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feat(security): use the vetted Vulnogram operations under the secure setup - #2182
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…setup outside the sandbox with a fixed argv and no override flag. The skills still allocated and pushed records through the generic tool interface, which passes every adapter flag through. Under the secure setup, with the operations granted, the allocation skill now allocates through the vetted operation, with the title written to a workspace file instead of quoted into a command, and the sync skill's record push uses the vetted push. The recipe renderer returns that command and the title file when given the workspace. The generic interface stays for what the vetted push refuses by design (a push that promotes a record to its final public state, and the two confirmed overrides) and for fetch, check, setup and publish. A failed vetted call names the client's exit code on stderr, so the existing exit tables still apply; any other refusal means nothing ran, and the skill falls back to the generic interface. Generated-by: Claude Opus 5
Fixes from the pre-PR review of the previous commit: - The vetted allocation names the PMC: the operation gains a validated pmc parameter, passed as --pmc, so the client refuses a token held for any other PMC instead of allocating for whatever the session holds. - Only a refusal naming a missing grant falls back to the generic tool interface. Any other refusal (a rejected record, a malformed argument) stops, so the vetted checks are never routed around, and an unclear allocation outcome sends the user to the PMC's records first, so an allocation is never sent twice. - The title file is named by a hash of tracker, issue and title, so no other run can replace the approved title before the allocation reads it. Generated-by: Claude Opus 5
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Summary
#2133 added vetted operations that run the shipped Vulnogram client outside the sandbox with a fixed argv:
cve-allocate,cve-record-updateandcve-record-fetch(granted in the[callers]example by #2164).The skills still allocated and pushed records through
cve-tool, which passes every adapter flag through (--allow-state-downgrade,--credentials, …).This is #2133's second follow-up: under the secure setup the skills now use the vetted operations where they can.
Allocation (
security-cve-allocate, Step 3).cve-allocate recipetakes an optionalvetted_workspace.With it, the API path's
commandisvetted-op --caller security-cve-allocate cve-allocate <pmc> <workspace>/cve-title-<hash>.txt, and a newtitle_fileoutput gives the path and text to write first (the name is a hash of tracker, issue and the approved title, so no other run — another tracker, or the same issue with another title — writes the same file before the allocation reads it).The reporter-influenced title travels as a file, never quoted into a command line.
Without
vetted_workspacenothing changes.Record push (
security-issue-sync, Step 5b). The push usesvetted-op --caller security-issue-sync cve-record-update, with the JSON in the workspace.What stays on
cve-tool. The vetted push refuses these by design, so they keepcve-tool push:PUBLICfrom another state;--replace-references,--allow-product-change).fetch,check,setupandpublishhave no vetted operation and stay as they are.A
REVIEW → DRAFTwalk-back needs no override (the client only refuses a downgrade fromPUBLIC), so the vetted push covers it.Exit codes. A failed vetted call exits 4 and names the client's code on stderr (
CVE tool exit N); the skills read the existing exit tables with thatN.Only a refusal naming a missing grant (
is not permitted to run) falls back tocve-tool. Any othervetted-oprefusal (a rejected record, a malformed PMC) stops, so the vetted checks are never routed around.Any other allocation outcome (an interrupted run) is treated as unclear and sends the user to the PMC's records first, so an allocation is never sent twice; a push simply re-runs, since it is idempotent.
vetted-op cve-allocategains apmcparameter (lowercase, validated), passed as--pmc, so the client refuses a token held for any other PMC.Without it the client used whatever PMC the current session held, and the Step 0 pre-flight could not guarantee that at allocation time.
Type of change
plugins/magpie-security/skills/cve-allocate,issue-sync/apply-and-push.md) — eval suites run belowtools/security-management,tools/vetted-ops: thepmcparameter)tools/spec-loop/specs/cve-tooling.mdgains the invariantTest plan
cve-allocateargv carries--pmc; malformed PMC values (Airflow,airflow --credentials,--credentials,../x, empty) never reach the clienta-b/c,a/b-c,a/b, nor between two titles for one issue): the vetted command andtitle_file(a hostile title never reaches the command line),cve-toolkept withoutvetted_workspace, workspace ignored off the API pathsecurity-managementandvetted-opstest suites pass (vetted-ops: apart from the 6 sandbox-only setup errors fixed separately in the openfix/approved-policy-sandbox-skipPR)security-cve-allocate4/4,security-issue-sync/step-5b-judged-gates2/2 (journaled, README tables regenerated)prek run --all-files --skip workspace-pytest --skip spec-validatepasses;measured_tokensrestamped (cve-allocate6470 → 6574)RFC-AI-0004 compliance
vetted-op, so every allocation and push keeps its per-call confirmation; allocation still runs once, on an explicit yesLinked issues
Refs #2133, #2164
Notes for reviewers (optional)
The design choices above (which operations move, which stay on
cve-tool, the fallback on a non-client refusal) were made to keep every existing behaviour reachable.Whether
cve-toolshould also stop passing the override flags through is a separate question, left for a follow-up.🤖 Generated with Claude Code