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🎯 What: The auto-updater hardcoded the mount path (
⚠️ Risk: An attacker or malicious process could preemptively mount a volume at
/Volumes/Click2Minimize) when attaching the downloaded application DMG./Volumes/Click2Minimizewith a compromisedClick2Minimize.app. The auto-updater would then inadvertently copy and install the malicious application to/Applicationsand run it, leading to arbitrary code execution under the user's privileges.🛡️ Solution: Modified the
hdiutil attachcommand to include-plistand-nobrowsearguments, and to pipe its standard output. Parsed the output usingPropertyListSerializationto dynamically resolve the actualmount-pointassigned by the system, ensuring the correct, newly downloaded DMG is always copied.PR created automatically by Jules for task 673254276934679037 started by @hatimhtm