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Security: faisalkhan91/Tare

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security vulnerabilities privately to the project maintainers through the channel where you received the project. Do not open a public issue for security-sensitive reports.

We aim to acknowledge a report within a few days and will coordinate a fix and disclosure timeline with you. There is no bug-bounty program.

Scope

Tare is a local-first, single-user desktop app + CLI. It runs on your own machine, stores data in a local SQLite database, and does not have accounts, multi-tenancy, or a hosted backend. The most relevant surfaces are:

  • The local read API and OTLP receiver, which bind to loopback (127.0.0.1) only.
  • The optional loopback proxy (tare serve), which forwards model traffic to a fixed, allowlisted set of provider base URLs.
  • Ingestion of untrusted transcript / OTLP JSON, which is size-capped and parsed without panicking on malformed input.

Redaction is best-effort (opt-in max_inspect)

By default Tare stores only token counts and attribution — never your prompts or responses.

The opt-in max_inspect privacy profile is the exception: it stores request/response bodies locally, in a store separate from the counts database (with PRAGMA secure_delete so a purge overwrites freed pages). Before any body is written, it passes through a redaction layer (tare-core/src/redact.rs) that masks known secret shapes — API keys, Bearer/Basic auth, sk-/sk_/pk_ keys, GitHub/GitLab/Slack/AWS/Google keys, JWTs, PEM private-key blocks, and emails.

Honest ceiling: this is a best-effort scrubber over well-known patterns, not a guarantee that no secret survives. A novel key format or a secret embedded in prose can slip through. Treat the stored text as "scrubbed of the obvious," not "safe to publish." Redaction deliberately prefers over-masking (false positives) to leaks (false negatives). The feature is opt-in and the data never leaves your machine, but you should enable max_inspect only when you understand this.

You can inspect the redaction patterns in tare-core/src/redact.rs and purge the transcript store at any time.

Supported versions

Tare is pre-1.0 and under active development. Security fixes are applied to the latest main; there are no long-term support branches yet.

There aren't any published security advisories