are touched. `apps/docs/src/content/docs/packages` is gitignored — a local copy regenerated at build — so nothing there ships. The round also reported `ctx.db.from("invoices").all()` in the cloudflare-access page. That call appears nowhere in the repo, tracked or otherwise, so nothing was changed for it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * security(playground): make the inbound-email sink internal, and stop claiming a DO reset The worker entry gates `email()` on `verify: authenticatesFrom` and says so at length: Cloudflare Email Routing authenticates the RECIPIENT domain, never the sender, so without the gate anyone who can send mail to the routed address reaches the sink with a `from` of their choosing. But the sink was a plain `mutation`, registered publicly, so the same call was on the client `api` — the gate was walked around rather than through. `internalMutation` is the sibling pattern (`cleanup.ts`), and it costs the mail path nothing: `@lunora/mail`'s shard dispatcher already sends `x-lunora-system: 1`, which is exactly what admits a server-initiated dispatch to an internal target — the package's own docblock says an inbound target "should be" internal for this reason. Verified rather than assumed: nothing in the app or the e2e suite calls it from a client. `inbound:list` stays public and now says why: it demonstrates that the write lands on the change feed, and the `inbox` table has no owner column to scope a read by. Called out as the demo's choice, not the pattern to copy. Separately, `/test/reset` POSTed `https://do/internal/reset` at a DO named `__e2e_reset__` inside a swallowing `catch`. `ShardDO.fetch` answers 404 to anything that is not `/rpc` or its WS/relay routes, and that name is neither `__root__` nor any channel shard, so even a real route would have reset the wrong DO. Only `clearD1` ever ran. Deleted rather than implemented: shard-local rows are reachable only through their channel and every spec mints a fresh one, so nothing depends on clearing them. The e2e fixture's "Clears DO state so tests are order-independent" and the `workers: 1` rationale now say what actually happens — D1 is truncated, DO state is not, and order-independence comes from each spec minting its own channel. Tests: the generated `api` keeps `onEmail` out of `ApiTypes` and in `InternalApiTypes`, and the worker entry no longer calls the phantom route. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * test(docs): make the doc-snippet deny-table falsifiable on its own Every `NONEXISTENT_API` entry was added because a shipped doc matched it, and once that doc is fixed the pattern matches nothing forever. From then on a narrowed or broken regex reads exactly like a clean repo — the run is green either way. That is the property the error-catalog scanner grew a self-check for in this same wave; this file had none. Add fixture strings per entry, asserting both directions: the pattern still matches the wrong form, and does not match the correct one. Verified by breaking it each way — narrowing `(?:const|let|var)` back to `const` reports the missed `let`, and widening `\w+` to swallow a destructuring pattern reports that it would now reject valid docs. Two patterns widened while adding their fixtures: `useMutation` was bound to `const` and missed `let`/`var`, and `ctx.db.findMany` matched only quote characters, missing a template literal. Also demote the payment section header in the error catalog from `/**` to `/*` — as a docblock it attached itself to nothing, sitting between the previous entry and `CONFIG_INVALID`'s own docblock. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * fix(docs): stop the useMutation gate rejecting a correct snippet The pattern matched any `const <name> = useMutation(` binding, so it rejected the correct non-destructuring form — `const m = useMutation(fn)` then `await m.mutate(args)` — which keeps the hook's object and calls `mutate` off it. A CI gate that blocks valid docs is worse than the misuse it catches, and the self-check added alongside it could not see this because its samples only covered the destructuring form. The two forms differ in whether the bound name is later CALLED, and that spans two lines, so a per-line scan cannot tell them apart. Buffer each fence and match over its body, with a backreference requiring the binding to be seen called. Line numbers are recovered from the match offset, so reports still point at the offending line rather than the fence. Verified against all four shapes: `const send = useMutation(…)` + `send(args)` reports at the right line; both correct forms pass; the `ctx.db.findMany` entry still fires, so the fence-scoped scan did not weaken the line-local pattern. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * fix(payment): mint the arg-shape guard as VALIDATION_ERROR, not CONFIG_INVALID Cataloguing `CONFIG_INVALID` as `internal: true` is right for what the code was meant to carry — "webhook secret not configured", a duplicate or absent adapter — messages that name server wiring and that the caller can do nothing with. But `check()`'s argument-shape guard minted the same code for "check() requires a featureId or priceId", which is the caller's own mistake, so marking the code internal turned actionable guidance into a generic 500. Move those two sites to `VALIDATION_ERROR`, already in the payment taxonomy at 400 and already catalogued as caller-safe. The `entitlements`-not-configured sites stay on `CONFIG_INVALID`: those do name server configuration, and the detail survives in the server-side log. Record the constraint in the catalog docblock so the next caller-fixable failure is not added to this code, which would quietly re-widen what the flag redacts. 252 payment tests and 669 errors tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * docs(values,errors): correct two claims the code does not support `v.bigint()`'s JSON Schema said it names "the JSON carrier". It does not: every RPC arg path runs `decodeWire` first (`shard-do.ts` 5528/5588/5647/5925), so a bigint's actual carrier is the tagged array `["$lunora.wire$","bigint","5"]` and a bare `"5"` fails the parser exactly as a bare `5` did. The emitted shape is unchanged and still right by the file's own convention — `bytes` and `date` describe their decoded payloads the same way, and nothing here consumes a tuple schema — but the comment claimed a parser agreement this node does not have, which is the class of thing the surrounding wave exists to remove. State the convention and the residual gap instead. The webhook-rejection entry claimed "the messages are fixed and name no internal state". Five of the six mints are fixed strings; `providers/stripe.ts` forwards the Stripe SDK's verification message. The non-internal verdict is still right — those texts describe the request the poster sent — but the justification was wrong, so it now says which site differs and what keeps it safe. 187 values tests and 669 errors tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * style(docs): format check-doc-imports Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ * style(errors): add the blank line jsdoc/lines-before-block requires Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ ### Bug Fixes * **errors,values,server:** close the gates that were failing open ([#621](#621)) ([42879c4](42879c4)) * **shard-engine,container:** bracket two control channels with the wire codec ([#623](#623)) ([da5e903](da5e903)) * **shard-engine:** reach global rows through their own by-id facade ([#626](#626)) ([7eb4033](7eb4033)) ### Dependencies * **@lunora/errors:** upgraded to 1.0.0-alpha.33 * **@lunora/bindings:** upgraded to 1.0.0-alpha.52
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Two hops carried decoded documents onto the wire with no codec on either end, while the peer at the other end assumed the codec had run. This is the third instance of that class found in this campaign — after
httpAction'sctx.run*andcreateDispatchRunner— so the sweep below matters as much as the fix.The replica control channel
packages/shard-engine/src/replica.tsused the wire codec in neither direction —grep -cE "encodeWire|decodeWire"returned 0 — while the documents it serialises come straight out ofdecodeDocJson, which is literallydecodeWire(JSON.parse(raw)). So av.bigint()column is a realbigintby the timeResponse.jsonsees it.Measured, on the exact shape of the pull response:
The bigint case is the severe one, and not because of the throw. The thrown response reaches the follower as a bare non-2xx;
catchUpreads that as "the owner is unreachable" and returns"unavailable"without latchingdivergent, so every subsequent read re-issues the identical doomed round trip forever. That is precisely the failureservePull's own docblock says it moved the floor check earlier to avoid. Bootstrap has the same shape, so the replica never holds a single row either. For bytes and Date there is no throw at all — the follower applies{}or an ISO string and diverges silently.Now bracketed by a single
replicaResponsehelper used by all four control-channel responses, withdecodeWireinShardReplica.pull/bootstrap— mirroringadminResponseinshard-do.ts.The container bridge, found by the sweep
packages/container/src/bridge.tsposts to/_lunora/rpcand ran the codec in neither direction, while the DO decodes inbound args and encodes results. Abigintarg threw; av.bigint()result reached the container as a raw tag. Also bracketed.The sweep
Every path putting a document-shaped payload on the wire was checked against
origin/alpha. Twelve are correctly bracketed. The zero-codec ones are safe for stated reasons:query-coordinator, theshard-dobatch path,nuxt,rest-routesand the CLI backup handler are pass-throughs that never decode, so tags ride intact to a peer that does — the CLI's is pinned by two tests thatdecodeWirethe NDJSON they assert.replica/event-log-do*carries contractually-arbitrary JSON;auth/do-wiringcarries only scalars; the rest carry no document-shaped payload.The admin-RPC asymmetry that a project memory still described as open is already closed —
shard-do.ts:338encodes, fixed by #365.Deliberately not fixed here
ctx.scheduler.runAfter/runAtargs are unbracketed at their producers while the shard decodes them. Encoding at the producer alone would push tagged params into every scheduled workflow, becausestartWorkflowInstancehands the sameargstocreate({ params })with no decode — trading one bug for another. That needs the decode at the workflow-side read plus its own tests, and is handled separately.Verification
Regression tests written first and confirmed to fail against the unfixed code: the replica case reports
expected undefined to strictly equal { _id: 'a', blob: …, views: 7n }(nothing imported, because the bigint threw insideResponse.json), and an earlier iteration reached theensureFreshassertion and showedexpected 'unavailable' to be 'fresh'— the forever-retry latch, verbatim. The container case reportsTypeError: Do not know how to serialize a BigInt. The test uses9_007_199_254_740_993specifically so a JSON-number round trip returns a wrong value rather than merely a mistyped one.All seven repo gates green on this branch: build, lint:types, test, prettier, eslint, api:check (54 snapshots), lint:package-json. Package suites: shard-engine 1434, do 695, container 173.
Reviewed before opening
Both
/thermospasses ran against this branch first. They confirmedencodeWireon the whole body cannot break a structurally-read field (cursor,epoch,floor,truncatedare all codec-identity), that the container error envelope is read before the decode so no error path changed, and that the scheduler deferral above is the right call. One finding — a section header the new helper displaced — is fixed.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01VUuYamsU1YLmAQhtut9PLZ
Summary by CodeRabbit
bigint, dates, binary data, and validated byte values when passing data through remote calls.