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Summary of ChangesHello @hikalif, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request introduces Docker Engine support to AEnvironment, providing a lightweight and flexible alternative to Kubernetes for managing environment instances. This enhancement is designed to streamline local development, simplify CI/CD pipelines, and enable deployments on resource-constrained edge devices by leveraging Docker's native capabilities for single containers and multi-container Compose stacks. Highlights
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Code Review
This pull request introduces significant new functionality by adding Docker Engine support as an alternative to Kubernetes. However, it contains critical security vulnerabilities related to insecure handling of user-controlled input when constructing and executing Docker Compose stacks. Specifically, path traversal vulnerabilities allow for arbitrary file write and deletion, and a YAML injection vulnerability enables attackers to inject malicious configurations, potentially leading to full host compromise. Beyond these critical security issues, there are also areas with code duplication and a potentially fragile implementation detail that could be improved for better long-term maintainability. These security issues must be addressed before merging.
| labels := fmt.Sprintf(` | ||
| labels: | ||
| - "aenv.env_name=%s" | ||
| - "aenv.version=%s" | ||
| - "aenv.owner=" | ||
| - "aenv.project_id=%s"`, aenvHubEnv.Name, aenvHubEnv.Version, projectID) |
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The injectComposeLabels function is vulnerable to YAML injection because it constructs a YAML snippet by directly embedding user-controlled environment name and version using fmt.Sprintf without proper sanitization. An attacker can inject arbitrary YAML syntax, including host volume mounts, to compromise the host system. This string manipulation approach is fragile and can lead to incorrect YAML formatting even without malicious intent. It is critical to use a proper YAML parsing library (e.g., gopkg.in/yaml.v3) to safely parse, modify, and serialize the docker-compose.yml file. If string manipulation is unavoidable, all user-controlled inputs must be strictly validated and sanitized to prevent injection.
| composeFilePath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, fmt.Sprintf("aenv-compose-%s.yaml", projectID)) | ||
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| if err := os.WriteFile(composeFilePath, []byte(composeFileContent), 0644); err != nil { |
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The projectID is constructed using the environment name (aenvHubEnv.Name), which is user-controlled input from the api-service. This projectID is then used to construct a file path in /tmp without any sanitization or validation. An attacker can provide an environment name containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../) to cause the application to write the Docker Compose file to an arbitrary location on the host system. For example, an environment name like ../../etc/cron.d/evil could result in a file being written to /etc/cron.d/, potentially leading to remote code execution on the host.
Remediation: Sanitize the environment name to ensure it only contains alphanumeric characters and hyphens, and validate that it does not contain path traversal sequences before using it to construct file paths.
| composeFilePath := filepath.Join("/tmp", fmt.Sprintf("aenv-compose-%s.yaml", projectID)) | ||
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| klog.Infof("Deleting compose stack %s", projectName) | ||
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| // Check if compose file exists | ||
| if _, err := os.Stat(composeFilePath); os.IsNotExist(err) { | ||
| klog.Warningf("Compose file not found: %s, will try to stop containers by label", composeFilePath) | ||
| return h.stopContainersByLabel(projectName) | ||
| } | ||
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| // Detect compose command | ||
| composeCmd := h.detectComposeCommand() | ||
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| // Execute docker-compose down | ||
| var cmd *exec.Cmd | ||
| if composeCmd == "docker compose" { | ||
| cmd = exec.Command("docker", "compose", "-f", composeFilePath, "-p", projectName, "down") | ||
| } else { | ||
| cmd = exec.Command("docker-compose", "-f", composeFilePath, "-p", projectName, "down") | ||
| } | ||
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| output, err := cmd.CombinedOutput() | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| klog.Errorf("Failed to stop compose stack: %v, output: %s", err, string(output)) | ||
| // Try to stop containers manually | ||
| return h.stopContainersByLabel(projectName) | ||
| } | ||
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| klog.Infof("Compose stack stopped: %s", string(output)) | ||
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| // Remove compose file | ||
| if err := os.Remove(composeFilePath); err != nil { |
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Similar to the creation flow, the deleteComposeStack function uses the user-supplied projectID to construct a file path for deletion. A path traversal vulnerability here allows an attacker to delete arbitrary files on the host system by providing a malicious projectID containing ../ sequences.
Remediation: Validate and sanitize the projectID to ensure it does not contain path traversal sequences before using it in file system operations.
| if ctrl.backendClient != nil { | ||
| backendEnv, err = ctrl.backendClient.GetEnvByVersion(name, version) | ||
| if err != nil { | ||
| // If backend is not available or env not found, create a default env for Docker mode | ||
| log.Infof("Backend not available or env not found, using default config for: %s@%s", name, version) | ||
| backendEnv = &backendmodels.Env{ | ||
| Name: name, | ||
| Version: version, | ||
| DeployConfig: map[string]interface{}{ | ||
| "imageName": fmt.Sprintf("aenv/%s:%s", name, version), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } else { | ||
| // No backend client, create default env | ||
| backendEnv = &backendmodels.Env{ | ||
| Name: name, | ||
| Version: version, | ||
| DeployConfig: map[string]interface{}{ | ||
| "imageName": fmt.Sprintf("aenv/%s:%s", name, version), | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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The logic for creating a default backendEnv is duplicated in the if err != nil block and the else block. This can be refactored to reduce redundancy and improve maintainability. Consider a single point of creation for the default environment if backendEnv is nil after the initial attempt to fetch it from the backend.
1 participant
Docker Engine Support for AEnvironment
linked Issue: #14
Overview
AEnvironment now supports Docker Engine as a lightweight sandbox alternative to Kubernetes, enabling local development, CI/CD integration, and small-scale deployments without the complexity of a full Kubernetes cluster.
Key Features
1. Single Container Deployment
2. Docker Compose Support
3. Multiple Connection Modes
unix:///var/run/docker.sock)tcp://host:2376)4. Production-Ready Features
Detailed docs