A browser-based SSH terminal management tool with multi-server connections, jump host proxying, and key reuse. Single binary deployment with embedded React frontend, backed by SQLite.
| Layer | Technology |
|---|---|
| Backend | Go 1.25, Gin, gorilla/websocket, golang.org/x/crypto/ssh |
| Frontend | React 19, TypeScript, Ant Design 6, xterm.js 6, Vite 8 |
| Database | SQLite 3 (WAL mode) |
| Deployment | Single binary (Go embed for frontend) |
OpsUp/
├── main.go # Entry: load config → init DB → start HTTP server
├── go.mod / go.sum
├── Makefile # Build: init, build, dev, clean
│
├── internal/ # ──── Go Backend ────
│ ├── config/
│ │ └── config.go # Config loading (env vars: DB path, JWT secret, encryption key, listen addr)
│ │
│ ├── database/
│ │ ├── database.go # SQLite init, WAL mode, migration execution
│ │ └── migrations.go # DDL + incremental ALTER TABLE migrations
│ │
│ ├── models/
│ │ ├── user.go # User model: CountUsers, CreateUser, GetUserByUsername
│ │ └── server.go # Server model: CRUD + ToListItem (hides private keys)
│ │
│ ├── auth/
│ │ ├── auth.go # bcrypt password hashing, JWT sign/verify
│ │ └── middleware.go # Gin middleware: extract and verify JWT from Authorization header
│ │
│ ├── crypto/
│ │ └── encryption.go # AES-256-GCM encrypt/decrypt for private key storage
│ │
│ ├── sshclient/
│ │ ├── client.go # SSH direct connect + jump host (DialViaJump)
│ │ └── session.go # SSH Session: PTY, Shell, Resize, Stdin/Stdout pipe
│ │
│ ├── terminal/
│ │ └── manager.go # Active terminal session registry (sync.Mutex)
│ │
│ └── api/
│ ├── router.go # Route registration: public(auth) / protected(servers) / WebSocket(terminal) / SPA
│ ├── auth_handler.go # POST /auth/setup, /auth/login, GET /auth/status
│ ├── server_handler.go # CRUD /servers + key reuse (copy_key_from) + jump host
│ └── terminal_handler.go # WS /terminal/:id → SSH connection + bidirectional data pump + keepalive
│
└── ui/ # ──── React Frontend ────
├── index.html # Vite entry HTML
├── package.json
├── vite.config.ts # Vite config: API proxy, build output dir
├── tsconfig.json
│
└── src/
├── main.tsx # ReactDOM mount
├── App.tsx # Routes: /login, /setup, /* (protected)
│
├── api/
│ ├── client.ts # Axios instance: JWT interceptor, 401 redirect
│ ├── auth.ts # getAuthStatus, setup, login
│ └── servers.ts # listServers, createServer, updateServer, deleteServer, testConnection
│
├── hooks/
│ └── useAuth.ts # Auth state management: login, setup, logout, token persistence
│
├── types/
│ └── index.ts # TypeScript interfaces: Server, ServerForm, AuthStatus, LoginResponse
│
├── pages/
│ ├── LoginPage.tsx # Login page: check init status → login form
│ ├── SetupPage.tsx # Setup page: first-time admin creation
│ └── MainPage.tsx # Main page: sidebar + terminal area, tab state management
│
├── components/
│ ├── ServerSidebar.tsx # Server list: grouped folding, search, context menu, CRUD
│ ├── ServerFormModal.tsx # Server form: key paste/reuse/import, jump host selection, grouping
│ ├── TerminalTabs.tsx # Custom tab bar + font size adjustment
│ └── TerminalTab.tsx # xterm.js terminal: WebSocket connection, resize, reconnect
│
└── styles/
├── global.css # Global styles, scrollbar, Ant Design overrides
└── terminal.css # xterm container styles
-- Users
users (id, username UNIQUE, password bcrypt, created_at, updated_at)
-- Servers
servers (
id, name, host, port DEFAULT 22, username,
private_key AES-256-GCM encrypted, -- Encrypted private key storage
description, group_name, -- Grouping
jump_server_id DEFAULT NULL, -- Jump host (self-referential FK)
created_at, updated_at
)
-- Session audit
sessions (id, user_id, server_id, started_at, ended_at, client_ip)| Method | Path | Auth | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/auth/status |
No | Check if initialized |
| POST | /api/auth/setup |
No | Create initial admin |
| POST | /api/auth/login |
No | Login, returns JWT |
| GET | /api/servers |
JWT | List servers |
| POST | /api/servers |
JWT | Add server |
| GET | /api/servers/:id |
JWT | Server details |
| PUT | /api/servers/:id |
JWT | Update server |
| DELETE | /api/servers/:id |
JWT | Delete server |
| POST | /api/servers/:id/test |
JWT | Test connection |
| WS | /api/terminal/:serverId?token= |
JWT | SSH terminal |
Binary frames, first byte is message type:
| Byte | Direction | Description |
|---|---|---|
0x00 |
Bidirectional | stdin/stdout data |
0x01 |
Bidirectional | resize(JSON) / stderr |
0x02 |
Server→Client | Error message |
0x03 |
Server→Client | Status change (connected/disconnected) |
0x04 |
Server→Client | Connection confirmed |
Requires Go 1.25+, a C compiler for SQLite/CGO, make, and Node.js 22.22.2+ (or 24.15+).
make build
# Initialize the administrator locally before exposing the service through HTTPS.
OPSUP_LISTEN=127.0.0.1:8080 OPSUP_DB_PATH=./data/opsup.db ./opsupFor development, run make build-frontend first, then run these in separate terminals:
cd ui && npm run dev
# From the repository root; keep data outside go run's temporary executable directory.
OPSUP_DB_PATH="$PWD/dev-data/opsup.db" go run .Vite proxies both HTTP and WebSocket requests under /api.
| Variable | Default / requirement |
|---|---|
OPSUP_DB_PATH |
opsup.db next to the executable |
OPSUP_LISTEN |
:8080 |
OPSUP_SECRETS_PATH |
<database path>.secrets.json, generated once with mode 0600 |
OPSUP_JWT_SECRET |
Persistent random secret when unset; overrides require at least 32 bytes and must not use the old default |
OPSUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY |
Persistent random key when unset; overrides require 64 hexadecimal characters |
Back up the database and its encryption key together. Never regenerate or delete the key on restart. Environment-provided keys must remain stable in your deployment's secret manager. Keep secret files out of Git. No secret file is created when both keys are supplied through the environment.
Docker's /data volume persists both the default database and secret file:
docker build -t opsup .
docker run -d -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 -v opsup-data:/data opsup- Stop the old service and back up the database (including any remaining WAL files) and any custom encryption key.
- If you previously configured a custom
OPSUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, continue supplying that exact key. - If you used the old public default key, remove any explicit old-default setting. Startup generates a persistent random key and transactionally re-encrypts legacy credentials.
- If any credential cannot be decrypted, startup stops without partially changing credentials. Restore the original key and retry; do not delete data or the secret file.
- The default JWT key changes, requiring login again. Enroll trusted SSH fingerprints for each target and jump server before connecting.
Enter the expected SHA256:… host fingerprint in the server form. Verify it through a trusted console, for example:
for key in /etc/ssh/ssh_host_*_key.pub; do
ssh-keygen -lf "$key"
doneConnections without an enrolled fingerprint are rejected and report the observed fingerprint for comparison. Do not trust that observation without independent verification. Changed keys are rejected too; update the saved fingerprint only after confirming a legitimate rotation. Targets and jump hosts are checked independently.
- One direct jump host is supported; nested jump chains are rejected.
- Upload request bodies are capped at 256 MiB, including multipart overhead. Each SFTP operation has a fifteen-minute limit.
- Uploads write private temporary files before publishing. Replacing a regular file preserves permissions and UID/GID; metadata failures abort replacement. New files use
0600; symlinks are not overwritten. - Servers without POSIX rename support accept new files only, not overwrites. Transport loss may leave
.opsup-upload-*files; remove them only after confirming no upload is active.
make test # Frontend typecheck/build/tests and Go vet/race tests
make clean # Build/dependency cleanup only; preserves data and secrets
# Destructive: stop the service and back up data first.
make reset-data CONFIRM=DELETE DB_PATH=/absolute/path/to/opsup.dbGitHub Actions verifies tests, Go formatting, types, binary builds, and Docker builds.
- SSH private keys and passwords use AES-256-GCM storage. APIs return neither credentials nor their ciphertext. Administrator passwords use bcrypt.
- New administrator passwords require at least 12 characters and at most 72 UTF-8 bytes. First-user creation is atomic under concurrent requests.
- Login and setup are rate-limited by source IP. Forwarded IP headers are not trusted by default, so clients behind a reverse proxy share its quota.
- JWTs expire after 24 hours. WebSocket authentication still uses a query parameter. Application access logs omit query strings; configure reverse-proxy logs to redact tokens or omit full terminal request URLs too.
- The application is same-origin, without wildcard CORS. Use HTTPS and never expose an uninitialized installation to the public internet.
- This remains a shared-administrator server manager, not a multi-tenant authorization system. SFTP access is limited by the remote SSH account's permissions.
IronRDP WASM adds NLA remote desktop sessions, keyboard/mouse input, fullscreen, dynamic resize and manual clipboard transfer while retaining single-binary deployment. Passwords are entered per connection and are never saved. See the RDP setup and validation guide for certificate configuration and compatibility limits.