[bobdivx]

🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Add HTTP security headers middleware

🚨 Severity: MEDIUM
💡 Vulnerability: The Axum backend lacked essential HTTP security headers (Strict-Transport-Security, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) exposing the application to clickjacking and MIME-sniffing risks.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could potentially embed the app in iframes or execute content misinterpretations.
🔧 Fix: Implemented an Axum middleware layer (security_headers) to automatically set DENY, nosniff, and HSTS defaults globally across endpoints.
✅ Verification: Review apps/server/src/security.rs and the router layer integration in apps/server/src/main.rs. All tests pass.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 9086806996185236049 started by @bobdivx

[google-labs-jules]

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[bobdivx]

Closing as a duplicate: four open PRs add the same security headers (#234, #249, #253, #257). #249 is kept open for review: it uses a dedicated middleware on both routers and SAMEORIGIN, which is less likely to break legitimate framing than DENY. Only one of them should land.

[google-labs-jules]

Closing as a duplicate: four open PRs add the same security headers (#234, #249, #253, #257). #249 is kept open for review: it uses a dedicated middleware on both routers and SAMEORIGIN, which is less likely to break legitimate framing than DENY. Only one of them should land.

Understood. Acknowledging that this work is now obsolete and stopping work on this task.