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Several users on one Omarchy machine: a greeter listing everyone by full name, per-user FIDO2/fingerprints, migrations for non-admins

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omarchy-multiuser

Several people on one Omarchy machine. Omarchy is provisioned for a single owner: the login screen only asks for that owner's password (and is skipped altogether on encrypted installs), and a few of its tools make machine-wide decisions based on whoever happens to run them. This package forks just those tools, under their own omarchy-mu-* names, and points the Omarchy menu at them.

Omarchy (single owner) omarchy-multiuser
One password opens the disk, logs in and is root's Each person's password is their own LUKS key slot: typing it at the disk prompt or the login screen says who they are
Greeter: a password box for the last user A password box that finds the account: no list, no username (omarchy-mu-login-match)
Autologin of the owner, for good on encrypted installs One automatic login, at that boot, for whoever opened the disk (omarchy-mu-login-select); the login screen any other time
omarchy-setup-security-fido2 writes /etc/fido2/fido2 for one user and refuses a second Each user adds their own line (omarchy-mu-setup-security-fido2); several keys per user
omarchy-remove-security-{fido2,fingerprint} tear PAM and packages down for everyone Each user removes their own keys/prints; machine-wide teardown only when nobody has any left
omarchy-apply-lock drops fingerprint unlock if the caller has no prints Kept while any user has prints (omarchy-mu-apply-lock, re-run by a path unit)
Migrations stall for users outside wheel Run what they can, privileged parts gated on an admin's run (omarchy-mu-migrate)
Root has the owner's password; ISO installs grant the owner sudo by name Root's password follows its holder, an administrator, and passes to whoever removes them; sudo grants by name or UID removed with the account
Update lock per user, update log at a fixed /tmp path One machine-wide lock for administrators' updates and migrations, also from the migrations notice; a finished update's log moved aside
— omarchy-mu-user-add, omarchy-mu-user-remove, omarchy-mu-user-admin, omarchy-mu-user-password

The lock screen

shell/lock is Omarchy's own lock screen (upstream/shell/plugins/lock, the omarchy.lock plugin) with, at the bottom, what doesn't need unlocking:

  • Switch user (F5): the login screen, the session staying locked behind it;
  • Suspend (F1), Reboot (F3) and Shut down (F4), the greeter's keys. Reboot and Shut down ask first: Enter or a click confirms; Esc, typing or 10 seconds cancels. A click or an F key that wakes a dark screen only wakes it; a letter or a space also goes into the password box, as on Omarchy's own lock.

Each is there only when the machine can do it (omarchy-mu-lock-action capabilities); Suspend follows the same switches as the system menu. Switch user also waits for the first console: SDDM 0.21 puts a new greeter there, and with a desktop holding it that greeter fails and the screen stays dark. Only SDDM's own automatic login puts a desktop there, and this package doesn't use it, so this matters only after /etc/sddm.conf or another tool has logged someone in that way.

System › Switch User in the menu does the same from an open desktop, for anyone once there are two accounts: it locks this desktop, then opens the person's running session, where their own lock asks for their password, or the login screen. With a desktop on the first console (SDDM's own automatic login) it offers to log out instead. A session left unlocked on another console is opened as it is, as Ctrl+Alt+Fn would.

omarchy-mu-login enables it once per account, as lbssousa.lock, in place of omarchy.lock. To go back: omarchy plugin disable lbssousa.lock; it stays off. Removing the package restores omarchy.lock for every account first, since the shell wouldn't, and that would leave the machine with no lock screen.

Coming back to a session through the login screen doesn't ask for the password twice: SDDM asks logind to unlock it, and a lock left with Switch user listens for that until it ends. A lock left any other way doesn't. Telling logind to unlock someone else's session takes an administrator's password (polkit's lock-sessions), but the session's own programs can do it while it waits in the background. A password or fingerprint accepted only after the session went to the background is ignored, and the reader isn't taken back there, so the session can't open unattended behind the login screen. Anyone at the keyboard can reboot or shut down from here, as they can from the greeter, which also closes the other users' sessions.

One password, one person

The model comes from Omarchy PR #16920:

  • Every account's password is also its own LUKS key slot, recorded in /etc/omarchy-multiuser/slots (<UUID> <slot> <uid> <user> <fingerprint of the shadow entry>, root's alone, no key material). A password has at least 6 characters and opens no other account or slot: it is what says who you are.
  • The disk prompt picks the person. Once the map exists, the boot image carries a small cryptsetup wrapper after encrypt (omarchy-mu-luks-slot), which runs the real unlock once, keeps its exit status and only then notes which slot opened the disk. omarchy-mu-login-select, before every SDDM start, turns that into one automatic login for the slot's owner. It is not SDDM's own: the greeter logs them in as it comes up, with a one-time pass that omarchy-mu-login-once checks in SDDM's PAM stack (their name, this boot, the last minute, taken by the first try), so the desktop gets a console of its own, as any login at the login screen does. Another SDDM theme makes no such try and shows the login screen. Anything else shows the login screen: no record, an unknown slot, a password changed with plain passwd, a change left unfinished, a second SDDM start. With one account on an encrypted disk, that account is logged in, as Omarchy does, unless the disk has a token (TPM2, FIDO2, clevis): it may have opened with nobody typing a password, so the login screen shows.
  • The login screen is a password box alone. Enter tries it for the last account, then each other one SDDM lists, until one logs in. omarchy-mu-login-match runs first in /etc/pam.d/sddm (omarchy-mu-sddm-guard keeps it there) and ends an attempt when the password is another account's, so the wrong account costs neither a delay nor a failed-login strike. A password that is nobody's counts once against each account.
  • Changes go through omarchy-mu-user-password (Setup › Users › Change Password, for everyone: your own, or anyone's for an administrator; Update › Password › User, plain passwd, is gone, as in Omarchy's PR), with omarchy-mu-user-helper as root behind it. Each change is journaled, keeps the old password working until the new one is proven everywhere, and is rolled back or forward by the next run if it stopped part way. Update › Password › Drive Encryption (omarchy-mu-drive-password) offers only the other encrypted drives once accounts have their own keys: the system disk's follow each person's password. omarchy-drive-password itself stays usable in a terminal. Adding and removing an account go through it too (omarchy-mu-user-add, omarchy-mu-user-remove): the account, its key and its password are one change. Adding a key takes a key the disk already knows, so it asks for your own password.

What it costs:

  • Every password opens the whole disk, and the disk is as strong as the weakest one. With a live USB, anyone with a password can read and change everything.
  • New accounts need their password up front. There is no list to pick them from, so they can no longer choose it at their first login.
  • Boot code of our own. The wrapper sits in the initramfs. It is checked with busybox ash -n at build time and left out if it doesn't parse. Omarchy's PR ran it through Plymouth and the console on real installs; a wrong copy here could stop the disk from opening, so keep a live USB at hand the first time. Each slot also adds a key derivation, about a second, to a wrong password at the disk prompt.
  • Accounts SDDM doesn't list can't log in here (UIDs outside MinimumUid..MaximumUid, or on directory accounts): use a text console.
  • Apple Silicon refuses a second person's slot until its boot package records them, and a systemd initramfs (no encrypt hook) shows the login screen after the disk prompt.

Coming from an earlier version. Run omarchy-mu-user-password for each person, yours first. Your login password has to open the disk; if it doesn't, make them the same with omarchy-drive-password. Slots recorded by the old omarchy-mu-luks-enroll are replaced then. Until then the machine shows the login screen after the disk prompt, and accounts that were waiting to choose a password can't log in.

The greeter

/usr/share/sddm/themes/omarchy-multiuser is Omarchy's own theme (upstream/sddm/omarchy/Main.qml) with the password search above and, at the bottom, Suspend (F1), Hibernate (F2), Reboot (F3) and Shut down (F4), by click or key, each only when SDDM says the machine can do it. An action keeps its key when another is missing. Reboot and Shut down ask first: Enter or a click confirms; Esc, typing or 10 seconds cancels.

It keeps following Appearance › Unlock: the images come from the stock theme, which omarchy-plymouth-set recolors, and omarchy-mu-sddm-sync (run by omarchy-mu-sddm-sync.path) copies its two colors into theme.conf.user. The recolor applies to everyone's login screen, so the menu offers it to administrators only.

Full names come from GECOS: chfn -f "Full Name" <user>, or omarchy-mu-user-add, which asks for one. System › Switch User shows them.

Who can do what

Administrators are the members of wheel; everyone else is in omarchy-users (created by sysusers.d). The sudoers drop-in lets omarchy-users:

  • add or remove their own line in /etc/fido2/fido2 through omarchy-mu-fido2-authfile (the user comes from SUDO_USER, never from the arguments), with their own password;
  • change their own password through omarchy-mu-user-helper password-self, which takes the user from SUDO_USER, asks for the current password and allows three tries an hour;
  • re-run omarchy-mu-apply-lock, which takes no input, without a password.

The same helper also runs through pkexec, for the security-key-omarchy overlay that Setup › Security › Fido2 opens when the shell has it: there is no terminal for sudo there. Its polkit action (org.omarchy-multiuser.fido2-authfile) asks for the user's own password, the user comes from PKEXEC_UID, and remove-key takes out one key (its handle on stdin) instead of the whole line. The rules file refuses the action to anyone outside wheel and omarchy-users.

Fingerprints need no root at all: fprintd lets a user in an active session enroll and delete their own.

The commands root runs for someone else without a root password (omarchy-mu-user-helper, omarchy-mu-apply-lock, omarchy-mu-fido2-authfile and the PAM step omarchy-mu-login-match) take as little as they can from whoever started them, as Omarchy's PR does (lib/omarchy-multiuser/security.sh):

  • they start with #!/bin/bash -p and refuse any other start (bash script, bash -p script), so Bash reads no BASH_ENV and imports no functions;
  • they start again without BASH_ENV, ENV, SHELLOPTS, BASHOPTS, PS4, CDPATH, GLOBIGNORE, IFS or exported functions, which privileged Bash ignores but would pass on to what they run;
  • as root they use a fixed PATH and a fixed umask, and, run through sudo, pkexec or PAM, ignore the OMU_* overrides the tests use (the helper ignores them whenever it is root). Through sudo, omarchy-mu-apply-lock copies the fingerprint resume hook from /usr/share/omarchy only, whatever OMARCHY_PATH says.

The menu hides from everyone else what would only end in sudo's refusal: Install, the Remove entries that drop packages (what lives in their own home, such as web apps, TUIs and mise dev envs, stays), and Update › Channel, Firmware, Timezone, Time, Update › Password › Drive Encryption, Config › Plymouth and Hardware › Trackpad. Their Setup › Users has only Change Password, for their own.

The entries this package adds (System › Switch User and Setup › Users) are written in the language Omarchy shows, from share/menu-labels.json, which has every language Omarchy has. The menu translates only its own rows, so omarchy-mu-menu-sync writes the labels at each login, and again when the language changes (omarchy-mu-menu-sync.path); the English label stays a search term.

The bar's update icon (omarchy.system-update), whose click runs omarchy-update, comes off their bar at their first login (omarchy-mu-update-widget-sync, run by omarchy-mu-login); put back by hand, it stays. Promoted to administrator, they get it back where it was. Omarchy's one-time Update System notice at an account's first login still shows.

Polkit refuses them, without a password dialog, what only an administrator may do but Omarchy asks for in their own session (/usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/10-omarchy-multiuser.rules): the browsers' machine-wide theme color, which every theme change and the first login write through pkexec omarchy-theme-set-browser-policy. Otherwise they'd be asked for an administrator's password, and an administrator should never type theirs into someone else's session. The browsers keep the color an administrator's theme set.

Children

As in Omarchy's PR, a child is an account in omarchy-child. Here it is also a limited account (omarchy-users), so everything above for limited accounts applies. omarchy-mu-user-add --child (or answering yes to "Is … a child?") makes one, with no other groups: not input, not docker. An administrator can't be a child; take someone out of omarchy-child before giving them administrator rights.

  • Blocked apps, per person (Setup › Users › Blocked Apps, omarchy-mu-user-apps, for children and limited accounts). Packages stay installed for the whole machine.
    • Each person's list (/var/lib/omarchy-multiuser/blocked-apps/<user>) names apps they don't run: omarchy-mu-user-apps-apply denies the program, and its own directory, with an ACL. A pacman hook does this again after every upgrade, which replaces programs.
    • A program everyone needs (a shell, an interpreter, a browser's launcher, Omarchy's) is never denied, so web apps are hidden only.
    • A new child starts with the PR's list blocked: the messaging, social and work web apps.
    • The PR hides the entries in the shell's launcher, which a package can't change. Here the hidden entry is a desktop file of the same id in the child's own ~/.local/share/applications, written as them; one of theirs already there is set aside and comes back when the app does. A child can undo the hiding, never the ACL.
  • An administrator's password opens a child's lock screen, so a parent can step in. After the child's own password fails, the lock screen asks omarchy-mu-user-helper adult-check through the child's one NOPASSWD grant. The answer is rate limited (after five misses, two minutes, doubling up to an hour) and logged to the auth log.
  • A local git identity (<user>@localhost), so a child's first login asks for none.

What a grown-up's password in a child's session costs, as the PR says: it is typed where the child sits. The lock screen runs sudo and the helper by absolute path, so a script on the child's PATH can't catch it, but a child able to change their own session (LD_PRELOAD, a shell of their own) could. And any password a child knows is a disk key: from a live USB they can read the whole disk. These keep a child to what was agreed; they don't stop a determined one.

Not here yet, waiting on Omarchy:

  • screen time (#11196);
  • the Kids theme collection (#12488);
  • the web allowlist;
  • a child's own Wi-Fi networks (the shell's network panel);
  • hiding a child's update notices.

Accounts and root

omarchy-mu-user-add and -remove hold /run/lock/omarchy-mu-accounts.lock, so two account changes never interleave, and omarchy-mu-user-helper holds omarchy-mu-slots.lock (root's alone) for each change it makes: adding an account, removing one, a password. Its journal (/var/lib/omarchy-multiuser/password-journal) lets the next run undo an add that stopped before the account had its password, and finish one that stopped after; a removal only goes forward. The lock files come from tmpfiles.d, root:wheel 0640: only administrators can open them.

  • Root. omarchy-provision-owner gives root the owner's password. As in Omarchy's PR, root's password then has a holder (/etc/omarchy-multiuser/root): the first administrator who makes a change with the password root has. Every password is its person's alone, so only the holder knows root's. Changing the holder's password changes root's in the same write. Removing the holder hands root to the administrator removing them, whose password the removal asks for, and taking the holder's rights away hands it over first (omarchy-mu-user-helper root-take). Earlier versions locked root with several people; that root comes back, unlocked, with its owner's next change, or at once with sudo omarchy-mu-user-helper root-take.
  • Sudo grants. Removal deletes the installer's NN_<user> grant and omarchy-sudo-passwordless' 99-omarchy-*nopasswd-<uid> rules before userdel, after locking the account and ending what it runs, and warns about other sudoers rules naming the account. New accounts get the lowest UID that owns nothing in /home, so a kept home never passes to someone else, and a name whose group or /home folder still exists is refused. Adding an administrator writes %wheel ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL when an ISO install only granted the owner by name.
  • Removing. omarchy-mu-user-remove asks whether to delete the home (--keep-home and --delete-home answer for it; keeping is the default answer), and every question, your password included, comes before anything changes. An account with programs running, in a session or not, is logged out if you agree, and its lingering turned off. SDDM shows nothing on the first console after a desktop it logged in automatically is forced to end, so it is asked for the login screen, which takes over the screen; Ctrl+Alt+Fn goes back to your console. A home holding the note of an unfinished disk password change (drive-password.state) isn't deleted. System accounts are refused, and the last administrator is the last one who can log in.
  • Administrator rights. omarchy-mu-user-admin <user> on|off (Setup › Users › Administrator Rights) adds the account to wheel, writing the %wheel rule when it's missing, or takes it out: the grants that would keep root outside wheel go first, as on removal, and the account stays in omarchy-users. When root's password is theirs, it becomes yours first. It then fails, rather than say the rights are gone, when sudo -l -U still shows a rule for every command (also one for a group) or the account is in docker. Open programs keep sudo until the account logs out, so it offers to log them out. It won't take away your own rights or the last administrator's. Administrator checks go by the session's groups, as sudo does, so a change applies at the next login.
  • Updates. omarchy-mu-update (Update › Omarchy) and the administrators' omarchy-mu-migrate hold /run/lock/omarchy-mu-update.lock. Upstream's own lock is per user. /tmp/omarchy-update.log belongs to whoever updated first and nobody else can open it, so omarchy-mu-update-log.path moves it to /tmp/omarchy-update.log.<owner> when each update ends. The bar's icon and the first-login notice run omarchy-update directly, so those updates get this but not the machine-wide lock.

Migrations

omarchy-update (system packages, then migrations) is for administrators. Their markers are mirrored into /var/lib/omarchy-multiuser/migrations by omarchy-mu-migrate-record@<admin>.path, which follows who is an administrator (omarchy-mu-accounts sync-migration-watchers, run by the account commands and when the package installs). What an account had marked before becoming an administrator doesn't count, except for the machine's first administrator: Omarchy's first setup marks every migration done without running any. The login notifier (a drop-in on omarchy-migrate-notify.service) waits out a running update and offers administrators omarchy-mu-migrate, which takes the machine-wide lock. For everyone else it runs omarchy-mu-migrate itself, which classifies each migration as it goes (lib/omarchy-multiuser/migrations.sh; corrections in share/migrations-overrides.tsv):

  • user: runs, with sudo/pkexec/run0 stubbed to fail;
  • system: marked done once an admin has run it;
  • mixed: runs once an admin has, with the privileged commands stubbed to succeed and logged (the stubs drain stdin, so … | sudo tee works). A step about the user's own account, naming them (alone or as user:group) or a path in their home, as in sudo gpasswd -d "$USER" input, is not one the admin's run did for them: that stub fails, and the migration waits for an administrator to do it.

The first migration that can't run stops the run, as upstream does; the next login retries. just classify-migrations prints the classes for review.

When Omarchy ships Setup › Users

Omarchy PR #16920 brings the password model above into Omarchy itself, with records in the same format under /etc/omarchy/users. Once its omarchy-user-helper and omarchy-login-select are installed, this package steps aside for them:

  • omarchy-mu-handoff (run by a pacman hook when they arrive, and on this package's install or upgrade) finishes any change our journal holds, then copies the slot map and root's holder to /etc/omarchy/users, never over Omarchy's own. It rebuilds the boot image, which then carries Omarchy's cryptsetup wrapper instead of ours. Only one wrapper is ever in the boot image. omarchy-mu-handoff --check says where things stand.
  • omarchy-mu-login-select only takes its own drop-in away, and omarchy-mu-sddm-guard takes omarchy-mu-login-match out of /etc/pam.d/sddm: Omarchy's do the same.
  • omarchy-mu-user-helper refuses changes, so there is one journal: Omarchy's. omarchy-mu-user-password, -add and -remove hand over to omarchy-user-password, -add and -delete. Removing still takes the account's FIDO2 keys and fingerprints first, and adding still sets up who records migrations.
  • Everything else stays with this package: FIDO2 and fingerprints per user, migrations for non-administrators, the update lock, the lock screen and the greeter.

Install

From a checkout, on Omarchy 4.5:

just test
just package
sudo pacman -U packaging/omarchy-multiuser-*.pkg.tar.zst
sudo systemctl enable --now omarchy-mu-sddm-guard.path omarchy-mu-sddm-sync.path omarchy-mu-apply-lock.path
sudo systemctl --global enable omarchy-mu-login.service
sudo usermod -aG omarchy-users <each non-admin user>

omarchy-setup does all of this from a signed release tag (just omarchy-multiuser). The greeter takes over at the next login screen; sddm is never restarted from under open sessions.

The package itself enables omarchy-mu-update-log.path and each administrator's omarchy-mu-migrate-record@<admin>.path.

Try the greeter in a window first: just greeter.

Upstream

upstream/ holds the Omarchy 4.5.0rc1 files the forks start from, and upstream/MAP pairs them. just diff-base is what this project changes; just diff-upstream is what Omarchy changed since. After each Omarchy upgrade a pacman hook warns when one of those files moved.

Removing

pacman -R omarchy-multiuser brings Omarchy's greeter back. Autologin stays off. The upstream commands were never replaced, so they work again as before, including their single-owner behavior.

License

MIT, like Omarchy.

About

Several users on one Omarchy machine: a greeter listing everyone by full name, per-user FIDO2/fingerprints, migrations for non-admins

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