api/app/vulnerable/authorizer.py implements an authorization fail-open on
purpose. It is the subject of the lab. Do not copy it, and do not deploy this
project anywhere that matters.
Specifically, BLACKOUT is not safe to expose to a network:
- authentication is a single unverified
X-Userheader; POST /control/modecan switch the active authorization implementation;POST /control/failure-modecan break the authorization dependency;- there is no TLS, no rate limiting and no CSRF protection anywhere.
Everything binds to 127.0.0.1 by default, and the Docker Compose file
publishes ports only on the loopback interface. Keep it that way.
No real credential, key, token, password or secret appears anywhere in this
repository. The "secrets" returned by the protected endpoint are the literal
strings BLACKOUT-DEMO-SECRET-001 and BLACKOUT-DEMO-SECRET-002, defined in
api/app/resources.py, and the response body labels itself as synthetic lab
data.
The telemetry emitter refuses to log values whose key names look like
credentials (password, secret, token, api_key, cookie, credential,
private_key, and the exact names authorization, auth, session).
If you find a defect in BLACKOUT that is not the intended vulnerability — for example the secure implementation granting access, the detector missing a true positive, or a way to reach the fail-open path in secure mode — please open an issue with:
- the failure mode and implementation you used;
- the request you sent;
- the trace ID from the response, and the matching lines from
logs/security-events.jsonl.
The security regression suite is tests/security/. A report that comes with a
failing test is the most useful kind.