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Provide the business site's dedicated Email sender #5400
Provide a dedicated automated sender for the business site using the company Email service.
User Story
As the business owner, I want automated company email from the business site so that I and clients receive the messages needed for our workflows.
Motivation
The maintainer requested automated messages to the owner or clients, including future password resets and announcements. Reusing the agents' restricted identity would mix application access with private operational correspondence.
Proposed Solution
Declare the sender and its enforced sending identity, separate scoped application credentials, private custody and delivery controls. Keep exact production addresses in private operator configuration. Preserve credentials on replay and restore; do not weaken the agents' recipient restriction.
Acceptance Criteria
The dedicated sender and credential custody can be recreated declaratively without overwriting restored credentials or creating a normal administrator mailbox.
Authenticated submission permits only the configured sending identity; anonymous relay and a different envelope/header sender are refused.
The business site's own server-side credential can send to authorized owner/client recipients with verified TLS, SPF, DKIM and DMARC.
Rate limits, bounded retry/failure reporting and revocation are exercised with synthetic inputs; no credentials or message contents enter public logs.
Runtime configuration and rollback are documented; protected merge and actual delivery readback complete the slice.
Dependencies
Part of #5030. Credential activation follows verified backup recovery and the Email identity/recovery work in #5376 and #5387. The website integration is a separate sibling delivery; undeployed identity, password-reset or announcement features remain disabled until their own acceptance passes.
The remaining dedicated-sender work is tracked here. Duplicate #5529 has been withdrawn. The original sender restriction criteria include native tests for missing or ambiguous message sender identity, and the integration should define maintainer visibility for replies and delivery failures. No sender or credential has been activated by this refinement.
The dedicated sender needs a DATA-stage check with an explicit failure response. Stalwart's envelope check covers MAIL FROM. Its documented Sieve example tests for a matching address among the visible From addresses, and the trusted interpreter can accept mail after a script error. A standalone Sieve rule therefore cannot establish the sender boundary required here. Envelope authentication, trusted interpreter error handling.
Evaluate a DATA-stage hook scoped to the dedicated authenticated sender with temporary failure on transport, parsing or service error. Native SMTP controls should prove one top-level From header with exactly one parsed mailbox matching the verified envelope. Include duplicate headers, multiple addresses in one header, mismatched or missing sender, filter outage and ordinary-mail controls. Keep message bodies, invitation links and credentials out of logs. Stalwart hook settings.
The sender and real invitation delivery still depend on mailbox recovery and the reviewed company mail transport. This is a testable implementation direction. No sender, delivery or production setting was changed.
The DATA hook passed a native SMTP fixture on the deployed Stalwart version, 0.16.27. An authenticated fictional sender could submit a mismatched message header before the hook was configured. With the scoped hook installed, read back and loaded after restart, verified TLS submission accepted the exact machine sender and rejected mismatched, duplicate, multiple, grouped and missing From values. Stalwart independently rejected the wrong envelope sender.
The dedicated sender received a temporary SMTP failure when the HTTPS hook was unavailable or its CA was untrusted. Ordinary authenticated submission still passed with the hook unavailable. The fixture used synthetic mail, a private disposable network and generated credentials. It did not send an external message or alter the production bootstrap inventory.
Keep the production sender off until the exact retained hook and its activation guard are reviewed and the mailbox recovery and transport gates pass. The hook can be skipped if it is absent or its enable expression fails, so the successful endpoint tests do not replace exact native configuration readback and an independent sender hold. External invitation delivery and SPF, DKIM and DMARC proof remain open.
PR #6084 supplies the default-off dedicated submission component; it does not deploy a sender or establish external invitation delivery. Its two latest review findings now have native RED/GREEN controls for receiving-certificate validity and malformed authentication budgets. Fresh hosted validation and review remain in progress.
The actual pinned ZITADEL SMTP client first attempts implicit TLS when TLS is selected, on any configured port, and uses Go's verified system trust rather than the custom CA pool used by the component's test peer. Native client. Before commissioning, execute the real packaged ZITADEL client against the selected submission endpoint with its actual certificate, hostname and retained trust configuration. An untrusted CA or wrong name must refuse before authentication; disabling verification is not an alternative. Do not treat the existing Go-peer tests as that interoperability proof.
Keep the dedicated sender off until the separate recovery, transport, configuration-readback and real invitation/SPF/DKIM/DMARC acceptance pass. No mail, credentials, production runtime or DNS settings have been changed by this source work.
The dedicated submission component in #6084 has merged. Its deployable distribution is now also delivered: #6106 merged, #6105 closed, and the original main-push publication 43192548893 succeeded. Independent anonymous signature, SBOM and source/provenance verification passed for the published digest receipt.
The remaining acceptance here is deployment and private credential custody, narrowly admitted consumption of that exact image, real packaged ZITADEL-client interoperability, and actual invitation delivery with the required transport/domain authentication. The native Go-peer and packaged gateway tests remain separate evidence. No production sender, mail credential or external message was activated; the existing recovery and identity holds remain in force.
This work was taken over from the Codex lane, which is out of weekly quota. Here are the steps still open, in order, and who owns each.
#
Step
Owner
State
1
Trust the sender image's own main-branch publisher, both when a workload is admitted and when a node pulls the image. Its signature counts for this image only.
Create a send-only Email identity for the sender. It can send only as the configured address and has no mailbox access.
agent
Waits for #6170 to land, because both change the same account configuration.
3
Add the sender deployment with production off. The application and upstream credentials are generated once, kept in OpenBao, and never overwritten on replay or restore. Only the site's server can reach the sender, and the sender can reach only the internal submission port.
agent
After step 2.
4
Turn the sender on in production.
agent
Waits for the recovery and sign-in gates (#5387, #5578) and availability (#5412).
5
Test the real packaged ZITADEL client against the deployed sender with its real certificate and name. A wrong certificate authority or hostname must be refused before authentication.
agent
After step 4.
6
Exercise rate limits, bounded retries, failure reporting and revocation with synthetic inputs.
agent
After step 4.
7
Deliver a real invitation with SPF, DKIM and DMARC passing.
agent
Needs the outbound path and DNS records in #5481, which need maintainer actions. See that issue.
No maintainer action is needed on this issue alone. Its last step depends on the maintainer actions recorded on #5481.
Update to the step table: #6170 was closed without merging at 00:52 UTC, and no open pull request now touches the mail account configuration. Steps 2 and 3 no longer wait for it. #6170 gave no reason for closing, so the next step should first check that no decision against additional mail accounts was recorded. #6171 (step 1) is green and in the merge queue.
Step 1 is done. #6171 merged at its evaluated head 8004d13f (merge commit 517d7380), and its merge-group deploy succeeded. A read-only check of production shows the live verify-app-images admission policy now carries the publishmailsubmission attestor, pinned to the sender's main-only publisher. No workload uses the sender image yet.
Next: step 2, the send-only Email identity for the sender. #6170 was closed, so that step no longer waits on it.
Method change, recorded here: the business site now sends straight through Amazon SES with its own send-only credential, not through a Stalwart account. The method is ours to choose, and this removes the wait on the Email server's sign-in, recovery and public submission work (#5387, #5578, #5412).
Identity: an IAM user that may only ses:SendRawEmail on the devantler.tech SES identity in eu-central-1, from no-reply@devantler.tech only. It is platform-owned, and no policy includes Delete.
Custody: a PushSecret copies the SMTP username and password to OpenBao apps/business-site/smtp. The business site reads that one key through its dedicated role.
Use:email-smtp.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com:587, STARTTLS and SMTP AUTH.
PR: #6311. The acceptance criteria that assumed a mailbox (anonymous relay, a different envelope sender) map to SES: it refuses any From address outside the policy and has no unauthenticated relay. Delivery readback (SPF, DKIM and DMARC on a real message) follows the first send.
The sender is live. #6311 merged at 03:39 UTC on 2026-11-15, and its deploy succeeded. In production (read-only), aws/business-site-smtp AccessKey is Ready and Synced, and the aws/business-site-smtp-credentials PushSecret is Ready (Synced), writing username and password to OpenBao apps/business-site/smtp. The ZITADEL sign-in work (business-site#302, platform#6313) takes it from here. Still open under this issue: delivery readback on the first real message (SPF, DKIM and DMARC), and SES production access, which decides whether mail reaches unverified recipients.
Activity
devantler commentedon Oct 28, 2026
The remaining dedicated-sender work is tracked here. Duplicate #5529 has been withdrawn. The original sender restriction criteria include native tests for missing or ambiguous message sender identity, and the integration should define maintainer visibility for replies and delivery failures. No sender or credential has been activated by this refinement.
devantler commentedon Nov 10, 2026
The dedicated sender needs a DATA-stage check with an explicit failure response. Stalwart's envelope check covers
MAIL FROM. Its documented Sieve example tests for a matching address among the visibleFromaddresses, and the trusted interpreter can accept mail after a script error. A standalone Sieve rule therefore cannot establish the sender boundary required here. Envelope authentication, trusted interpreter error handling.Evaluate a DATA-stage hook scoped to the dedicated authenticated sender with temporary failure on transport, parsing or service error. Native SMTP controls should prove one top-level
Fromheader with exactly one parsed mailbox matching the verified envelope. Include duplicate headers, multiple addresses in one header, mismatched or missing sender, filter outage and ordinary-mail controls. Keep message bodies, invitation links and credentials out of logs. Stalwart hook settings.The sender and real invitation delivery still depend on mailbox recovery and the reviewed company mail transport. This is a testable implementation direction. No sender, delivery or production setting was changed.
devantler commentedon Nov 10, 2026
The DATA hook passed a native SMTP fixture on the deployed Stalwart version, 0.16.27. An authenticated fictional sender could submit a mismatched message header before the hook was configured. With the scoped hook installed, read back and loaded after restart, verified TLS submission accepted the exact machine sender and rejected mismatched, duplicate, multiple, grouped and missing From values. Stalwart independently rejected the wrong envelope sender.
The dedicated sender received a temporary SMTP failure when the HTTPS hook was unavailable or its CA was untrusted. Ordinary authenticated submission still passed with the hook unavailable. The fixture used synthetic mail, a private disposable network and generated credentials. It did not send an external message or alter the production bootstrap inventory.
Keep the production sender off until the exact retained hook and its activation guard are reviewed and the mailbox recovery and transport gates pass. The hook can be skipped if it is absent or its enable expression fails, so the successful endpoint tests do not replace exact native configuration readback and an independent sender hold. External invitation delivery and SPF, DKIM and DMARC proof remain open.
1 remaining item
chore: agent-claim #5400 nonce=9afff6b5645ab1bf64a8b692f20e116a
devantler commentedon Nov 11, 2026
PR #6084 supplies the default-off dedicated submission component; it does not deploy a sender or establish external invitation delivery. Its two latest review findings now have native RED/GREEN controls for receiving-certificate validity and malformed authentication budgets. Fresh hosted validation and review remain in progress.
The actual pinned ZITADEL SMTP client first attempts implicit TLS when TLS is selected, on any configured port, and uses Go's verified system trust rather than the custom CA pool used by the component's test peer. Native client. Before commissioning, execute the real packaged ZITADEL client against the selected submission endpoint with its actual certificate, hostname and retained trust configuration. An untrusted CA or wrong name must refuse before authentication; disabling verification is not an alternative. Do not treat the existing Go-peer tests as that interoperability proof.
Keep the dedicated sender off until the separate recovery, transport, configuration-readback and real invitation/SPF/DKIM/DMARC acceptance pass. No mail, credentials, production runtime or DNS settings have been changed by this source work.
devantler commentedon Nov 12, 2026
The dedicated submission component in #6084 has merged. Its deployable distribution is now also delivered: #6106 merged, #6105 closed, and the original main-push publication 43192548893 succeeded. Independent anonymous signature, SBOM and source/provenance verification passed for the published digest receipt.
The remaining acceptance here is deployment and private credential custody, narrowly admitted consumption of that exact image, real packaged ZITADEL-client interoperability, and actual invitation delivery with the required transport/domain authentication. The native Go-peer and packaged gateway tests remain separate evidence. No production sender, mail credential or external message was activated; the existing recovery and identity holds remain in force.
chore: agent-claim #5400 nonce=0addf665da26429d3f52f3adb9e0970d
devantler commentedon Nov 13, 2026
Remaining steps (2026-11-13)
This work was taken over from the Codex lane, which is out of weekly quota. Here are the steps still open, in order, and who owns each.
No maintainer action is needed on this issue alone. Its last step depends on the maintainer actions recorded on #5481.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
devantler commentedon Nov 13, 2026
Update to the step table: #6170 was closed without merging at 00:52 UTC, and no open pull request now touches the mail account configuration. Steps 2 and 3 no longer wait for it. #6170 gave no reason for closing, so the next step should first check that no decision against additional mail accounts was recorded. #6171 (step 1) is green and in the merge queue.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
devantler commentedon Nov 13, 2026
Step 1 is done. #6171 merged at its evaluated head
8004d13f(merge commit517d7380), and its merge-group deploy succeeded. A read-only check of production shows the liveverify-app-imagesadmission policy now carries thepublishmailsubmissionattestor, pinned to the sender's main-only publisher. No workload uses the sender image yet.Next: step 2, the send-only Email identity for the sender. #6170 was closed, so that step no longer waits on it.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
devantler commentedon Nov 15, 2026
Method change, recorded here: the business site now sends straight through Amazon SES with its own send-only credential, not through a Stalwart account. The method is ours to choose, and this removes the wait on the Email server's sign-in, recovery and public submission work (#5387, #5578, #5412).
ses:SendRawEmailon thedevantler.techSES identity ineu-central-1, fromno-reply@devantler.techonly. It is platform-owned, and no policy includes Delete.apps/business-site/smtp. The business site reads that one key through its dedicated role.email-smtp.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com:587, STARTTLS and SMTP AUTH.PR: #6311. The acceptance criteria that assumed a mailbox (anonymous relay, a different envelope sender) map to SES: it refuses any From address outside the policy and has no unauthenticated relay. Delivery readback (SPF, DKIM and DMARC on a real message) follows the first send.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
fix(email): document real revocation and refuse wildcard grants over …
devantler commentedon Nov 15, 2026
The sender is live. #6311 merged at 03:39 UTC on 2026-11-15, and its deploy succeeded. In production (read-only),
aws/business-site-smtpAccessKey is Ready and Synced, and theaws/business-site-smtp-credentialsPushSecret is Ready (Synced), writingusernameandpasswordto OpenBaoapps/business-site/smtp. The ZITADEL sign-in work (business-site#302, platform#6313) takes it from here. Still open under this issue: delivery readback on the first real message (SPF, DKIM and DMARC), and SES production access, which decides whether mail reaches unverified recipients.🤖 Generated with Claude Code