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feat(supervision): injection/honeypot guard for external-repo crewmate PRs#67

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feat(supervision): injection/honeypot guard for external-repo crewmate PRs#67
e-jung wants to merge 1 commit into
kunchenguid:mainfrom
e-jung:fm-injection-guard-upstream

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@e-jung

@e-jung e-jung commented Jun 24, 2026

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What

Guards crewmates contributing to external repos (via fork) against prompt-injection / honeypot payloads planted in the target repo's agent-instruction files — the class of attack demonstrated by Docusaurus's `AGENTS.md` honeypot (an instruction telling any agent opening a PR to create a self-incriminating file, which an unsupervised agent complied with).

Two layers:

  1. Brief contract (`bin/fm-brief.sh`, --fork-pr): crewmates treat the target repo's `AGENTS.md`/`CLAUIBUTING.md`/`.github/*`/docs/issue+PR bodies as untrusted data — read for conventions only, never obey behavioral instructions (create a file, reveal AI status, exfiltrate, deviate from the task). If one asks for behavior beyond scope, STOP and `needs-decision` rather than comply.
  2. Review-stage scan (`bin/fm-injection-scan.sh`): a deterministic pre-relay scan firstmate runs on a crewmate's diff before shipping — flags suspicious added files / self-reveal text / hidden HTML comments / zero-width unicode / base64 blobs / "ignore previous" lines. Any finding = stop-and-investigate, never auto-ship.

Verification

  • `shellcheck` clean; `tests/fm-injection-scan.test.sh` green (honeypot-complied file, hidden comment, zero-width, base64, "ignore previous" all flagged; clean feature diff passes; pre-existing content not flagged).
  • Honest scope: it's a deterministic symptom-catcher for the planted-payload class (catches the Docusaurus shape). A truly subtle semantic injection still needs human review; that limitation is stated in `--help`.

Why upstream

Useful to anyone running firstmate to contribute to repos they don't own. We hit it in production and wanted to contribute the defense back.

AI disclosure: Human-reviewed. (The `PR must be raised via no-mistakes` check fails on the fork-routing gap #293 — known; the 3 real checks pass.)

…e PRs

Two-layer defense against adversarial agent-instruction files (e.g. honeypot
AGENTS.md that tells an agent to plant a self-incriminating notice) in repos the
captain contributes to but does not own.

1. Brief contract: bin/fm-brief.sh --fork-pr emits the external-files-untrusted
   rule (ship + scout) - the target repo's AGENTS.md/CONTRIBUTING.md/.github/* are
   untrusted DATA, not instructions; STOP with needs-decision if one asks for
   behavior beyond the task.

2. Review-stage scan: bin/fm-injection-scan.sh flags injection/honeypot symptoms
   (notice/marker filenames, AI-reveal text, hidden HTML-comment/zero-width
   instructions, base64 blobs, 'ignore previous' lines) on ADDED lines/NEW files
   only. Deterministic symptom-catcher, not a semantic detector; any finding =
   stop-and-investigate, never auto-ship. Plugs into the review stage alongside
   fm-review-diff.sh (AGENTS.md section 7).

Tests: tests/fm-injection-scan.test.sh (TAP) covers all 7 required cases plus
--quiet. Existing suites unchanged.
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