docs(fleet): add the compliance crosswalk

src/components/docs/nav.ts

@@ -491,6 +491,11 @@ export const DOCS_NAV: DocsSection[] = [
                 label: 'Bond verification',
                 blurb: 'GET /api/bond — re-resolve a bond against live bitcoin UTXO state. The load-bearing leg.',
             },
+            {
+                href: '/fleet/compliance',
+                label: 'Compliance crosswalk',
+                blurb: 'Fleet artifacts mapped to EU AI Act / SOC 2 / NIST AI RMF — with honest rails. The procurement exit.',
+            },
             {
                 href: '/fleet/webhooks',
                 label: 'Webhooks',

src/pages/fleet/compliance.mdx

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+export const metadata = {
+    title: 'Fleet compliance crosswalk',
+    description:
+        'How OC Fleet artifacts — signed delegations, stamped actions, revocations, bonded pledges, and offline-verifiable audit bundles — map to EU AI Act, SOC 2, and NIST AI RMF controls. Evidence infrastructure, stated honestly: what it gives an auditor, and what it explicitly does not.',
+};
+
+# Compliance crosswalk
+
+Enterprise AI-agent rollouts stall in the same place: a compliance reviewer asks
+_who authorized this agent to do that, what was it allowed to do, when was it
+revoked, and what does it have to lose if it misbehaves_ — and the team cannot
+answer with evidence that survives scrutiny. Service accounts collapse the
+user→agent→tool chain into one shared credential, which is the SOC 2 CC6 finding
+auditors now reject outright.
+
+Fleet's artifacts are built to answer those questions with **content-addressed,
+BIP-322-signed, OpenTimestamps-anchored evidence that verifies offline against
+Bitcoin** — no trust in fleet required. This page maps each control family to
+the artifact that satisfies it.
+
+## Read this first — the honesty rails
+
+These four statements bound everything below. Quote them to your reviewer; they
+are the difference between an honest control and an overclaim.
+
+1. **Fleet is evidence infrastructure, not a compliance guarantee.** It produces
+   the audit trail a framework asks for. It does not certify you against any
+   framework. Your auditor still audits you.
+2. **Protocol cannot transfer liability.** A bonded pledge is verifiable
+   economic exposure, not an indemnity. No envelope makes someone else legally
+   responsible for an agent's act.
+3. **Fleet is not a real-time kill-switch.** Revocation is a signed, anchored
+   fact that any verifier honors going forward; it is not an in-band interceptor
+   that halts a running tool call. Fleet **composes under** your runtime
+   guardrails and observability stack — it does not replace them.
+4. **A bond proves skin-in-the-game, not good behavior.** It raises the cost of
+   misbehaving and makes that cost verifiable. It does not prevent the act.
+
+## EU AI Act
+
+| Article                                    | Requirement                                                             | Fleet artifact                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
+| ------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Art. 12 — Record-keeping**               | Automatic logging of events over the system's lifetime, tamper-evident. | Every action is a kind-30084 envelope: content-addressed, BIP-322-signed by the agent, OTS-anchored to a Bitcoin block. The audit bundle is the lifetime log; the block anchor is the tamper-evidence.                                                                                   |
+| **Art. 14 — Human oversight**              | A human can understand, oversee, and intervene.                         | Authority originates in a **human-signed** delegation (BIP-322 over the principal's Bitcoin address) with an explicit scope grammar and a block-height expiry; intervention is a human-signed **revocation** envelope. Oversight is the scoped grant; intervention is the signed revoke. |
+| **Art. 14 — Traceability of intervention** | Ordering of act vs. intervention is non-repudiable.                     | OTS block-height anchoring gives an offline verifier a non-malleable clock to order an action against its revocation deterministically — a signed wall-clock is forgeable, a block height is not.                                                                                        |
+
+## SOC 2
+
+| Criterion                                  | Requirement                                                                   | Fleet artifact                                                                                                                                                                                           |
+| ------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **CC6.1 — Logical access**                 | Least-privilege, per-identity access; no shared credentials.                  | Each agent acts under its **own** Bitcoin-address identity and its **own** scoped delegation — the opposite of a shared service account. Scope is an explicit, attenuable grammar, not "all of the API". |
+| **CC6.2 / CC6.3 — Provisioning & removal** | Authorization is granted and revoked through a controlled, evidenced process. | Grant = signed delegation; removal = signed revocation. Both are first-class, exportable, offline-verifiable envelopes — the provisioning record _is_ the artifact.                                      |
+| **CC7.2 / CC7.3 — Monitoring & evidence**  | Immutable, exportable activity logs.                                          | NDJSON / JSON / CSV audit-bundle export; every row re-verifies against the agent's signature and the Bitcoin header chain with `@orangecheck/agent-core`.                                                |
+
+## NIST AI RMF
+
+| Function    | What fleet contributes                                                                                                                 |
+| ----------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **GOVERN**  | A named, address-keyed authority model: who delegated, to whom, with what scope, with what bond.                                       |
+| **MAP**     | The scope grammar makes an agent's permitted actions explicit and enumerable before deployment.                                        |
+| **MEASURE** | The bond gives a measurable, chain-verifiable stake (`sats × days_unspent`); the action stream gives in-scope vs. out-of-scope counts. |
+| **MANAGE**  | Scoped, revocable authority + a bonded accountability signal that a counterparty can weigh — without custody, without an account.      |
+
+## The bond as a control
+
+Most frameworks above are satisfied by _capability + audit_, which an ordinary
+keypair could also provide. The differentiator that needs Bitcoin is the
+[bond](/fleet/bond): a counterparty can verify the agent (or the org running it)
+has real, unspent, aged bitcoin exposure to losing — re-resolved live against
+UTXO state, trusting no one. That is the one control on this page that does not
+reduce to a verifiable credential. See [Bond verification](/fleet/bond) for the
+contract and its honest limitations.