feat: production container, Render deployment, and cutover runbook (Hosting Interval E)

[quangshuynh]

Hosting Interval E, repository part: everything needed to deploy the one private Flipper instance. Nothing is deployed by this PR, and no real data is involved.

What it adds

• Dockerfile: python:3.13-slim-bookworm (the version CI tests) with the pinned requirements.txt. Runs one Uvicorn process (web.app:app, no workers, no reload, --no-proxy-headers, graceful shutdown) as non-root uid 10001. Image defaults fail closed: FLIPPER_WEB_SECURITY_MODE=hosted, FLIPPER_DATA_DIR=/var/data/flipper, FLIPPER_CREDENTIAL_BACKEND=file. Includes openssh-sftp-server and /root/.ssh so Render's SSH/scp -s can move a verified backup at cutover. The image runs no SSH server of its own.
• .dockerignore: an allow-list. .env, databases, attachments, credentials, backups, context.md, .claude/, tests, docs, and .git cannot enter the image.
• deploy/entrypoint.sh: refuses to start unless the data directory is on a mounted volume, so SQLite can never land on ephemeral disk. Gives the root-owned disk to the app user, sets umask 077, drops root with setpriv, and execs the command.
• deploy/flipper-cli (flipper on PATH): runs the CLI as the app user inside the container.
• deploy/smoke.py: read-only HTTPS security smoke covering headers, HSTS, CSP, no-store, sign-in redirects, generic wrong password, __Host-/Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite cookie, CSRF origin checks, the public eBay route, hidden framework docs, and sign-out.
• render.yaml: Blueprint for a new flipper-app service only. Starter plan, numInstances: 1, 1 GB disk at /var/data, health check GET /login, deploys main only after CI passes, and every secret sync: false.
• CI container job: builds the image, inspects it for data and secrets, proves it refuses to start without a volume or secrets, runs the smoke with synthetic secrets, checks the non-root uid, proves persistence across restart and container replacement, and rehearses backup, verify, restore, and verify-restore on the volume.
• Docs: docs/operations/deployment.md covers architecture, container, Render, environment and secrets, synthetic first deploy, real-data cutover, equivalence, authority transition, eBay reconnect, backups and disaster recovery, rollback, logs, and a phone checklist. Cross-links in the web-security, backup, and configuration docs and the README.

Deliberately unchanged

• The existing eBay account-deletion service (flipper-zyui.onrender.com, standalone ebay.compliance:app) is not in the Blueprint and keeps working. Both services coexist, and the eBay developer account is untouched.
• No new routes. /login is already public and serves as the health check, so the route classification table is unchanged.
• No schema change (v14). No changes to accounting, Deal Score, Q/S/C allocation, backup fingerprint semantics, CSP, CSRF, or trusted-host checks. No WAL. No PWA work.

Verification

• pytest: 802 passed, 4 skipped (the Blueprint path test is POSIX-only and runs in CI).
• ruff check . and ruff format --check . pass; mkdocs build --strict passes; git diff --check is clean; tracked-ignored hygiene passes.
• Local Docker, synthetic data only:
  • The image builds from a clean git archive of the tree.
  • Without a volume: exit 65. With a volume but no secrets: exit 3, and no database is created.
  • The smoke passes, and an untrusted Host gets 400.
  • PID 1 runs as uid 10001. Database, attachment, and credential file are owner-only (600/700).
  • The fingerprint, attachment hash, and credential file survive both a restart and replacement with a rebuilt image.
  • Backup → verify → restore → verify-restore passes, credentials are excluded, and a restore onto the active directory is refused.
  • The cutover switch was rehearsed: pointing FLIPPER_DATA_DIR at the restored directory and restarting gives equivalent data.
  • At 390×844, Dashboard, Deals, Research History, Inventory and detail, Sales, Insights, Settings, and the add-opportunity form showed no page overflow and no input under 16px. The table scrolls inside its container, attachments load, and sign-out works.
  • Access logs contain only method, path, and status; no password, hash, session secret, cookie, or token.

After merge (human actions)

Creating the Render service needs the owner's Render account (a paid Starter plan plus a disk, about USD 7.25/month) and an owner password chosen by the owner. The real-data cutover needs separate explicit approval. See the runbook.

[gitguardian]

⚠️ GitGuardian has uncovered 1 secret following the scan of your pull request.

Please consider investigating the findings and remediating the incidents. Failure to do so may lead to compromising the associated services or software components.

🔎 Detected hardcoded secret in your pull request

GitGuardian id	GitGuardian status	Secret	Commit	Filename
37670708	Triggered	Generic High Entropy Secret	55fbd53	tests/test_deployment.py	View secret

🛠 Guidelines to remediate hardcoded secrets

1. Understand the implications of revoking this secret by investigating where it is used in your code.
2. Replace and store your secret safely. Learn here the best practices.
3. Revoke and rotate this secret.
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To avoid such incidents in the future consider

• following these best practices for managing and storing secrets including API keys and other credentials
• install secret detection on pre-commit to catch secret before it leaves your machine and ease remediation.

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