Feature/search web v1

.gitignore

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 # Rust build artifacts
 /target/
-/devit-landing-preview/
+## Landing preview (now versioned)
+# devit-landing-preview/
 /site/
 **/*.rs.bk
 Cargo.lock

crates/agent/src/lib.rs

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ impl Agent {
         Ok(answer)
     }
 
-    /// Génère un message de commit (Conventional Commits) à partir du goal, d'un résumé et d'un extrait de diff.
+/// Generate a Conventional Commit message from a goal, a summary, and a diff snippet.
     /// Retourne une ligne courte (≤ 72 chars) ; body optionnel non inclus (MVP).
     pub async fn commit_message(
         &self,

crates/cli/src/core/policy.rs

@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ impl PolicyEngine {
         }
 
         let reason = format!(
-            "Niveau untrusted : confirmation requise pour {} changement(s)",
+            "Untrusted level: confirmation required for {} change(s)",
             context.file_changes.len()
         );
         Ok(PolicyDecision::allow_with_confirmation(reason))
@@ -223,12 +223,12 @@ impl PolicyEngine {
             return Ok(PolicyDecision::allow_with_confirmation(reason));
         }
 
-        // Ask : demander confirmation sauf pour les changements très simples
+        // Ask: request confirmation except for very simple changes
         if self.is_simple_change(context) {
-            let reason = "Changement simple, autorisé automatiquement".to_string();
+            let reason = "Simple change, automatically allowed".to_string();
             Ok(PolicyDecision::allow(reason))
         } else {
-            let reason = "Changement nécessitant confirmation utilisateur".to_string();
+            let reason = "Change requires user confirmation".to_string();
             Ok(PolicyDecision::allow_with_confirmation(reason))
         }
     }
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ impl PolicyEngine {
 
         if context.file_changes.len() > context.config.max_files_moderate {
             let reason = format!(
-                "Trop de fichiers ({} > {}), dégradé vers ask",
+                "Too many files ({} > {}), downgraded to Ask",
                 context.file_changes.len(),
                 context.config.max_files_moderate
             );
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ impl PolicyEngine {
 
         if total_lines > context.config.max_lines_moderate {
             let reason = format!(
-                "Trop de lignes changées ({} > {}), dégradé vers ask",
+                "Too many lines changed ({} > {}), downgraded to Ask",
                 total_lines, context.config.max_lines_moderate
             );
             return Ok(PolicyDecision::downgrade(reason, ApprovalLevel::Ask, true));
@@ -275,22 +275,22 @@ impl PolicyEngine {
         }
 
         if context.file_changes.iter().any(|fc| fc.is_binary) {
-            let reason = "Les fichiers binaires nécessitent le niveau Ask".to_string();
+            let reason = "Binary files require Ask level".to_string();
             return Ok(PolicyDecision::downgrade(reason, ApprovalLevel::Ask, true));
         }
 
         if context.file_changes.iter().any(|fc| fc.touches_gitmodules) {
             return Ok(PolicyDecision::deny(
-                "Modification de .gitmodules réservée au niveau privileged".to_string(),
+                ".gitmodules modification is restricted to privileged level".to_string(),
             ));
         }
 
         if context.file_changes.iter().any(|fc| fc.touches_submodule) {
-            let reason = "Changement de sous-module nécessite le niveau Ask".to_string();
+            let reason = "Submodule change requires Ask level".to_string();
             return Ok(PolicyDecision::downgrade(reason, ApprovalLevel::Ask, true));
         }
 
-        let reason = "Changement autorisé au niveau moderate".to_string();
+        let reason = "Change allowed at moderate level".to_string();
         Ok(PolicyDecision::allow(reason))
     }
 
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ impl PolicyEngine {
 
         if context.file_changes.iter().any(|fc| fc.touches_gitmodules) {
             return Ok(PolicyDecision::deny(
-                "Modification de .gitmodules réservée au niveau privileged".to_string(),
+                ".gitmodules modification is restricted to privileged level".to_string(),
             ));
         }
 
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ impl PolicyEngine {
         for file_change in &context.file_changes {
             if file_change.is_binary {
                 if !self.is_whitelisted_binary(file_change, &context.config) {
-                    let reason = format!("Binaire non autorisé: {}", file_change.path.display());
+                    let reason = format!("Unauthorized binary: {}", file_change.path.display());
                     return Ok(PolicyDecision::downgrade(reason, ApprovalLevel::Ask, true));
                 }
             }
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ impl PolicyEngine {
         let reason = if requires_confirmation {
             "Sensitive path modified: confirmation required".to_string()
         } else {
-            "Changement autorisé au niveau trusted".to_string()
+            "Change allowed at trusted level".to_string()
         };
 
         if requires_confirmation {
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ impl PolicyEngine {
 
             if !path_allowed {
                 let reason = format!(
-                    "Chemin non autorisé en mode privileged: {}",
+                    "Path not allowed in privileged mode: {}",
                     file_change.path.display()
                 );
                 return Ok(PolicyDecision::deny(reason));
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ pub struct FileChange {
     /// Si le changement touche un sous-module Git
     pub touches_submodule: bool,
 
-    /// Si le changement touche .gitmodules
+    /// Whether the change touches .gitmodules
     pub touches_gitmodules: bool,
 
     /// Taille du fichier en octets (pour les binaires)
@@ -853,18 +853,18 @@ pub struct PolicyDecision {
     /// Si l'opération est autorisée
     pub allow: bool,
 
-    /// Si une confirmation utilisateur est requise
+    /// Whether user confirmation is required
     pub requires_confirmation: bool,
 
     /// Raison de la décision
     pub reason: String,
 
-    /// Niveau d'approbation dégradé si applicable
+    /// Downgraded approval level, if any
     pub downgraded_to: Option<ApprovalLevel>,
 }
 
 impl PolicyDecision {
-    /// Crée une décision d'autorisation.
+    /// Create an allow decision.
     pub fn allow(reason: String) -> Self {
         Self {
             allow: true,
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ impl PolicyDecision {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Crée une décision d'autorisation avec confirmation.
+    /// Create an allow decision requiring confirmation.
     pub fn allow_with_confirmation(reason: String) -> Self {
         Self {
             allow: true,
@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ impl PolicyDecision {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Crée une décision de refus.
+    /// Create a deny decision.
     pub fn deny(reason: String) -> Self {
         Self {
             allow: false,
@@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ impl PolicyDecision {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Crée une décision avec dégradation de niveau.
+    /// Create a decision with a downgraded approval level.
     pub fn downgrade(
         reason: String,
         downgraded_to: ApprovalLevel,
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ impl PolicyDecision {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    /// Crée un contexte de test avec des valeurs par défaut.
+    /// Create a test context with default values.
     fn create_test_context(
         file_changes: Vec<FileChange>,
         approval_level: ApprovalLevel,
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Crée un changement de fichier simple pour les tests.
+    /// Create a simple file change for tests.
     fn create_simple_file_change(path: &str) -> FileChange {
         FileChange {
             path: PathBuf::from(path),
@@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Crée un Policy Engine pour les tests.
+    /// Create a Policy Engine for tests.
     fn create_test_engine() -> PolicyEngine {
         PolicyEngine::new(
             ApprovalLevel::Privileged {
@@ -1046,7 +1046,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn test_ask_complex_change_requires_confirmation() {
         let engine = create_test_engine();
         let mut change = create_simple_file_change("src/main.rs");
-        change.lines_added = 50; // Dépasse le seuil simple
+        change.lines_added = 50; // Exceeds simple threshold
         let changes = vec![change];
         let context = create_test_context(changes, ApprovalLevel::Ask);
 
@@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn test_moderate_too_many_files_downgrades() {
         let engine = create_test_engine();
         let mut changes = Vec::new();
-        // Créer plus de fichiers que la limite moderate
+        // Create more files than the moderate limit
         for i in 0..15 {
             changes.push(create_simple_file_change(&format!("src/file{}.rs", i)));
         }
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(decision.allow);
         assert!(decision.requires_confirmation);
         assert_eq!(decision.downgraded_to, Some(ApprovalLevel::Ask));
-        assert!(decision.reason.contains("Binaire non autorisé"));
+        assert!(decision.reason.contains("Unauthorized binary"));
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ mod tests {
 
         assert!(!decision.allow);
         assert!(!decision.requires_confirmation);
-        assert!(decision.reason.contains("non autorisé en mode privileged"));
+        assert!(decision.reason.contains("not allowed in privileged mode"));
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ mod tests {
         let decision = engine.evaluate_changes(&context).unwrap();
 
         assert!(decision.allow);
-        // Symlink interne : peut demander confirmation si changement non simple
+        // Internal symlink: may require confirmation if change is not simple
         assert!(decision.requires_confirmation);
     }
 

crates/cli/src/main.rs

@@ -597,9 +597,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         }
         Some(Commands::Run { goal, use_mcp }) => {
             if policy_requires_yes && !assume_yes {
-                eprintln!(
-                    "La politique 'on-request' nécessite --yes pour exécuter cette commande."
-                );
+                eprintln!("Policy 'on-request' requires --yes to run this command.");
                 std::process::exit(1);
             }
             let response = handle_run(goal, use_mcp, use_json_output).await;
@@ -797,7 +795,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
                     ext_allow.as_deref(),
                     json_out.as_deref(),
                 )?;
-                println!("index écrit: {}", written.display());
+                println!("index written: {}", written.display());
             }
         },
         Some(Commands::CommitMsg {
@@ -1045,10 +1043,10 @@ fn read_patch(input: &str) -> Result<String> {
 
 fn ensure_git_repo() -> Result<()> {
     if !git::is_git_available() {
-        anyhow::bail!("git n'est pas disponible dans le PATH.");
+        anyhow::bail!("git is not available in PATH.");
     }
     if !git::in_repo() {
-        anyhow::bail!("pas dans un dépôt git (git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree).");
+        anyhow::bail!("not inside a git repository (git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree).");
     }
     Ok(())
 }
@@ -1230,7 +1228,7 @@ fn tool_call_json(
         "fs_patch_apply" => {
             ensure_git_repo()?;
             if cfg.policy.sandbox.to_lowercase() == "read-only" {
-                anyhow::bail!("policy.sandbox=read-only: apply refusé (aucune écriture autorisée)");
+                anyhow::bail!("policy.sandbox=read-only: apply denied (no write operations allowed)");
             }
             let patch = args.get("patch").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
             let mode = args.get("mode").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("index");
@@ -1294,7 +1292,7 @@ fn tool_call_json(
                 .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
                 .unwrap_or(false);
             if patch.is_empty() {
-                anyhow::bail!("fs_patch_apply: champ 'patch' requis (contenu du diff)");
+                anyhow::bail!("fs_patch_apply: 'patch' field is required (diff content)");
             }
             // Precommit gate
             if precommit_only {
@@ -1363,14 +1361,14 @@ fn tool_call_json(
             }
             let ask = requires_approval_tool(&cfg.policy, "git", yes, "write");
             if ask && !ask_approval()? {
-                anyhow::bail!("Annulé par l'utilisateur.");
+                anyhow::bail!("Cancelled by user.");
             }
             let ok = match mode {
                 "worktree" => git::apply_worktree(patch)?,
                 _ => git::apply_index(patch)?,
             };
             if !ok {
-                anyhow::bail!("Échec git apply ({mode})");
+                anyhow::bail!(format!("git apply failed ({mode})"));
             }
             // tests impacted pipeline
             let tests_enabled = match tests_mode.as_str() {
@@ -1620,11 +1618,11 @@ fn tool_call_json(
         "shell_exec" => {
             let cmd = args.get("cmd").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
             if cmd.is_empty() {
-                anyhow::bail!("shell_exec: champ 'cmd' requis");
+                anyhow::bail!("shell_exec: 'cmd' field is required");
             }
             let ask = requires_approval_tool(&cfg.policy, "shell", yes, "exec");
             if ask && !ask_approval()? {
-                anyhow::bail!("Annulé par l'utilisateur.");
+                anyhow::bail!("Cancelled by user.");
             }
             #[cfg(feature = "sandbox")]
             let (code, out) = sandbox::run_shell_sandboxed_capture(cmd, &cfg.policy, &cfg.sandbox)?;
@@ -1636,7 +1634,7 @@ fn tool_call_json(
             }
             Ok(serde_json::json!({"exit_code": code, "output": out}))
         }
-        _ => anyhow::bail!(format!("outil inconnu: {name}")),
+        _ => anyhow::bail!(format!("unknown tool: {name}")),
     }
 }
 
@@ -1656,7 +1654,7 @@ fn tool_call_legacy(
         "fs_patch_apply" => {
             ensure_git_repo()?;
             if cfg.policy.sandbox.to_lowercase() == "read-only" {
-                anyhow::bail!("policy.sandbox=read-only: apply refusé (aucune écriture autorisée)");
+                anyhow::bail!("policy.sandbox=read-only: apply denied (no write operations allowed)");
             }
             let patch = read_patch(input)?;
             if precommit_only {
@@ -1693,10 +1691,10 @@ fn tool_call_legacy(
             git::apply_check(&patch)?;
             let ask = requires_approval_tool(&cfg.policy, "git", yes, "write");
             if ask && !ask_approval()? {
-                anyhow::bail!("Annulé par l'utilisateur.");
+                anyhow::bail!("Cancelled by user.");
             }
             if !git::apply_index(&patch)? {
-                anyhow::bail!("Échec git apply --index (patch-only).");
+                anyhow::bail!("git apply --index failed (patch-only).");
             }
             // run impacted tests (auto on for non-danger profiles)
             let profile = cfg
@@ -1732,7 +1730,7 @@ fn tool_call_legacy(
         "shell_exec" => {
             let ask = requires_approval_tool(&cfg.policy, "shell", yes, "exec");
             if ask && !ask_approval()? {
-                anyhow::bail!("Annulé par l'utilisateur.");
+                anyhow::bail!("Cancelled by user.");
             }
             let cmd = if input == "-" {
                 anyhow::bail!("shell_exec requires a command string as input");
@@ -1752,7 +1750,7 @@ fn tool_call_legacy(
             }
             Ok(())
         }
-        _ => anyhow::bail!(format!("outil inconnu: {name}")),
+        _ => anyhow::bail!(format!("unknown tool: {name}")),
     }
 }
 
@@ -3184,7 +3182,7 @@ async fn run_sandboxed_test(
         }
         Ok(Ok(Err(e))) => {
             // Fallback to non-sandboxed execution if binary not allowed
-            if e.to_string().contains("binaire non autorisé")
+            if e.to_string().contains("unauthorized binary")
                 || e.to_string().contains("binary not allowed")
             {
                 tracing::warn!(