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🔒 Fix SSRF vulnerability in TEI proxy endpoint path handling - #122
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Validate requested paths in _proxy_to_tei against an explicit allowlist (ALLOWED_TEI_PATHS) to prevent SSRF and unauthorized endpoint invocation. Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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🎯 What: The
_proxy_to_teihelper insrc/app/dependencies/services.pynow enforces an explicit whitelist (ALLOWED_TEI_PATHS = {"/v1/embeddings", "/rerank", "/predict", "/embed"}) before appending paths totei_url.patharguments passed to_proxy_to_teiallowed potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) or arbitrary internal endpoint targeting on the TEI server instance.🛡️ Solution: Validates that
pathis inALLOWED_TEI_PATHS, raising HTTP 400 if invalid, and safely formats the target URL usingtei_url.rstrip('/'). Comprehensive unit tests were added tosrc/tests/test_tei_proxy.py.PR created automatically by Jules for task 10672689314195510687 started by @chottokun