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Block unlisted egress in the catalogue's credential-holding publish and release jobs #628

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Description

@devantler

🤖 Generated by the Agentic Engineer (interactive Claude Code session)

Evidence

step-security/harden-runner is the first step of nearly every job across the catalogue, as the repository's own rule requires. All 143 egress-policy settings in .github/ and actions/ are audit (counted 2026-10-17), which records outbound connections and blocks none. That includes the jobs that hold signing identities, registry write tokens and App tokens: publishing, release and the signed-fix writer. The pinned version (v2.22.1) is current and postdates this year's published bypass advisories.

Class of failure this would contain

A compromised dependency or tool inside a credential-holding job could send that credential to an arbitrary host. Under audit, that is recorded and allowed. Under block with a reviewed allow-list, it is refused.

DevEx side

Block mode fails a job when a legitimate endpoint is missing from its allow-list. That is friction unless the allow-list is derived from observed traffic, and unless a failure names the refused host and the exact file to edit. Consumers must not have to write allow-lists for the shared workflows. The catalogue owns them.

Direction

  1. Start with the jobs that hold write or signing credentials in publish-app, publish-manifests and create-release. Read-only validation jobs stay in audit.
  2. Derive each job's allow-list from recorded audit traffic over a representative window. Keep it beside the workflow and review it like code.
  3. Ship it behind a default-off input, try it on the catalogue's own release first, then on one consumer, and flip the default only after a clean window. This is the repository's feature-flag-first rule.
  4. Make a refused connection fail with the host name and the allow-list file to change.

Acceptance criteria

  • Each credential-holding job in the three workflows can run in block mode behind an opt-in input, and both states are tested.
  • A test proves an unlisted host is refused and the failure names it.
  • One full release of this repository and one consumer release succeed in block mode before the default flips.
  • Read-only jobs and the everyday consumer configuration are unchanged.

Priority rationale: the jobs with the most to lose currently have the least containment, and the control is already installed and only needs switching on. Effort: medium; most of the work is deriving allow-lists. Prerequisites: none. It is lower priority than the security bump and the instruction-file work in this repository.

Rough size: M.

Activity

  1. moved this to 📥 Backlog in 🌊 Project Boardon Oct 17, 2026
  2. devantler commented on Nov 12, 2026

    @devantler
    ContributorAuthor

    🤖 Generated by the Agentic Engineer

    Measured egress for the credential-holding jobs (2026-11-12)

    Direction step 2 asks for allow-lists derived from recorded audit traffic. StepSecurity's public run insights for these public repositories record every outbound host each step reached. These are the hosts the steps reached, excluding the runner's own end-of-job calls:

    Job Window Hosts reached (all on port 443)
    create-release → release 12 successful runs, 5 repositories (ksail, platform, go-template, world-at-ruin, wedding-app); telemetry present in all 12 github.com, api.github.com, registry.npmjs.org
    publish-manifests → publish 10 successful runs (.github CD and aws CD); telemetry present in 7 github.com, ghcr.io, pkg-containers.githubusercontent.com, release-assets.githubusercontent.com, fulcio.sigstore.dev, rekor.sigstore.dev, timestamp.sigstore.dev, tuf-repo-cdn.sigstore.dev
    publish-app → publish not measured yet Image builds pull whatever each consumer's own build needs, so this list varies by consumer

    Every run was otherwise identical in shape: the same hosts appeared in every run that had telemetry. Three aws runs carried no telemetry and prove nothing either way.

    Suggested order

    1. create-release first. It is the smallest list, it is used by about 20 repositories, and changing it needs no other approval. The two publishers are different: their exact revision is part of the signing identity that Platform verifies, so a change there also waits for Platform to approve the new revision before any consumer can use it.
    2. publish-manifests next, with the list above, once Platform approval for the new revision is lined up.
    3. publish-app last. Its image-build traffic depends on the consumer, so it needs a design that does not make consumers write allow-lists (the DevEx constraint above).

    The first slice is filed as a sub-issue.

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