Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories. Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.
Include what you can: the command or flow, what you expected, what happened, and whether a credential could leave the machine. We aim to acknowledge within three business days.
Never include a real credential in a report. All CLI output is redacted to
a masked fn2d_…wxyz form already, so paste it as printed.
These are the properties worth attacking; a break in any of them is a vulnerability, not a bug report.
| Guarantee | Where it lives |
|---|---|
The credential is only ever sent to https://fn2.ai or *.fn2.ai |
config.enforce_base_url |
No secret appears in output, --json, error text, or argv |
config.mask / config.redact, storage (Keychain writes go over stdin) |
No working-directory file can inject a credential or endpoint: there is no .env support |
config.resolve |
Stored credentials are owner-only: directory 0700, file 0600, symlinks refused, O_NOFOLLOW on write |
storage._write_owner_json |
| The pending device-login state never contains an access token | storage.save_pending |
| A server-supplied poll interval cannot wedge the CLI | deviceauth.poll_until_complete |
A device credential is scoped and revocable. Its scopes are agents,
models, and research (read-only: FN2's market data and the notes your own
agents saved). It cannot read or change billing, email, or password; cannot
open a web session or read your chats; and cannot approve new devices or
create API keys.
fn2 auth logout --revokeOr revoke it in the FN2 AI web app under Preferences → Developer → Connected Devices. Revocation takes effect within a few minutes everywhere.
Signing in again on a machine that already holds a device credential revokes the one being replaced, so a superseded credential does not stay active. The old token is sent only to the endpoint that issued it, and a failure to revoke never blocks the new sign-in.
The latest release on main is supported. Fixes ship forward; there are no
backport branches.