Check Point Harmony SASE P81 LPE - #21868
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Documented the exploitation of a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Check Point Harmony SASE for macOS. Included verification steps, options, actions, scenarios, and references.
jvoisin
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Sep 3, 2026
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This PR adds a local exploit module for a root command injection in the Check Point Harmony SASE (formerly Perimeter 81) macOS HelperTool. It escalates a local, unprivileged user to root and supports both a root session (SESSION action) and running a single command as root (EXEC action), on Intel and Apple Silicon.
Vulnerability
Check Point Harmony SASE (formerly Perimeter 81) for macOS ships a privileged SMJobBless HelperTool (
com.perimeter81.osx.HelperTool). Its daemon-install routineDIInstallScriptsExecutor.copyDaemonbuilds a shell command and runs it as root through/bin/bash -c, inserting the connecting client's app bundle path (NSBundle.mainBundle.bundlePath) inside single quotes with no escaping. Adittocopy of the app keeps the vendor signature and still satisfies the helper'sSMAuthorizedClientsrequirement, so relocating that copy under a directory whose name contains a single quote injects a command that runs as root - local user to root.Verification Steps
msfconsole.use exploit/osx/local/harmony_sase_helpertool_lpeset SESSION <id>set TARGET 0(Apple Silicon) orset TARGET 1(Intel)set LHOST <address>runset ACTION EXECandset COMMAND <cmd>to get the command output instead.Options
TRIGGER_MODE - which install path to drive:
relaunch_flag(default, deterministic) orrace.COMMAND - command to run as root for the EXEC action. Default
whoami.Scenarios
Harmony SASE 12.9.0 (build 11237), Apple Silicon, root session
Attacker: Kali (
10.211.55.6). Victim: macOS Apple Silicon, standard userdexter.