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security: fix #167-#172 — credential isolation, path traversal, TLS verification, token leakage#173

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mjudeikis merged 4 commits intomainfrom
security/issues-167-172
Mar 31, 2026
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security: fix #167-#172 — credential isolation, path traversal, TLS verification, token leakage#173
mjudeikis merged 4 commits intomainfrom
security/issues-167-172

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Fixes #167, #168, #169, #170, #171, #172

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mjudeikis-bot and others added 3 commits March 31, 2026 12:51
…, TLS verification

#167: add kcp impersonation headers (Impersonate-User/Group) in OIDC and
static-token proxy paths so kcp enforces per-user RBAC instead of all
requests running with admin credentials.

#168: validate JWT clusterName claim against strict regex before using
it in URL path construction; reject invalid values with 401.

#169: document that all tunneled k8s requests run at agent-SA privilege
level; per-user scoping in the downstream cluster is not yet supported.

#170: remove static token bypass for SubjectAccessReview in edges proxy;
all tokens (static and OIDC) now go through authorizeFn equally.

#171: populate CertificateAuthorityData from hub serving cert in
auto-generated agent kubeconfigs instead of unconditional
InsecureSkipTLSVerify: true; fall back to InsecureSkipTLSVerify only
in devMode.

#172: strip Authorization header before forwarding the raw upgrade
request to the edge agent, preventing user OIDC tokens from
unnecessarily transiting the reverse tunnel.

Co-authored-by: Mangirdas Judeikis <mangirdas@judeikis.lt>
The buildEdgesProxyHandler was calling authorizeFn for all tokens including
static tokens, which broke TestEdgesProxy_StaticTokenBypassesAuth and
TestEdgesProxy_StaticToken_BypassesAuthorization.

Static tokens are pre-authenticated server-side credentials and must skip
kcp SubjectAccessReview, consistent with the agent-proxy handler.

Fixes the CI test failure on security/issues-167-172.
When the hub kubeconfig contains CertificateAuthorityData (populated by
the rbac_reconciler from ServingCertFile) but the agent is also started
with --hub-insecure-skip-tls-verify, rest.TLSConfigFor rejects the
combination with 'specifying a root certificates file with the insecure
flag is not allowed'.

Fix: zero out TLSClientConfig.CAData and CAFile before calling
TLSConfigFor when Insecure=true is requested.

Fixes OIDC and multisite e2e failures introduced by #171 kubeconfig
CA embedding.

Signed-off-by: mjudeikis-bot <bot@faros.sh>
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Reviewed all 6 files. Security fixes look correct:

  • agent.go: CA data + Insecure=true conflict fixed correctly.
  • tunnel/server.go: Agent-SA privilege level docs are good. Impersonation callout noted.
  • rbac_reconciler.go: hubCAData/devMode split is right approach. Minor: ServingCertFile read won't pick up cert rotations but acceptable for one-time kubeconfig generation.
  • proxy.go: Path traversal regex ^[a-z0-9]+(?:[:-][a-z0-9]+)*$ correct for kcp cluster names. Impersonation headers fix the shared-admin-creds issue.
  • edges_proxy_builder.go: Condition rewrite is cleaner and semantically equivalent. Authorization strip on upgrade requests is correct.

LGTM from Hex review. Ready to merge once CI passes.

@mjudeikis mjudeikis merged commit 966c641 into main Mar 31, 2026
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security: shared admin transport used for all user proxy requests — zero per-user credential isolation

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