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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion tools/spec-loop/.last-sync
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@@ -1 +1 @@
9e979ff3e591ccffd1bc97460e87b99c8e608968
226ca2d8e4d07ea44a1849b6eb69cd0598cda55f
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions tools/spec-loop/specs/security-issue-lifecycle.md
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Expand Up @@ -249,6 +249,10 @@ publication, with a human gate and an audit-log entry at every step.
`issue-create-labeled` instead (#1982), and the import skills and
`security-issue-invalidate` point at `tools/github/project-board.md`
for the orphan-issue, introspection and archive board recipes.
- The tracker's Projects V2 board stays security-only: `security-issue-sync`
adds, moves and archives items through the vetted `board-*` operations and
its end-of-sync sweep archives non-security items (#2179, #2181; see
[vetted-command-surface.md](vetted-command-surface.md)).
- Status rollups are written by `tools/github-rollup/`
(`append`, `amend-latest`, `fold`, `list`, `latest`).
Under the secure setup that CLI's `gh` runs sandboxed and fails, so the
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52 changes: 52 additions & 0 deletions tools/spec-loop/specs/vetted-command-surface.md
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Expand Up @@ -142,6 +142,13 @@ A read too large to carry through the agent's context goes to a file:
sweep's pages reach a deterministic tool such as `tools/pr-management`
without passing through the agent (#1570).
Writes and procedures refuse it, and `NAME` is a single path component.
Each `--save` also prunes `saved/` entries older than `saved_retention_days`
(under `[values]`, default 7 days): only regular files and symlinks the
caller owns, relative to the same `saved/` descriptor, never following a
link; the marker, dot-files, subdirectories and the file just written stay
(#2183).
Body and title files are removed from the workspace once their write
succeeds (#2163).
Because `vetted-op-read` runs outside the sandbox and `--config` can name a
policy the agent wrote, `--save` writes only into a `<workspace>/saved/`
directory that already exists and holds a regular `.vetted-ops-save` marker;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -225,6 +232,24 @@ registered `--stable-path`, else the account's home from the password
database), since Codex execpolicy cannot match `~`; any other root is one the
agent could have built and stays refused.

**Project-board operations** (#2179, #2181).
A GitHub-backed tracker's Projects V2 board is kept through five operations
whose ids come from the policy (`board_project_id`, `board_status_field_id`,
`[values.board_columns]`): reads `board-item` and `board-items`, writes
`board-add-item`, `board-set-status` and `board-archive-item`.
`security-issue-sync` adds a missing item, moves it to the column its labels
call for and archives it once closed; its end-of-sync sweep archives anything
that is not a security tracker, keeping the board security-only
(`tools/github/project-board.md`).

**Every skill carries the sandbox golden rule** (#2162).
The shared block `tools/dev/blocks/sandbox-golden-rule.md`, kept in sync by
`check-shared-blocks.py`, tells the agent that a step the sandbox blocks
becomes a vetted operation (`vetted-op-read`, `vetted-op`, `vetted-op-tracker`,
`vetted-op-git`) or a documented in-sandbox route, never a bypass or a wider
exclusion; if none exists it gives the user the one command and proposes
`setup-upstream-fix`.

## Scoping — what is real and what is aspiration

The dispatcher requires `--caller` and refuses operations outside that caller's
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -359,6 +384,33 @@ per [`docs/adapters/registry.md`](../../../docs/adapters/registry.md).
[`tools/permission-audit`](../../permission-audit/README.md) is the natural
place to detect and offer to remove them.

## Git operations the sandbox blocks (`vetted-op-git`)

A fourth entry point, `vetted-op-git`
(`tools/vetted-ops/src/vetted_ops/git_ops.py`, #2161), runs the git steps a
sandboxed session cannot: a push over SSH (the proxy gives no TCP and a
hardware key's touch prompt never reaches the user) and adding, moving or
removing a linked worktree the session did not create (its administrative
directory is read-only). It is excluded from the sandbox and kept on `ask`,
like `vetted-op`.
Operations are closed shapes: `git-push-branch` (a leased push, `--force-with-lease`
on the caller's expected SHA or `new`, to the policy's `fork` or to an
`upstream_push`-matching branch of upstream, protected branches always
refused, an emptied rebase refused), `git-worktree-sync` (`reset --keep` of a
clean linked worktree), `git-worktree-add` and `git-worktree-remove` (never
`--force`).
The policy's `[git]` table bounds them (`checkouts`, `fork`, `upstream_push`,
`protected`, `worktree_roots`).
Safety rests on: destinations built from policy, never from a configured
remote; refusal while repository config holds any key outside an inert list,
checked in every working tree and again before the acting command; pinned
config (no fsmonitor/gc, `https`/`ssh` only, attributes read from the empty
tree, hooks never run, `--no-verify`); validated directories held by
descriptor and git given the validated git directory; and every `GIT_*`
variable dropped with `HOME` taken from the password database.
Git 2.42 or newer is required.
The `pre-push` checks run in the sandbox first.

## Codex native integration

The Codex marketplace advertises the self-contained vetted-ops substrate plugin.
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