feat(middleware): mode-aware security headers (#437) [stacked on #474] - #475
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feat(middleware): mode-aware security headers (#437) [stacked on #474]#475olegbrok wants to merge 1 commit into
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PR-4 of the #433 web-exposed hardening track. Replaces the inline helmet-style middleware in api.py with a mode-aware module that adds CSP, HSTS-when-verified, and a stricter permissions-policy on top of what was already shipped. Header matrix ============= ============================ ======== ===== ===== Header trusted lan web ============================ ======== ===== ===== X-Content-Type-Options ✓ ✓ ✓ X-Frame-Options ✗ ✓ ✓ Referrer-Policy ✗ ✓ ✓ Permissions-Policy ✗ ✓ ✓ Content-Security-Policy ✗ basic strict Strict-Transport-Security ✗ ✗ ✓ (verified-HTTPS only) X-XSS-Protection ``0`` ``0`` ``0`` ============================ ======== ===== ===== Stacked on #474 → #473 → #472. What ---- * `pinky_daemon.middleware.security_headers`: - `headers_for_mode(mode)` — static header set per posture. - `build_csp(mode)` — CSP string (web adds object-src 'none' + upgrade-insecure-requests). 'unsafe-inline' for style-src is documented compromise per CLAUDE.md. - `is_verified_https(request)` — direct TLS OR `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` from a peer ∈ trusted_proxies. Bare `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` from any other peer is NOT enough — closes the HSTS-poisoning vector. - `build_security_headers_middleware(csp_enforcing=None)` — ASGI middleware closure. Reads `app.state.deployment_mode` per request. CSP defaults to `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`; flip to `Content-Security-Policy` via `PINKY_CSP_ENFORCING=1` env or `csp_enforcing=True` arg. Soak in report-only first. * `pinky_daemon.net.client_identity`: promoted `peer_is_trusted` and `raw_peer_from_request` from underscore-private to public — needed by the security_headers HSTS check and by future #438 / #439 work. * `create_api`: replaced inline middleware with `build_security_headers_middleware()`. Murzik review followups (from #437) ----------------------------------- * [x] HSTS only emitted when HTTPS is **verified** through a trusted proxy or direct TLS — bare `X-Forwarded-Proto` from untrusted peers ignored. * [x] CSP runs in report-only by default; operator opts into enforcing via env. * [x] CSP allows `data:` for img-src, `'unsafe-inline'` for style-src (Svelte inline-styles compromise documented in module docstring). * [x] `connect-src 'self' ws: wss:` for SSE/websocket. * [x] `frame-ancestors 'none'` (redundant with X-Frame-Options DENY, fine). * [x] X-XSS-Protection: 0 in all modes (modern OWASP guidance). * [x] Twilio callbacks unaffected (server-to-server, no CSP relevance). Tests (24 new) -------------- * `headers_for_mode`: trusted minimal, lan + web headers, X-XSS=0 everywhere. * `build_csp`: lan/web required directives, web-only extras. * `is_verified_https`: direct TLS, trusted-peer XFP, untrusted-peer XFP rejected, XFP=http rejected, no header rejected. * Middleware closure: trusted minimal, lan CSP report-only, CSP enforcing kwarg + env, web HSTS only when verified, web HSTS NOT when untrusted-peer claims https, websocket upgrade pass-through. * End-to-end `create_api`: trusted minimal, lan full set + report-only CSP, web no HSTS over plain http. 286 existing api tests still green. Closes part of #433. Refs #437. 🤖 Authored by Barsik
This was referenced May 13, 2026
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Summary
PR-4 of the #433 web-exposed hardening track. Replaces the inline helmet-style middleware in `api.py` with a mode-aware module that adds CSP, HSTS-only-when-verified, and a stricter Permissions-Policy on top of what already shipped.
Stacked on #474 → #473 → #472. No code conflicts with the parents; just consumes the cached `app.state.deployment_mode` and `app.state.trusted_proxies`.
Closes part of #433. Refs #437.
Header matrix
What
`pinky_daemon.middleware.security_headers` (new module):
`pinky_daemon.net.client_identity`: promoted `peer_is_trusted` + `raw_peer_from_request` from underscore-private to public (needed by the HSTS check + future Hardening 5/8: Auth/admin rate limiting #438/Hardening 6/8: Elevated-session protection for /admin/* in web mode #439).
`create_api`: replaced the inline middleware.
Murzik review followups (from #437) — addressed
Tests (24 new)
`tests/test_security_headers.py`:
286 existing api tests + all earlier hardening-track tests still green.
Test plan
🤖 Opened by Barsik