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I realise this will probably need some extra work for Cloudflare on the hash/digest method. |
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@porsager Any thoughts on adding support for channel binding (SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS) — based on this PR or otherwise? node-postgres merged this a while back: It's currently behind a custom config flag there, but it would be nicer to support |
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Hello. I hope you'll consider this patch, which adds support for SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS authentication.
SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS in Postgres enables
tls-server-end-pointchannel binding, where the client sends the server a hash of the certificate it received as part of the TLS handshake. This prevents some kinds of MITM attacks where the attacker obtains a certificate that appears valid for the server, but is not actually the server's.So far I've tested it working against Neon (who support SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS) and Supabase (who don't).
Feel free to make any changes you think appropriate.