fix(security): cors, GitHub Actions, PR Preview, HTML sanitization - #4572
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…njection Stored XSS: several components injected HTML coming from wiki articles (converted from user-authored markdown) or Discourse forum posts directly via innerHTML/v-html, without any sanitization. A malicious wiki edit or forum post could therefore execute arbitrary JavaScript for any visitor. Add dompurify and a shared src/js/sanitize-html.js helper exposing: - sanitizeHtml(): default DOMPurify allow-list, for forum "cooked" posts and third-party geodata descriptions. - sanitizeRichHtml(): same, plus an explicit allow-list for the c2c wiki markdown's custom `c2c:*` attributes and the <iframe> video embeds it produces, so existing wiki rendering (images, emojis, internal links, embedded videos) keeps working. Apply it at every HTML entry point identified by the security audit: Markdown.vue, CommentsBox.vue, SiteNotice.vue, BoardAnnoucementWidget.vue, HelperWindow.vue, ProtectedAreasLayer.vue and EditionContainer.vue. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docker/nginx.conf served the SPA without X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy or any Content-Security-Policy. Add: - X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff - X-Frame-Options: DENY (no self-embedding feature found in this app) - Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin - A pragmatic baseline CSP: strict on script-src/object-src/base-uri (the directives that actually stop XSS), with an explicit allow-list for Google Analytics (src/main.js) and Google reCAPTCHA (src/views/user/LoginView.vue). img-src/connect-src stay broad (https:) on purpose: this app is a map viewer that talks to dozens of independently-run tile/geodata providers (swisstopo, IGN, ArcGIS, OpenTopoMap, biodiv-sports...) that can't reasonably be enumerated. style-src keeps 'unsafe-inline' because many components (OpenLayers overlays, dynamic widths/heights) rely on inline style attributes at runtime. Full rationale is documented inline in nginx.conf. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All patch: entries dated from 2019-2020 and targeted CVEs fixed upstream years ago. Nearly all of them (snyk > ... > lodash/graphlib/...) referenced the standalone snyk CLI's own internal dependency tree, which isn't a dependency of this project at all (only the unrelated @snyk/protect runtime helper is). The one entry on a direct dependency (axios, pre-0.21 SSRF issue) is moot: the project now pins a current axios release unaffected by it. Rationale kept as a comment in .snyk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Pin tj-actions/branch-names@v9 (both usages in ci.yml) and
ad-m/github-push-action@v1.0.0 to their exact commit SHA instead of a
mutable tag. tj-actions suffered a supply-chain compromise in March
2025 where release tags were rewritten to point at malicious commits;
ad-m/github-push-action runs with GITHUB_TOKEN and push access, so the
same class of attack applies. Tag kept as a comment for readability.
- Add explicit least-privilege `permissions:` blocks to the three
workflows that had none and were relying on the repo/org default
GITHUB_TOKEN permissions:
- codeql-analysis.yml: contents: read, security-events: write
(required for the analyze step to upload SARIF results), actions:
read (needed on private repos).
- retrieve-i18n.yml: contents: write, pull-requests: write, matching
what its action (push a branch + open a PR) actually needs.
- semantic-pull-request.yml: contents: read, pull-requests: write.
This one matters most: it runs on pull_request_target, which grants
GITHUB_TOKEN write access and secrets even for PRs from forks.
(ci.yml and browserslist-update.yml already declared explicit
per-job permissions and needed no change.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Any non-fork PR currently auto-publishes a live build to a public c2corg.github.io/c2c_ui/<branch> URL the moment CI runs, with no human in the loop. Gate the github-pages job behind a "pr-preview" GitHub Environment for pull_request-triggered runs, so a required reviewer must approve before the deploy step executes; push-triggered runs (master/tags, already reviewed at merge time) use a separate unprotected "github-pages-deploy" environment to avoid adding friction to code that's already gone through review. The required-reviewers rule itself is a repo Settings change (admin-only, can't be expressed in a workflow file) - documented in README.md under "Previews de PR" as a one-time manual setup step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nayor
changed the title
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Ca parle chinois pour moi. Juste 1 question : est-ce que le sanitize conserve les images et liens ? |
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WalkthroughThe change centralizes HTML sanitization, applies it to rendered content, restricts video iframes, adds Nginx security headers, and tightens GitHub Actions permissions and deployment controls. ChangesSecurity and deployment hardening
Priority: ⬆️ High Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~30 minutes Change: Bug fix Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The current workflows expose write-capable automation to mutable action revisions, and the new browser policy blocks the advertisement script and weather iframe. Pin the actions and allow the required origins before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 0.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 2 functions across 1 files. (15 skipped: 15 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 2📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🛠️ Fix failing CI checks 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 3
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In @.github/workflows/retrieve-i18n.yml:
- Around line 11-13: Update the workflow’s actions/checkout and
c2corg/transifex-pull-request-action references to reviewed, immutable full
commit SHAs instead of version tags. Keep the existing write permissions and
workflow behavior unchanged.
In `@docker/nginx.conf`:
- Line 52: Add https://static.admysports.com to the script-src directive and
https://www.meteoblue.com to the frame-src directive in the
Content-Security-Policy header. Preserve all existing directives and sources
unchanged, adding only these two origins.
In `@src/js/sanitize-html.js`:
- Around line 44-45: Update sanitizeRichHtml() and the related rich-content
rendering path so retained iframes are restricted to the generated video
structure or consistently receive the required sandboxing before rendering.
Ensure raw iframe elements without the expected div[c2c:role=video] wrapper
cannot render unsandboxed, while preserving the existing video iframe behavior.
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.github/workflows/ci.yml.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml.github/workflows/retrieve-i18n.yml.github/workflows/semantic-pull-request.yml.snykREADME.mddocker/nginx.confpackage.jsonsrc/components/generics/Markdown.vuesrc/components/helper/HelperWindow.vuesrc/components/yeti/map-layers/ProtectedAreasLayer.vuesrc/js/sanitize-html.jssrc/views/SiteNotice.vuesrc/views/document/utils/boxes/CommentsBox.vuesrc/views/portals/utils/BoardAnnoucementWidget.vuesrc/views/wiki/edition/utils/EditionContainer.vue
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Merci pour ton retour ! Principalement des modifs de sécu |
- retrieve-i18n.yml: pin actions/checkout and c2corg/transifex-pull-request-action to reviewed commit SHAs (the latter has no exact "v5" tag, only a moving "v5" branch - resolved to its current tip) instead of mutable version tags. - docker/nginx.conf: add the two real external origins the CSP was missing - https://static.admysports.com (ad script loaded in DfmAdLarge.vue/DfmAdSmall.vue) to script-src, https://www.meteoblue.com (weather widget iframe in SubPanelMeteo.vue) to frame-src. Verified both against actual usage before adding. - sanitize-html.js: the real finding here - sanitizeRichHtml() allow-listed <iframe> for the wiki video embeds, but nothing enforced sandboxing or restricted src beyond that allow-list. A raw <iframe src="..."> injected in wiki content outside the expected div[c2c:role=video] wrapper would pass through untouched and only Markdown.vue's computeVideos() (which only looks inside that wrapper) ever added the sandbox attribute - so a malicious raw iframe rendered fully unsandboxed. Added a DOMPurify uponSanitizeElement hook that drops any iframe whose src isn't one of the known video-player hosts and forces the sandbox attribute on the ones that remain, regardless of wrapper shape. Verified: eslint clean, npm run build succeeds (BUILD_ENV=camptocamp). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
| container.innerHTML = this.content; | ||
| // this.content comes from wiki articles converted from user-authored markdown: | ||
| // sanitize it before injecting it in the DOM to prevent stored XSS. | ||
| container.innerHTML = sanitizeRichHtml(this.content); |
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Will this break automatically turning link text into <a href> ?
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Verified with a real DOMPurify run: passes through both sanitizeHtml and sanitizeRichHtml completely untouched
/href are in DOMPurify's default allow-list and are never stripped. Sanitization only runs after markdown→HTML conversion (done server-side), so it can't affect how links get generated in the first place.
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Can we double check that all the sanitization doesn't result in loss of usability? Beginners don't know about markdown urls syntax, and I'm not sure how turning http into links is less secure. |
Checked the backend markdown parser (c2corg_api/markdown/init.py) ; it has no autolink extension enabled today, with or without this change. So pasting a bare URL without text syntax doesn't become clickable currently, and this PR doesn't make that worse or better, it's an orthogonal, pre-existing parser behavior, not something the sanitizer restricts. If we want that for beginners, it's a backend change (enable an autolink extension), and it wouldn't be "less secure": DOMPurify already allows unconditionally, so an autolinked plain URL would sanitize exactly the same as a manually-linked one. Separately worth noting: the wiki content this sanitizer processes already goes through server-side bleach cleaning before reaching the frontend, so this DOMPurify pass is mostly defense-in-depth there. It's not redundant everywhere though — forum posts (Discourse) never pass through that backend cleaner, so for that content path this is the only sanitization c2c_ui controls. |
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Summary by CodeRabbit
Security
New Features
Documentation
Maintenance