fix(security): harden cross-platform containment - #65
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ClawSweeper status: review started. I am starting a fresh review of this pull request: fix(security): harden cross-platform containment This is item 1/1 in the current shard. Shard 0/1. This placeholder means the worker is alive and reading the current context. I will edit this same comment with the actual review when the claws are done clicking. Crustacean status: shell secured, claws on keyboard, evidence pebbles being sorted. |
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This was referenced Aug 2, 2026
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Summary
root()inputs before normalized I/OO_RESOLVE_BENEATH, retain the component-walk fallback, and apply anF_GETPATHcontainment detector to both routes{ fd, containment }from nativeopenBeneath()and exposecontainmenton JavaScript open/read/writable resultsItem 1 verification
The claimed v0.4.7
root()escape did not reproduce against tagv0.4.7or currentmain: read/open rejected, and write/openWritable operated on the normalized in-root path without touching the outside inode. That containment behavior dates to the initial root implementation in5ddca80.The exported
resolveRootPathvalidator did still normalize before walking aliases, so it could approve a different spelling than a direct caller later used. This change fixes that live validation flaw and adds the exactsub/up/../outside/secret.txtregression for read, write, open, and openWritable through both forced-JavaScript and native-enabled configurations.Proof
pnpm checkpnpm test:securitypnpm pack:checkpnpm docs:sitepnpm native:buildpnpm native:testrustfmt --edition 2024 --check native/src/lib.rs native/src/unix.rs