Please report security issues privately through GitHub → Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository. Do not open a public issue. You'll get an acknowledgement within a few business days.
In scope:
- the auto-updater (signature/checksum bypass, downgrade, URL/host handling)
- parsing of DST files,
.tepprojects and glyph-library fonts (crashes, hangs, path traversal, memory exhaustion) - the release pipeline in
.github/workflows
Only the latest release receives fixes. The app updates itself, so staying current is automatic unless update checks are turned off.
- Release binaries are built by GitHub Actions from a tag on
main, with SHA-pinned Actions. checksums.txtis signed with an Ed25519 key that exists only as a GitHub Actions environment secret. The public key is compiled into the app (internal/updater/release-key.pub).- The updater installs a build only if the signature verifies and the file's SHA-256 matches the signed list. It only contacts
api.github.com,github.comand GitHub's release-asset hosts over HTTPS, with size limits on every download. - Every release asset has a GitHub build-provenance attestation (
gh attestation verify <file> --repo <owner>/<repo>). - Development builds (
version = dev) never check for or install updates.
DST and project files are treated as untrusted: record counts and file sizes are capped, the DST reader is fuzz-tested in CI, glyph fonts can only reference files inside their own folder, and the UI escapes all file-provided text and runs under a strict Content-Security-Policy.