SysAdminMaster runs commands on production Windows servers as SYSTEM. We take reports seriously and are
grateful for responsible disclosure.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 2.32.x (latest) | ✅ |
| older | ❌ — please upgrade |
Please do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for a security problem.
Use GitHub's private reporting instead: Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository (private vulnerability reporting).
Please include:
- the affected component (
AgentMaster, dashboard, agent script, installer…) and version; - a description of the issue and its impact;
- steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept that does not touch systems you do not own.
What to expect:
- an acknowledgement within 5 working days;
- an assessment and, if confirmed, a fix plan within 30 days;
- credit in the release notes if you wish.
In scope: authentication and token handling, command authorisation (what can be queued and executed), path traversal on served scripts, injection in generated PowerShell, cross-site scripting in the dashboard, secrets written to logs.
Out of scope: denial of service by flooding a server you operate yourself, issues that require an attacker to already hold the master token or administrative access to a session host, and missing hardening of a deployment that ignores docs/security-model.md.
- Keep the three tokens (
SAM_AGENT_TOKEN,SAM_MASTER_TOKEN,SAM_READ_TOKEN) long, random and different. - Expose only the dashboard, behind a TLS reverse proxy; never expose port 5000 beyond the session hosts.
- Restrict port 5000 at the firewall to the session hosts (and to read-only consumers, if any).
- Store
.envwith mode600; never commit it (CI fails if a runtime secret file is tracked). - Rotate the agent token with the built-in two-token window (
SAM_AGENT_TOKEN_LEGACY), see docs/agents.md.