| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.0.x | ✅ |
| < 1.0 | ❌ |
Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
If you discover a security vulnerability in FortressQL, please report it responsibly:
- Email: security@dyber.org
- Subject line:
[FortressQL Security] <brief description> - PGP: If you need to encrypt your report, contact us for our PGP public key.
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce (minimal test case if possible)
- Impact assessment — what an attacker could achieve
- Affected versions — which FortressQL versions are impacted
- Affected component — TDE, WAL signing, pgcrypto_pqc, PQC TLS, core, etc.
| Stage | Timeline |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgment | Within 48 hours |
| Initial assessment | Within 7 days |
| Fix development | Within 30 days (critical), 90 days (moderate) |
| Public disclosure | Coordinated with reporter after fix is released |
| Severity | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | Remote code execution, key material exposure, TDE bypass | Plaintext key in logs, buffer overflow in PQC code |
| High | Authentication bypass, data integrity violation | WAL signature forgery, KEM decapsulation failure |
| Medium | Information disclosure, denial of service | Timing side-channel in PQC operations, crash via malformed input |
| Low | Minor information leak, non-default configuration issue | Version disclosure, debug info in error messages |
Security issues in the following areas are of particular interest:
- PQC algorithm integration — incorrect use of liboqs APIs, key material handling
- Transparent Data Encryption — key cache security, page encryption/decryption, key rotation
- WAL signing — signature generation/verification, tamper detection bypass
- TLS transport — PQC key exchange negotiation, hybrid mode downgrade attacks
- Authentication — pqc-cert verification bypass, SCRAM implementation
- pgcrypto_pqc — hybrid encryption, key encapsulation, signature verification
- Memory safety — secret key material exposure, missing secure wipes, use-after-free
FortressQL's post-quantum cryptography stack:
- Key Encapsulation: ML-KEM-512/768/1024 (FIPS 203) via liboqs
- Digital Signatures: ML-DSA-44/65/87 (FIPS 204) via liboqs
- Hash-Based Signatures: SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) via liboqs
- Symmetric Encryption: AES-256-GCM (TDE) via OpenSSL
- TLS: Hybrid classical + PQC key exchange via OpenSSL 3.x
| Component | Library | Version Policy |
|---|---|---|
| PQC algorithms | liboqs | Track latest stable |
| TLS / AES | OpenSSL | 3.x required |
| Random number generation | OpenSSL CSPRNG | System entropy source |
- No formal cryptographic audit yet — the PQC integration has been reviewed internally but has not undergone a third-party cryptographic audit. See Security Posture for details.
- Side-channel resistance — liboqs algorithms implement constant-time operations where specified by NIST standards, but the FortressQL integration layer (key cache, TDE page encryption) has not been formally analyzed for side-channel leaks.
- Key management — TDE master keys are stored on the filesystem. Hardware Security Module (HSM) integration is planned for a future release.
Issues related to the underlying PQC algorithms should be reported to NIST or Open Quantum Safe.
We do not currently operate a formal bug bounty program. However, we deeply appreciate responsible disclosure and will publicly credit reporters (with permission) in our release notes and security advisories.
Security advisories will be published as GitHub Security Advisories and announced on the project's releases page.