Report a vulnerability through GitHub's private advisory form: https://github.com/macayu17/Cutscene/security/advisories/new. Do not open a public issue.
Expect an acknowledgement within a week. This is a small project with one maintainer, and that is stated so you can plan around it rather than guess.
- The extension: anything that captures more than the tab being recorded, that
records while no recording is active, or that writes an unmasked input value
into
trace.jsonl. - The editor: anything that sends a recording anywhere the user did not ask it to go.
- The share server: path traversal into the bundle store, bypassing the review token checks, or reaching another recording's data.
- The runner: anything that executes content from a recording as code.
- The share server serving public, unguessable links to anyone holding the URL. That is the documented design; it has no accounts and no private links.
- Recordings being readable by anyone with access to the machine that made them. They are stored locally by design.
- Any behaviour that requires an attacker to already control the extension's own origin or the user's browser profile.
A trace.jsonl masks input values at capture, before it is written. It does not
mask URLs, routes, or accessible names, which can carry a customer name or an
account id. Treat a recording of a real system as sensitive when you attach one
to a report.