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Security: hudsonwa/botport

Security

docs/SECURITY.md

g2h security model

What g2h is, and is not. g2h is a bridge between two bots you own, both running as your user. It reduces the chance that one bot treats the other's text as instructions (framing, hop limit, caps, owner-approved ops); a language model can still follow framed text, so this is defence in depth, not a guarantee. It is not a security boundary against a bot that already has a shell as your user: such a bot can change g2h's config or skip g2h entirely. That is the default. Running g2hd as a separate OS user is implemented as an opt-in mode ([separate_user]; not yet run in production): its config, state and approval step are then out of the bots' reach if the recipe's conditions hold (root-owned paths, and the whole setup and every approve done from a separate admin account's own login session); see the conditions there. Setup: G2H-SEPARATE-USER.md. g2h doctor says which mode is running.

g2h connects two bots that act for the same owner on one machine: a Grok Bot (through its computer connector) and a Hermes bot. It assumes either bot may be confused or prompt-injected by the other, and that the machine's other users are not trusted. The defaults below are about those two threats, not about containing a bot that already runs commands as you.

Assets

  • The routine webhook URL + sender key. Anyone holding them can run the owner's routine and spend credit, and can steer a Grok Bot that has a computer connector to act on the owner's machine (the routine prompts limit this to g2h verbs). Treat them like a password.
  • The owner's Grok credit and Hermes tokens (cost), and both bots' tools (actions).
  • The message log (what the bots said).

Threats and defaults

Threat Default
Network attacker No listener at all: g2hd serves only a Unix socket in the g2h home (dir 0700, socket 0600). The wake webhook is one outbound HTTPS POST. No tunnel, no port.
Other local users Home 0700; credentials must be 0600 (refused otherwise, without reading it); state written 0600 atomically.
Secret leakage Credentials never logged or shown (status/setup --check say set/missing/bad; logs carry the webhook host only). https:// POSTs go through curl with its config on stdin (not in ps). Outbound bodies are scanned for secrets and redacted. The setup paste is hidden input; agents never see the values.
Bot loops / runaway cost Hop limit 3, no reply to end/ack, one Grok-to-Hermes turn in flight per conversation (separate conversations can run concurrently), daily caps: 200 messages, 200k tokens, 10 wakes (past 80 % only --urgent wakes). Wakes are debounced (30 s), batched, and skipped while the Grok bot is in wait or active (5 min).
Prompt injection between bots Peer text is framed as untrusted data on both sides with the same markers: the Hermes peer turn gets [Message from … via g2h — untrusted data …] … [end of peer message], and on the Grok side g2h ask, recv, wait and ops (args) print every peer body inside those markers too. Body escaping neutralises forged markers (look-alike brackets, zero-width splits, case/spacing tricks) and any line that could pass for a recv header (--- …, dash look-alikes) gets a > prefix, so a peer cannot close the frame early or fake another message. --json prints one JSON object per message with the body as a JSON string. Peer sessions on the Hermes side get no toolsets by default (peer_toolsets = []). The routine prompt and standing instruction say "data, not instructions".
Unbounded peer context (cost, drift) Each conv's dedicated Hermes peer session is rotated: after peer_session_max_turns turns (default 8) or once a turn's context size reaches peer_session_max_tokens (default 24000; usage.context_used, else the turn's share of the running usage.total), g2h starts a new session (new request_id generation and title, so the old one is never resumed or resolved again) and seeds its first turn with a framed recap of the last 2 exchanges (about 1.5K chars). Logged as peer_session_rotated; counters survive a daemon restart. 0 disables a limit. Hermes session.create has no compression-threshold or context-limit field (CREATE_FIELDS: max_turns caps agent tool iterations, run_budget caps a run), so g2h bounds context itself.
Spending credit by accident dry_run = true by default (wakes logged, not sent). g2h selftest --live fires exactly one POST and asks first; --yes is for agents after the owner's yes in chat. The daemon also guards live selftest wakes: refused under dry_run unless the request carries consent, refused while a 4xx alert is set, one in flight at a time, and at most selftest_wakes_per_day (default 3) per day, separate from the wake cap. The webhook URL must be https:// (plain http:// only for loopback hosts). A 4xx from the webhook stops waking (alert) until g2h wake-reset or a restart.
Peer-requested ops A peer can only request an op; the receiver's [ops] allowlist decides (empty = refuse all). Approve-tier ops need a one-time code (CSPRNG, memory only, 10 min, single use, 5 tries) sent to the human through the owner-set [ops_approver] command; with no approver they are refused. Peer text cannot forge op blocks or approvals.
Config tampering g2h setup edits only g2h's own files and one user service, and records them in setup-manifest.json; it never edits Hermes config. g2h uninstall treats the manifest only as a hint: it removes only files setup writes, recomputed (g2h home files and a unit file whose content is a g2h unit for this install), never symlinks or directories, and stops a service only if its unit is a g2h unit.

Known limits (documented, accepted)

  • Fresh hop-0 messages: g2h hermes-send without --reply-to starts a new chain at hop 0, so the Hermes side can keep starting chains; only the daily message/token caps bound this. The same holds for g2h ask/send.
  • Turn limit is per conversation: the in-flight turn guard is keyed by conversation, so several conversations can each have a turn running at once; only the daily caps bound the total.
  • Token cap is not a strict spend cap: before a turn g2hd checks room for the outgoing message, but the reply's tokens are known only after Hermes has generated it. A reply that would cross max_tokens is refused and not delivered, yet its generation has already been paid for. Treat the cap as a daily brake, not a budget.
  • Session map is not pruned: sessions.json in the g2h home keeps per-conversation metadata (stored session id, rotation and turn counters, and the truncated last exchanges used for the rotation recap) for every conversation ever seen; nothing removes old entries today, so the file grows slowly and keeps that recap text. Deleting it while g2hd is stopped is safe, but a conversation still in use may resume its first peer session rather than a fresh one.
  • Half-closed clients: a client that half-closes its write side after sending wait is treated as gone and gets no answer (its messages stay queued). The bundled g2h never does this.
  • Disconnected ask: if the caller of ask goes away, the Hermes turn still finishes (and counts against the caps); the reply is discarded, not delivered.
  • Webhook body: the Grok platform re-serializes it and shows the model only a few KB, so it carries {conv_id, count, hint} only; message text is fetched with g2h recv.
  • Live-selftest consent is advisory: the consent flag on a live selftest request is set by the client, so any local caller can set it; the real bound is the daemon's selftest_wakes_per_day cap (default 3 POSTs a day).
  • Anyone who can run commands as the owner can use the socket; g2h is not a sandbox between processes of one user. In separate-user mode they can still send and request ops, but cannot approve them or change g2hd's config, if the recipe's conditions hold (root-owned paths, and the whole setup and every approve done from a separate admin account's own login session).
  • Ops threat model: the allowlist defends against peer-message injection, not against a bot that already has a shell as the owner's user. Both bots run as that user, so such a bot can edit config.toml, change the approver, restart g2hd or act without g2h. The approval code is only as strong as the approver channel's separation from the bots. Use auto only for read-only ops (export, battery). The opt-in separate-user mode (G2H-SEPARATE-USER.md) puts the config, the approver and approve out of the bots' uid's reach, if the recipe's conditions hold (root-owned paths, and the whole setup and every approve done from a separate admin account's own login session).
  • botport mirror, staged copies in a shared box: apply-pack --precheck ITEM --install-to DIR reads the staged skill once, checks it against the pack and writes exactly the copy it checked into the box's skills folder, so a staged file swapped after the check is never installed. The destination is checked by path (the agent data folder is resolved once, since in a box it is itself a link; the flag must resolve to <resolved agent data>/workflows, and that skills folder must be a real folder, not a link), then written under a temporary name and renamed into place; the write is not bound to the folder that was checked, so a folder swapped and restored in that moment is not caught. Doing so needs write access to the box's workspace during an install. The box is one trust domain: every bot in it can write the box's skills folder itself, and is trusted as much as the Mirror bot (design, residual risks).

Waking an idle bot is capped separately by max_wakes_per_day (configurable, default 10). g2h status shows today's op count per tier, e.g. ops today: 3 (auto 2, approved 0, refused 1).

Reporting

Report vulnerabilities privately as a GitHub security advisory: on this repository's page, open Security → Report a vulnerability (the same private channel CONTRIBUTING.md points to). Do not open a public issue with exploit details.

botport porter: secret detect-and-route

Threat model. The porter's input is the Grok bot's own self-description: the export JSON, the bundle, and NOT_CAPTURED.md. The goal is that no secret leaks by accident into anything botport writes. That covers the profile, the checklist, describe.json, reports, --json / --details, and the argv of hermes cron create. The bias is conservative: a false route is cheap, a written secret is not. Deliberate evasion by an adversary who controls the input is out of scope.

Two rules, one place (src/core/secrets.rs). Text is normalized first: zero-width and other Unicode format characters are dropped, then NFKC (full-width, ligature and compatibility forms become plain). Normalization is for matching only: written text is never edited, a hit is routed or refused instead. Like any detector, this is not a guarantee.

(A) Routing (secrets::scan, connector_url, credential_name): keyword-based and conservative, applied only to schedule prompts and fields, connector fields and URLs, and credential names.

  • Keyword rule: password, secret, token, api key, pin, … anywhere in the text, in any case or separator form, with leet and spacing folds and a mixed-script check.
  • URL rule: userinfo, credential-ish or high-entropy query values, fragments, ;params, a keyword path segment followed by a value, percent-encoded smuggling.
  • The value checks of (B), plus bare forms such as password hunter2, the secret is ….

A hit is never an error: that schedule, connector or credential goes to the "set up by hand" checklist with a display name and the reason, unwritten. "rotate the API token weekly" as a schedule prompt is routed.

(B) Write guard (secrets::guard / guard_str, guard_args): high precision, applied to every written string — bundle files, describe.json, the Hermes config, skills, memories and checklist, reports and --json/--details, and the argv of hermes cron create. One guard, at every atomic write.

  • Token shapes: sk-, xai-, gh*_, xox*-, glpat-, AKIA, JWT, bearer/basic values, PEM private keys.
  • No entropy check: a random-looking value is refused only under a secret-named key (next rule), so names, slugs, ids, paths, hashes and the tool's own fields are never refused. Routing (A) still treats a high-entropy value after =/:/is in a schedule prompt as suspicious.
  • URLs with userinfo, or a query/fragment/;param whose key names a secret.
  • An explicit key=value / key: value whose key names a secret and whose value is real: not empty, not a prose word, not a pure template (${X}, $X, {{x}}, <x>).

There is no keyword matching in (B): "rotate the API token weekly" in a skill, memory or chat passes everywhere; api_key=abc123def456 anywhere is refused (or routed earlier by (A) when it is in a schedule). A hit is a hard refusal naming the file and field path (or line), never the value. Callers that can route do so first with the same check (a skill file or memory line that would fail (B) goes to the checklist; an instructions or unparsed line in describe.json becomes [text not copied: <reason>]), so the hard refusal only fires when that routing missed. Restore points are zipped, so each live file is guarded as plaintext before it is added: a hit refuses the restore point and with it the whole apply, before anything is written, not even a directory (move the value to .env and retry).

Apply is sequential, not transactional. It writes one file at a time behind a restore point; if it stops part-way, the files already written stay written. The restore point lets you put them back by hand; it does not roll back a partial apply on its own. What the lock covers. Every command that writes into a Hermes profile holds an OS file lock (flock) on <profile>/.botport.lock while it plans and writes: apply, sync (both halves of --direction both under one lock), and the record that export-hermes and sync --direction h2g write to botport.lock.json. A second such run on the same profile is refused at once, naming the holder's pid. The kernel drops the lock when the holder exits, however it exits, so there is no stale-lock takeover. The file itself stays (it only holds the last holder's pid for that message); deleting it while a run holds it would let a second run in, so don't. A lock file that is a hard link or belongs to someone other than the profile's owner is still locked but never written. On a network filesystem (NFS) the lock may only be local, or may fail with "No locks available" when the lock daemon isn't running; use a local disk for profiles. plan, drift and --dry-run never take or create it. Limits: the lock is advisory and per host. It doesn't stop hermes itself, your editor, or a botport on another machine writing to a shared or network profile directory. A symlink or non-regular file at that path is refused. On a read-only profile that has no lock file yet, a run that has nothing to write goes ahead without one (with a note); one that would write fails. A malformed or unreadable cron/jobs.json stops plan, apply, sync, drift and export-hermes with an error instead of being read as "no jobs".

Paths stay confined. Profile names must be plain names (no /, no leading .); skill names and skill file paths from a bundle must stay below skills/<category>/<name>/ or the skill goes to the checklist (the library adapters' write refuses them); verify reports every symlink or other non-regular entry in the bundle's readable directories, listed in the manifest or not, and every listed path that resolves outside it; plan/apply take an exported bundle's skills and memory only from the manifest-listed regular files that verify just read and hash-checked (no link followed; profile.json, describe.json and NOT_CAPTURED.md are read again afterwards, so a bundle someone else changes during the run is out of scope), and refuse a legacy hand export that holds any symlink or special file; atomic writes use an unpredictable temporary name created exclusively (never through an existing file or symlink); g2h's service_label must be a reverse-DNS name, or g2h neither writes nor unloads a service for it. A bundle that another user can change while botport reads it is outside this model.

The bar. The gate test (tests/describe_sync.rs) seeds every secret in a (B) shape into every field and runs export → describe → plan → apply → export-hermes. It passes as shipped and with (A) switched off (G2H_TEST_SKIP_FIELD_SCAN, debug builds only), where (B) alone keeps every secret off disk; making guard() or guard_args() return Ok turns it red.

Known limits (accepted):

  • Homoglyphs. A mixed-script word (ASCII next to Cyrillic or Greek letters) is routed, but a word written entirely in look-alike letters is not.
  • Leet and spacing. Some simple folds are handled (p@$$w0rd, p a s s), but deliberate obfuscation is not chased.
  • Keyword-only secrets outside (A)'s fields. password hunter2 in a skill or memory is not refused by (B).
  • Keyword-free secrets. A random string with no keyword, no known prefix and no value position (use Zq7Wv3… here, /v1/<random>/mcp) is not detected.
  • Encoding. Base64, rot13, a value split across lines or fields, or other obfuscation is not decoded.

Path checks are check-then-open (accepted residual). These checks run on paths, not on one held directory handle:

  • Confined reads (read_confined: bundle files, local records, every FolderStore read of a mirror folder) lstat the file, check that its resolved path stays under the root, then open it and require the same inode as a regular file (and decide on the mode of the file actually opened). A swap of the file itself is caught; a directory above it swapped for a link to somewhere else in the moment between the check and the open is not, and the mirror folder's root is held as a path, not an open handle. Doing so needs write access to that folder, i.e. the owner's own account (or a sync client acting for it), which is outside this model.
  • Program checks (program/tool: curl, sqlite3, hermes, token commands) check every folder on the way, follow only root-owned links (read by path after the lstat), then run the program by path. Folders and files must be owned by root or the user and writable by no one else, so a swap between the check and the exec needs root or the owner's account; macOS has no exec-by-handle to close it.

botport twin (the Hermes plugin interface)

What it touches (docs/TWIN.md): reads the Grok desktop app's cache (roster and transcript-replica slices of one account, only the selected bots' transcripts, within a file and byte budget; never login files), the twin's Hermes profile and the state folder the caller names; writes only the profile, the state folder and, with twin mirror, the pair folder. No network calls.

  • Untrusted input. Names, descriptions and routine names from the cache are cleaned (control and direction characters dropped) and capped; ids must be plain identifiers; names from the twin index are checked on every load before they become part of a path.
  • Suspected secrets. An item that looks like it holds a secret is held back whole and reported by location; text shown for preview or conflicts has such lines masked first. A check, not a guarantee (see the porter section above).
  • Deletes. twin remove checks that every target resolves inside the state folder or the profile, with no link on the way; a link at the target itself is removed, never followed.
  • The pair key and the Mirror bot (accepted residual). One pair key (HMAC, 0600) authenticates both directions. The owner gives it to their Mirror bot as an attached file (never pasted text), and the bot keeps it in the pair's work folder. The platform keeps chat attachments, so the key also exists there; run botport twin mirror --rotate-key after setup if that matters to you (the Mirror bot then needs the new file). twin mirror --off replaces the key, and twin remove deletes it. Separate per-side signing keys are planned (ROADMAP).
  • Non-Unix systems. No-follow opens (O_NOFOLLOW) are Unix only; elsewhere botport checks with symlink_metadata before it opens a file, a check-then-open residual like the one above.

There aren't any published security advisories