You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
{{ message }}
Repository navigation
Proposal 6: a signed ledger and command channel #9
Closes: element K2 and interface L9 of docs/STRUCTURE.md (in #2).
The gap
The loop's ledger (results/ledger.json) is hash-chained, so an edit is detected. Nothing says who wrote it or who set its budget. Weft's telemetry line carries an unkeyed hash, which its roadmap describes as "integrity against accidents, not authentication". A plant that takes requests from a scheduler needs to know who asked.
The theorem run_bounded says the number of changes the system makes to itself is at most the budget it was given. That is only as good as the record of who gave it.
The system
Each ledger head and each budget grant becomes a Synmerit record, signed by the person who set the budget. The delegation is then explicit and revocable: a person grants N changes, and the proof bounds the system by N.
First slice
The current ledger head, with its budget of 64, signed as a Synmerit bundle and checked by Synmerit's conformance script.
Done when
a ledger whose budget was altered after signing fails the check;
a ledger extended past its signed budget fails the check;
the signed head is committed beside the ledger.
Rests on
Moissanite-Labs/synmerit v0.1. Its open issue on accepting small-order Ed25519 keys should be closed first.
Boundary
A signature records who authorised a budget. It does not make a proposal safe. The gate still decides each step.
Filed by an AI agent (Claude Code) working for the owner of aska-physical.
Activity