The banking console application now enforces a layered security model that combines strong authentication, role-based authorization, centralized logging, and tamper-evident audit trails. These enhancements ensure that sensitive banking operations are observable, traceable, and restricted to least-privilege users.

• Identity Provider: In-application AuthService issues HMAC-SHA256 signed JWT access tokens with one-hour lifetimes.
• Credential Storage: Passwords are hashed with SHA-256 and stored in-memory. Default administrative, teller, auditor, and customer accounts are seeded for testing.
• Role Enforcement: AuthMiddleware validates every token and enforces role checks (ADMIN, TELLER, AUDITOR, USER) before allowing service operations.
• Session Handling: The console UI requires successful login and supports re-authentication if tokens expire or privileges change.

• Central Logger: LoggingConfig standardizes Java util logging for console and rotating file outputs under logs/.
• Trace Correlation: TraceContext manages per-request trace identifiers that flow through asynchronous banking operations.
• Log Hygiene: All logging avoids sensitive data exposure and downgrades stack traces to debug files while preserving operational visibility.

• Persistent Audit Store: AuditTrailService writes JSON Lines entries to logs/audit_trail.jsonl for every privileged action.
• Data Masking: Account numbers, customer names, and tokens are automatically masked before persistence to prevent sensitive data leaks.
• Tamper Awareness: Audit events include timestamps and trace identifiers, enabling reconciliation with application logs.

• Access Control: Enforced multi-role authorization with least-privilege defaults.
• Authentication: Strong credential hashing and signed tokens with configurable secret via BANKING_JWT_SECRET.
• Auditability: Immutable, append-only audit trail with masked sensitive fields.
• Logging: Centralized, structured logs with correlation IDs for forensic analysis.
• Data Protection: Sensitive identifiers masked prior to storage and display in audit artifacts.
• Encryption at Rest: Persisted banking_system.ser file remains unencrypted (consider OS-level volume encryption or keystore integration).
• Secret Management: JWT signing key defaults to a static string; production deployments should inject a secret via environment variables or secrets manager.

1. Set BANKING_JWT_SECRET to a strong, environment-specific value.
2. Periodically rotate credentials and audit log files.
3. Monitor logs/application.log and logs/audit_trail.jsonl for anomalous activity.
4. Review the compliance checklist regularly and close remaining gaps before production deployment.