🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix Git command injections and config attacks#63
🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix Git command injections and config attacks#63tachyon-beep wants to merge 2 commits into
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Passed `_SAFE_GIT_CONFIG = ("-c", "core.fsmonitor=false")` to all untrusted Git subprocess executions in delta and legis.
Co-authored-by: tachyon-beep <544926+tachyon-beep@users.noreply.github.com>
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Passed `_SAFE_GIT_CONFIG = ("-c", "core.fsmonitor=false")` to all untrusted Git subprocess executions in delta and legis.
Co-authored-by: tachyon-beep <544926+tachyon-beep@users.noreply.github.com>
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| assert mock_run.call_args_list[1].args[0] == ["git", "-c", "core.fsmonitor=false", "rev-parse", "--verify", "--end-of-options", "HEAD~1"] | ||
| assert mock_run.call_args_list[2].args[0] == ["git", "-c", "core.fsmonitor=false", "diff", "--name-only", "abc123", "--"] |
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The CI lint job in .github/workflows/ci.yml runs uv run ruff check src tests, and pyproject.toml sets line-length = 120; these newly-expanded assertions are 141 and 125 characters, so ruff check tests/unit/core/test_delta.py --select E501 fails before the PR can pass lint. Please split the expected argv lists over multiple lines.
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| if TYPE_CHECKING: | ||
| from wardline.scanner.index import Entity | ||
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| _SAFE_GIT_CONFIG = ("-c", "core.fsmonitor=false") |
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The same CI job also runs uv run ruff format --check src tests; inserting this top-level constant with only one blank line before the following def makes ruff format --check report the changed source files would be reformatted, so fixing the E501s alone still leaves the PR red. Add the formatter-required extra blank line here and at the matching new constant in src/wardline/core/legis.py.
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🚨 Severity: MEDIUM
💡 Vulnerability: Potential arbitrary local code execution when running
gitsubprocess commands against untrusted repositories due to malicious.git/configconfigurations such ascore.fsmonitor.🎯 Impact: An attacker can get arbitrary code execution on the analysis server/machine running Wardline if the tool scans a malicious Git repository.
🔧 Fix: Add the
_SAFE_GIT_CONFIG = ("-c", "core.fsmonitor=false")tosubprocess.runcalls evaluating Git commands indelta.pyandlegis.py.✅ Verification: Ran
make testto ensure all functionality is still operational and test assertions for mock run args match the new-c core.fsmonitor=falsepayload.PR created automatically by Jules for task 12815921081369848082 started by @tachyon-beep