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Enforce an agent's autonomy limits from the event log - #146
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Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to An agent can exceed its configured tool-call limit when it submits an oversized or malformed tool-call batch. The batch is counted as zero calls, yet its calls still run. Fix this so the guard refuses unreadable batches before merging. Pre-merge checks |
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The card's max_iterations and max_tool_calls were compared with counters nothing incremented, time_budget_secs was never read, the circuit breaker never tripped, and the token and cost budgets were checked only for a bounded_autonomous card on an agent node in the in-process worker. A card could declare every limit and none of them held. Every limit is now decided in node_guard, so the claim route and the in-process worker enforce the same thing, at every autonomy level, for every node acting for the agent and for an agent node calling it. The counts come from the run's event log across its segments: each admitted step is recorded as agent_step_admitted, and tokens, cost and failures are read from the step's node_completed or node_failed. A restart or a rollover cannot reset them and a state_patch cannot reach them. The step is recorded by append_event_if with a condition that re-runs the check, so two claims cannot both take the last step. On a limit the node fails for good with autonomy_limit_reached or circuit_breaker_tripped. A card with on_limit_exceeded: escalate_to_human holds the step for an ordinary approval instead, bound and deadlined like any other. The completion route accepts cost_usd (refusing a negative one, which would refund a budget) and records a result for an agent's node only for an item the claim route admitted.
Agent token and cost budgets read what a step reports on completion, and the Python worker reported neither, so a node run by it never counted. The worker now forwards input_tokens, output_tokens and cost_usd from a node's output when they are a spend, and the client sends them.
Review found that an approval of an over-limit step was bound only to the action digest, which advances when the node completes. A failed step's retry, a reclaim or a duplicate item carried the same digest, so one approval released every one of them and also silenced the circuit breaker. An approval given for a policy gate before the limit was reached counted as well, and an approved step skipped the compare-and-set entirely, so a failing card's limit reached meanwhile was not seen. An escalated step now needs an approved request raised for the limit and not yet used: the step records the request it used, and the compare-and-set checks that no other step used it and that no failing card's limit has been reached. A result over HTTP is recorded only while its admitted step is still open, so SQLite's repeated unfenced completion cannot end a newer step. The stop events are recorded once per request, and the Python worker no longer forwards token counts the engine cannot read.
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @runtime/workers/src/node_guard.rs:
- Around line 535-541: Update `step_tool_calls` to return `Result<u32, String>`
and propagate unreadable pending-call errors instead of counting them as zero.
In `guard_dispatch_in`, record the policy violation and return
`GuardOutcome::Blocked` when counting fails; pass the count to
`agent_limits::plan` only on success.
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docs/architecture/agent-model.mdis excluded by!docs/**docs/guides/agent-model-guide.mdis excluded by!docs/**docs/guides/yaml-reference.mdis excluded by!docs/**docs/rfcs/RFC-005-agent-model.mdis excluded by!docs/**
📒 Files selected for processing (16)
CHANGELOG.mdruntime/agents/src/card.rsruntime/api/src/routes.rsruntime/api/tests/agent_autonomy_limits.rsruntime/policy/src/autonomy.rsruntime/policy/tests/trading_agent_autonomy.rsruntime/state/src/budget.rsruntime/state/src/event.rsruntime/workers/src/agent_limits.rsruntime/workers/src/dispatch_guard.rsruntime/workers/src/lib.rsruntime/workers/src/node_guard.rsruntime/workers/src/worker.rssdk/python/jamjet/cli/main.pysdk/python/jamjet/client.pysdk/python/tests/test_worker.py
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step_tool_calls counted an unreadable batch as zero calls, so max_tool_calls relied on the agent card's per-call check refusing the batch first. The count is now an error carrying the batch's audit rule, and the guard blocks on it. Found by CodeRabbit on #146.
The card's autonomy limits were mostly compared against counters that nothing incremented. They are now enforced from the event log, at the shared guard, on every transport.
AgentStepAdmittedis recorded each time the guard lets a step for an agent fire. Iterations, tool calls, tokens, cost, time and consecutive errors are folded from those events over the whole segment chain, so neitherstate_patchnor a restart can reset them.AutonomyLimitReachedorCircuitBreakerTrippedis recorded. Withon_limit_exceeded: escalate_to_human, the step goes through the approval path instead, and an approval releases that one step, once.max_consecutive_errors(default 3).43 Rust and 8 Python mutants, all killed after unmutated controls. Independently reviewed, and the review's critical finding is fixed in 0a54d9c.
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