[Precogs AI] Auto-Fix: Cumulative vulnerabilities resolution#14
Open
sameer6pre wants to merge 2 commits into
Open
[Precogs AI] Auto-Fix: Cumulative vulnerabilities resolution#14sameer6pre wants to merge 2 commits into
sameer6pre wants to merge 2 commits into
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Precogs Auto-Fix — 4 Vulnerabilities Fixed
Vulnerability Details
app.pyExplanation:
Primary: SQL Injection (CWE-89) — The get_user_by_name function constructs an SQL statement by interpolating the raw username into the query string using an f-string. This allows an attacker-controlled username to alter the SQL statement, enabling SQL injection. The cursor.execute call accepts the crafted SQL and executes it against the database without any parameterization or sanitization.
Also found: Hard-coded Secret (CWE-798) — A secret API_KEY value is hard-coded in source. Storing credentials or secrets in source code risks accidental disclosure (e.g., via version control, code leak) and makes rotation and environment-specific configuration difficult. An attacker discovering this key could authenticate to services or escalate privileges if that key is accepted by other systems.
Please review and address the issue accordingly.
Vulnerability Details
app.pyExplanation:
The ping() route embeds the user-provided ip parameter directly into a shell command executed via os.system. os.system passes the string to the shell, so an attacker can inject shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&) to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
Please review and address the issue accordingly.
Vulnerability Details
app.pyExplanation:
The application deserializes user-supplied data using pickle.loads. Pickle is not safe for untrusted input: it can encode instructions to import modules and execute arbitrary code during deserialization, allowing remote code execution.
Please review and address the issue accordingly.
Vulnerability Details
sample-vuln/app.pyExplanation:
The endpoint accepts an 'ip' parameter from an HTTP request and uses it to invoke the system 'ping' command. Although ipaddress.ip_address() is used, it only validates IP syntax and does not prevent the use of private, loopback, link-local, reserved, or otherwise internal addresses. This allows an attacker to trigger outbound network traffic from the server to internal resources (SSRF-like behavior). Using the 'ping' binary with a user-supplied address enables the server to be used as a probe into internal networks (including cloud metadata IPs like 169.254.169.254), potentially exposing sensitive infrastructure or credentials. Even when subprocess.run() is passed a list (avoiding shell injection), the network access itself is the security problem.
Please review and address the issue accordingly.
This PR was auto-generated by Precogs AI. Review the changes and verify CI results before merging.