🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix arbitrary code execution via git config

[tachyon-beep]

🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Calling git via subprocess against potentially untrusted directories can lead to local code execution via malicious .git/config files (e.g., core.fsmonitor exploitation). Some git commands in delta.py and legis.py lacked the _SAFE_GIT_CONFIG parameter.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could gain local code execution if they can control the root directory provided to wardline when using these features.
🔧 Fix: Add the _SAFE_GIT_CONFIG parameter to all remaining git subprocess calls in src/wardline/core/delta.py and src/wardline/core/legis.py to prevent loading malicious config files.
✅ Verification: Ran make test and make lint to ensure test assertions pass with updated parameters and functionality has not regressed.

---

PR created automatically by Jules for task 10268765486506753183 started by @tachyon-beep

[google-labs-jules]

👋 Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request.

When you start a review, I'll add a 👀 emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down.

I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job!

For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with @jules. You can find this option in the Pull Request section of your global Jules UI settings. You can always switch back!

New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs.

---

For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task.