[criptogus]

Summary

Publishing the first21 qualified business versions made archive and compatibility rows directly readable by the anonymous database role. The unchanged public-read check rejected both tables.

anonymous visitor
  published-package API/server gate
  exact current metadata + verified plugin archive

direct table reader
  authenticated role + existing row predicates

Restrict only the two SELECT policies to authenticated readers. Keep the allowlist, row predicates, administrator/author permissions and adversarial criteria unchanged. Record the access boundary in an ADR and add a finite publication verifier for21 source-bound metadata/plugin endpoints.

Evidence

• Before: anonymous-access verification failed on21 archive rows and21 compatibility rows after publication.
  **After:**92-table RLS/anonymous verification passes with the same allowlist;21/21 public metadata and plugin manifests remain accessible with the qualified source/version and exclusive supported model.
• The native transactional business RLS suite passed36 assertions with rollback, including stronger direct-anonymous-read denials. The two-policy migration was then applied and verified.
• Project batch10/10 passed, including228 Node tests, strict lint, types, audit, build and generated artifacts. New CLI regressions reject empty/no-op cohorts and report overwrites.
• Original273-case adversarial contract, raw responses,21 published0.1.4 archives and exact-model qualification remain unchanged.

Merge Danger

Door: two-way

Blast Radius: evidence

Anonymous direct database consumers must use the existing public package APIs. Authenticated row access and server-mediated public metadata/downloads remain available. No approval/publication flags are changed by the migration; no Lovable generation calls.