Please report security issues privately — do not open a public issue.

• Preferred: GitHub → the repo's Security tab → Report a vulnerability (private advisory).
• Or email mik@morion.ai.

We aim to acknowledge within a few days. Please include repro steps and the affected version.

Only the latest release is supported. Fixes land on main and ship in the next build.

Morion is local-first and single-user. The HTTP/WebSocket server binds to 127.0.0.1 (loopback) and, in browser-local mode, runs with no auth token by design. There is no multi-tenant server, no remote attacker surface, and no cloud component. Every input — notes, uploads, MCP calls — comes from the machine's own user (or an LLM client that user wired up).

This materially lowers the real-world severity of several npm audit advisories that assume a hostile remote client. We track them, but they are not treated as launch blockers:

• Transitive HTTP utils (qs, ws, etc.) — remote-DoS class. Reachable only over loopback by the local user; resolved by routine npm audit fix.
• file-type (malformed-media DoS via the upload validator). The upload path is self-served (you would DoS your own local instance). A fix requires a major bump and is scheduled as a follow-up.
• Dev toolchain (esbuild / vite / vitest) advisories, incl. the esbuild dev-server one. These affect development tooling only — they are not present in the runtime the desktop app / sidecar ships. A vite/vitest major bump is scheduled separately.

If you find a vulnerability that is exploitable within this threat model (e.g. an MCP actor escaping its permission scope, a path-traversal in attachments, a sidecar auth bypass), please report it — those we treat as real.