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Re-review: request changes — one blocker before semantic approval
Reviewed head: c2c52fa27bec24e72285564057cab198e4654e36.
Base: 71ca724a8b6ec23f1655b086a6f549496d10a47f.
Issue #36's framing remains sound, but this new Phase A protocol needs a bounded correction before semantic approval. This review covers the written protocol, not merely the issue wording cleared in re-review 5659896617. The live head was rechecked before posting and still matches the reviewed commit.
B1 — Post-commit history suppression conflicts with C38's hidden-history independence
Location: the new candidate, §8, especially the sealed-payload suppression rule and C38 paragraph; §§10–11; and the interaction between RD-C08 and RD-C16.
The candidate requires a newly learned, potentially material committed qualifier to invalidate the prepared historical reply. Once the payload or evidence is sealed, it requires suppression of the attempt, prohibits changing the buffer, and requires a separately requested new read for another protected reply. The same section also requires hidden history not to change the response category, omission pattern, or fallback choice.
Those requirements are not reconciled for a reply whose history qualification is already WITHHELD.
Concrete counterexample
Consider two otherwise equivalent reads of the same independently verified historical refusal. The caller has current permission to receive the original result. The independently selected disclosure policy permits a limited RECORDED_RESULT, but prohibits disclosure of history status and observation time. Both reads therefore prepare the same public history qualification: WITHHELD, with null status and time.
Both complete evidence commitment C, before disclosure L. No authorization, session, retention, payload, or other independently disclosable fact changes. Now vary only hidden history:
| Execution | What happens between C and L | Result required by the current draft |
|---|---|---|
| A | No new hidden qualifier becomes known | The prepared limited historical reply may be disclosed. |
| B | The owner learns of a newly committed hidden qualifier, including one whose admission or classification remains unresolved | The sealed attempt is suppressed. Its protected historical-result payload cannot be returned or rebuilt under that identity. |
This follows §8's suppression rule, §10's history-validity condition at L, and §11's prohibition on same-identity protected-response retry.
The caller can distinguish the two executions by whether the historical result is returned—even though the only difference is undisclosable history. A sanitized failure message does not remove that distinction: the result's presence or omission is itself observable.
That conflicts with PR #31 §5.4 at 092be94. Its C38 rule covers not only hidden fields and wording, but also the choice between a limited historical reply and exclusion, the failure category, and the omission pattern. PR #35 §9 at b9ccdc9 preserves that same requirement.
Why this blocks protocol approval
This is not a request to weaken the known-candidate refresh rule. PR #35 §6 explicitly requires refresh or permitted unavailable/withheld handling and prohibits splicing refreshed history into finalized evidence. That obligation must remain.
The problem is that this proposal chooses terminal suppression after sealing, without explaining how that choice remains hidden-history-independent when the already selected public posture is WITHHELD. The draft separately tests late-candidate suppression in RD-C08 and hidden-history pairs in RD-C16, but does not specify their combined outcome.
A future provider could potentially prevent this interleaving through a reviewed guard guarantee. That would be a valid avenue to examine, but it must be made an explicit required guarantee for the affected path—not assumed while the protocol also specifies the interleaving as a supported failure case.
This is a conflict in the proposed behavior, not evidence of a deployed information leak.
Smallest controlled correction
Change class: candidate RFC correction plus conformance expansion.
Affected file: only package_meta/history/clean_baseline_migration/phase_reports/governed_read_transaction_coverage_and_disclosure_protocol_rfc_candidate_v0_1.md. No active-baseline edit is proposed.
- Reconcile sealed-reply invalidation with policy-selected withholding. Define how a late hidden-only qualifier affects a
WITHHELDlimited reply without making its publishability depend on hidden history. Either provide compatible handling or require an explicit owner-backed guarantee that prevents the conflicting interleaving. Do not invent an exemption from required authorization or evidence checks. - Add the combined hostile case. Pair otherwise identical reads with and without a hidden committed candidate arriving after C but before L, including unresolved admission. Cover both independently selected C38 policy paths: limited reply and exclusion. Also retain the case where history is disclosable and refresh or suppression really is required.
- Keep the owner boundary explicit. If the solution requires changing PR #35's reply-validity semantics or PR #31's privacy rule, identify that exact dependency and obtain separate owner review. Do not solve the conflict by silently narrowing either requirement.
The correction must preserve spent consumption, immutable sealed evidence, no unauthorized replay, and truthful uncertainty. The current draft already requires those safeguards; they should not be traded away to repair this interaction.
Other reviewed areas
No additional blocker was identified in these parts:
Sharing coverage: §7 supplies a substantive positive example. It distinguishes receiving permitted contents of an exact artifact revision from independently reading its raw origins, retains surviving source restrictions, and identifies unresolved content bindings rather than granting access by provenance alone. That interpretation has a basis in Constitution §7.15, which expressly permits receiving specific compiled outputs.
Evidence and delivery claims: §§9–11 distinguish preparation, committed evidence, observed disclosure attempts, acceptance extent, and delivery uncertainty. They do not infer delivery from a preparation receipt or permit replay to repair missing outcome evidence.
Qualification ordering and binding limits: §6.2 keeps genuine pre-evaluation evidence separate from the final public projection, while §14 explicitly leaves actual source, guard, egress, and implementation bindings open. Their absence is declared implementation debt, not an additional finding merely because this is Phase A.
Recommendation: request changes for B1; keep issue #36 open. The earlier issue-framing clearance does not approve this newly specified state machine. This is a review recommendation, not semantic, merge, materialization, promotion, extraction or implementation authorization.
Static source review only. No runtime, concurrency, durability, or package tests were executed for this review.
|
Prepared the bounded B1 correction at The proposal uses the review's explicit-guarantee option. Sections 6.1 and 8.2–8.3 now require complete-universe source-backed protection for every permitted WITHHELD limited historical reply before its final observation, continuing through evidence commit C to disclosure L. A competing qualifier is ordered before the protected cut or after L/irrevocable termination. Optimistic detection followed by suppression, delayed notifications and hidden-contention-only admission failure are explicitly insufficient. Policy-selected exclusion stays uniform; disclosable history retains refresh/suppression. The original decision, spent consumption, sealed evidence, one handoff/no replay and truthful uncertainty are preserved. A real protection breach remains fail-closed and fails privacy/seal conformance—changing its label is not the proposed fix. I13 and C20/C21 now pair actual commit order with public response behavior for both C38 policy paths, including unresolved admission, pre-cut omissions, missing commit paths and lost/forged protection. RD-BIND03-W is a required but still open sub-obligation of RD-BIND03. No actual provider guarantee, new database/reader authority or PR #31/#35 amendment is claimed. Primary trust boundary: governed-read transaction integrity and protected disclosure. Scope stayed inside the existing one-file candidate and its publication/navigation. Four static repository checks, all source pins, structure/traceability/whitespace, seven unchanged-section comparisons and exact remote text read-back passed. No runtime, concurrency, durability or privacy experiment ran. What is next: exact-head re-review of this correction and its guarantee's sufficiency. Decision version 2 is unapproved; all binding, acceptance, promotion, extraction and implementation gates remain open. |
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Re-review: no blocking findings — B1 resolved at the protocol-design level
Reviewed head: 41cd45b90fb8e133f6377d8f389858b89c3dd7ae, proposed decision version 2.
Previously reviewed head: c2c52fa27bec24e72285564057cab198e4654e36.
Base: 71ca724a8b6ec23f1655b086a6f549496d10a47f.
B1 from review 5194803845 is resolved at the protocol-design level. No further corrective patch is requested at this head. The actual source-backed guarantee remains unproven and must still be supplied before the affected read path can be admitted.
The bounded revision changes the same candidate file: 96 insertions and 35 deletions. The live head was rechecked before posting and still matches the reviewed commit; the PR remains open, draft and unmerged.
1. B1: the conflicting interleaving is now prohibited, not relabelled
The earlier proposal allowed two otherwise equivalent WITHHELD reads to diverge after evidence commitment C: one returned the historical result, while the other suppressed it because a hidden qualifier became known.
Section 8.3 at the reviewed head now requires protection before the final observation, continuing across C through disclosure L, for every policy-permitted WITHHELD limited historical reply. Protection is not conditional on finding a qualifier. A competing candidate must commit before the protected cut, where it belongs in the observation, or after L/irrevocable termination. Detection followed by cancellation is explicitly insufficient.
That gives the previous counterexample a coherent positive ordering:
| Situation | Required treatment |
|---|---|
| Candidate committed before protection | Include it in the final observation, even if its notification arrives later or admission remains unresolved. |
| Candidate attempts to commit between C and L | Under the required guarantee, its actual commitment follows L when the read otherwise remains eligible. The limited reply does not change because of that hidden attempt. |
| Provider nevertheless permits an intervening commit or reveals a pre-cut omission | Stop disclosure, but also fail the provider's observation/privacy conformance. Suppression is not presented as a successful privacy-preserving outcome. |
These distinctions are explicit in §8.3. This implements the explicit-guarantee option requested in the prior review; it does not merely rename B1 as an ordinary guard failure.
2. The correction addresses the main ways the leak could move elsewhere
Acquisition and deadlines. Section 8.3(5) expressly rejects hidden-contention-only acquisition timeouts, optimistic conflict aborts, and admission behavior that transfers the disclosure-versus-failure distinction to an earlier stage. Requiring protection uniformly would not have been sufficient without this clause.
Incomplete protection. The required scope includes the complete candidate universe and participating commit paths—not merely currently known qualifier IDs or successfully admitted records. Imports, migrations, qualifications of qualifiers, and unresolved or malformed-root candidates are explicitly included. Delaying notifications about already committed candidates is prohibited.
Policy-selected exclusion. Sections 8.2–8.4 keep the exclusion path uniform without fabricating a successful historical-read receipt. Conversely, when history is disclosable, the existing refresh/suppression behavior remains; the runtime cannot switch to WITHHELD because an inconvenient candidate appears. This preserves the distinction between privacy policy and history-dependent processing.
3. C20/C21 now test the interaction that was missing
Section 13 requires observation of both authoritative commit order and public behavior, rather than merely checking that a guard returns success or that delivered JSON contains null history fields.
RD-C20 pairs the limited-reply and exclusion paths, includes unresolved admission, and explicitly fails a provider that permits the intervening commit and then returns a sanitized failure. RD-C21 covers pre-cut notification lag, omitted commit paths, incomplete partitions, forged or prematurely released protection, and hidden-contention-only admission failure. RD-C08 remains the comparator for disclosable-history refresh/suppression.
That closes the conformance-specification gap behind B1. These remain case specifications, not executed evidence.
4. No regression found in evidence truth or owner boundaries
Sections 9–11 bind protection acquisition, scope and observation evidence already established before C. The preparation receipt does not predict that protection will remain valid through L; that continuity is checked by the live owner at L and may be recorded afterward. This avoids introducing future facts into the immutable preparation receipt.
Spent consumption, immutable finalized bytes, no same-identity protected replay, and truthful disclosure uncertainty remain intact. A failed guarantee does not authorize stale disclosure, undo consumption, or make a retry lawful. Protection ends at L or irrevocable termination—not at recipient acknowledgement or completion of network delivery.
Section 14 keeps RD-BIND03-W within the existing transaction/observation binding, explicitly unbound. The revision does not claim an existing database mechanism, widen source access, activate a writer, or amend PR #31/#35. Any required source/storage change or upstream semantic amendment must return to its owner.
Remaining limitation—not another Phase A blocker
The difficult implementation obligation remains real: demonstrate that the actual providers can enforce complete-universe protection across C–L without making hidden contention determine whether a permitted reply succeeds before its deadline.
This review does not establish that current OFARM2 storage or transaction interfaces can supply that guarantee. The candidate correctly records the missing proof under RD-BIND03-W and requires later owner-backed bindings and paired race evidence. Requiring that implementation to exist before reviewing this Phase A correction would collapse the delivery stages the proposal expressly keeps separate.
Recommendation and limits
Version 2 is ready for explicit exact-head Phase A semantic approval. Keep PR #37 draft/unmerged and issue #36 open. This verdict closes the identified design finding, not RD-BIND03-W or any other binding, promotion, extraction or implementation gate. It does not itself grant semantic approval, merge authorization or permission to begin later stages.
Static re-review of the revision and pinned source context. I did not rerun the author's package checks or execute database, concurrency, durability or privacy tests. Posting this review changes no candidate bytes, active authority, schema, runtime or issue state.
Task-user Phase A semantic approval — version 2On 2026-09-14, the task user replied “i approve” to the explicit request to approve decision This comment records that task-user decision; it is not an AI self-approval or a new code review. Re-review 5196618462 covers this same head, reports no blocking findings, resolves B1 at the protocol-design level, and requests no further corrective patch. The live PR head and clean local worktree were checked before this record. The approval covers the Phase A governed-read semantics in the candidate's §§1 and 4–12, including complete result coverage, genuine qualification, atomic preparation evidence followed by the guarded one-time disclosure handoff, truthful outcomes and uncertainty, no protected replay, retention/privacy handling, and version 2's explicit WITHHELD sealing/commit-order requirement. It does not assert that an actual provider supplies that guarantee. The exact reviewed candidate bytes remain unchanged. File blob: Primary trust boundary: governed-read transaction integrity and protected disclosure. Scope stays inside the existing design and approval/navigation record; no canonical candidate, runtime, schema, source/storage authority or adjacent owner semantics change. Keep PR #37 open, draft and unmerged, and issue #36 open. RD-BIND01–07, including RD-BIND03-W, HSP/QG/CP2A dependencies and OFARM2 G2/G3/G4 remain open. The full unchanged ASSERT_OPERATION_CLAIM and RECEIVE_READ_DATA rules and all eleven delivery stages remain required. This approval is not accepted-law adoption, binding closure, schema materialization, conformance completion, current/default promotion, extraction, runtime implementation, writer activation or proven writer deferral, merge or deployment authorization. Any needed source/storage or PR #31/#35 semantic change requires its separately reviewed owner scope. No new package, runtime, database, concurrency, durability, delivery or privacy tests ran in this approval-recording turn. What is next: prepare the bounded next-stage binding plan against the approved owner designs, starting with the real source/transaction/egress mapping and open RD-BIND03-W obligation. Seek separate authorization before materialization or implementation, and preserve the OFARM2 #353 / PR #359 → #178 → bounded #176 sequence. |
Align Scope A timing with PR #11 e9052ef and Scope B privacy with PR #31 81f92cf. Keep owner decisions separate, preserve actual-C acknowledgement race coverage, and leave the provider/progress binding open. Boundary: governed-read transaction integrity and protected disclosure. Publish for review only; no semantic acceptance, merge or implementation. Refs #36; samovers/OFARM2#392.
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Review: no new blocking findings
Reviewed head: 56e549df954245b31f5cfd530479f765f071a860.
Base: 71ca724a8b6ec23f1655b086a6f549496d10a47f.
Amendment compared with predecessor: 41cd45b90fb8e133f6377d8f389858b89c3dd7ae.
The live head was rechecked immediately before posting and still matches the reviewed commit. This review covers the current Scope A/B amendment—not a transfer of the predecessor's approval.
I would not request another corrective patch within this bounded amendment. Its read-lifecycle wording is consistent with the separately proposed timing rule in PR #11 at e9052ef and privacy exception in PR #31 at 81f92cf. The actual provider binding remains unresolved.
Primary review boundary: governed-read transaction integrity and protected disclosure. References to sections and RD cases below are to this exact candidate.
1. Late evidence settlement does not become late disclosure permission
Sections 5.2 and 9.2.1 preserve the important distinction:
- D is the full effective authorization cutoff, not merely the request timeout.
- I is actual transaction-owner entry into finalization—not preparation, a previous clock check, or a queued request.
- An operation legitimately initiated before D may settle afterward under independent persistence authority, but disclosure L must still occur strictly before D.
The precheck/pause counterexample is explicitly covered: checking before D and resuming at or after D does not authorize initiation. Late settlement permanently spends the attempt without manufacturing timely consumption or restoring disclosure eligibility. This matches PR #11's amended section 18.5.1.
2. The privacy downgrade stays within the owner's stated exception
Section 8.3.1 imports the closed storage-wait categories from PR #31 rather than creating a general “storage was slow” exemption. It excludes history-classification difficulty, incomplete coverage, missing retention capability, arbitrary pool exhaustion, early timeouts, artificial delays, and hidden-selected fallback changes.
It also states the actual cost: otherwise equivalent requests may differ between success and deadline failure, potentially revealing hidden activity or contention; repeated requests may strengthen that inference. This is presented as a weaker privacy rule, not compliance with the predecessor's stronger guarantee. Uniform policy exclusion and disclosable-history refresh remain separate and unchanged.
3. The actual-commit/acknowledgement race is not accidentally exempted
This is the most consequential retained requirement. The positive paired execution begins at actual C, even before the reader receives its acknowledgement.
Under the same independent conditions permitting disclosure, a hidden candidate newly offered between C and L must not prevent the limited reply—including by delaying C's acknowledgement past D. The candidate must actually commit after L. Sanitized suppression, or simply dropping the writer, does not pass that case. Conversely, genuine independent acknowledgement loss still prevents disclosure; the privacy requirement does not authorize sending without confirmed complete evidence. Sections 8.3–8.3.1 and RD-C20 state both sides explicitly.
4. Failure handling preserves evidence truth and single-use semantics
The amendment distinguishes incomplete preparation, definitive rollback, unknown commitment, and an authoritatively committed incomplete/inconsistent set. Only the last is a committed-set integrity breach.
A complete C remains spent even when late, unacknowledged, or followed by suppressed disclosure. Reconciliation cannot reopen the handoff, repair finalized evidence by replay, or transfer the attempt to a replacement handler. The corresponding cases—particularly RD-C09 and RD-C12–C14—cover these distinctions rather than treating every failure as “nothing happened.”
What remains blocking downstream
OFARM2 #392/B1 and RD-BIND03-W remain real unresolved work. The amendment does not demonstrate a provider that supplies actual initiation proof, complete protected observation, protection across C through L, and the retained post-C progress guarantee. Its binding table and approval record explicitly leave those obligations open. That is not a newly introduced defect in this draft, but it prevents treating this review as provider clearance or implementation readiness.
Section 15.2 also keeps the two owner amendments separately identified and unapproved; neither their old approvals nor approval of one scope silently approves the other.
Verification and recommendation
GitHub's repository-validation and generated-currentness jobs both passed at the reviewed head. I inspected those results; I did not rerun the checks locally or execute PostgreSQL, concurrency, durability, egress, or privacy tests. The document's symbolic cases are acceptance requirements, not executed proof.
Recommendation: proceed to renewed exact-head semantic approval of this amendment, with the separate owner decisions and all actual binding gates preserved. Keep PR #37 draft/unmerged and issue #36 open. No active-baseline edit or additional corrective patch is requested by this review.
This is a review recommendation, not semantic approval, provider admission, materialization, acceptance, promotion, extraction, implementation, merge or deployment authorization. It does not close OFARM2 #392/B1 or any actual binding gate.
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Re-review: no blocking findings in the current alignment
Reviewed exact head 33abbe3c413a33ae38ba5ce189850c1d8556c4bd against the previously reviewed 56e549df954245b31f5cfd530479f765f071a860. The live head was rechecked unchanged immediately before posting. This review covers the covered-expiry correction and its owner-contract integration, not a fresh audit of the unchanged protocol.
No additional corrective patch is needed in PR #37. The amendment explicitly consumes PR #31's revised public-expiry rule instead of leaving the failure-response choice implicit.
Submitted as a COMMENT review. This is a review recommendation, not task-user semantic approval, formal GitHub approval, provider admission, implementation authorization or merge authority.
1. The two covered expiry paths now produce the same public response without falsifying internal facts
The candidate at this head, §8.3.1, requires PR #31's proposed HISTORICAL_READ_EXPIRED projection, rather than choosing between RESULT_UNAVAILABLE and COMMIT_UNCONFIRMED. Its meaning is that commitment status is not reported, not that the transaction owner necessarily lacks that knowledge.
The relevant paired executions are now specified as follows:
| State at the deadline | Internal commitment facts | Required public response |
|---|---|---|
| Protection acquisition remains blocked; read finalization was never initiated | No read C occurred, and the specified case has no relevant commitment uncertainty | HISTORICAL_READ_EXPIRED |
| Protection was acquired, but read-evidence finalization remains unresolved | Commitment is genuinely unconfirmed | The same HISTORICAL_READ_EXPIRED projection |
PR #31 at 907b934b44617fba01cd81b4ddb4ab8ca6979190, §§5.4.1 and 6, supplies the explicit precedence and common fields, labels, warnings, withholding posture, references, omissions and outward carrier constraints. It also prohibits switching to a settled/unconfirmed message when additional commitment facts arrive while forming that same expiry reply. This addresses the failure-versus-failure distinction raised in the owner review.
2. RD-C16 now covers the missing cross-expiry pair
The consumer case requires both executions to use the owner's identical expiry projection while retaining their different internal commitment facts. I checked that the pinned PR #31 C38 variants contain the corresponding positive pair and reject projection through either generic failure kind. This is more than checking a common reason code or zero protected bytes.
3. The new response does not broaden the timeout exception
The full effective deadline and closed causal-wait requirements remain. History-classification difficulty, incomplete coverage, missing retention capability, artificial delays and shorter internal timeouts do not become covered expiry merely because the new response exists.
The important post-commit safeguard also remains: a hidden candidate newly offered after actual C cannot delay acknowledgement beyond D and have the resulting suppression treated as a permitted expiry. That remains provider-conformance failure. Independent acknowledgement loss still prevents disclosure; neither the new projection nor later reconciliation restores eligibility.
These distinctions remain explicit in §8.3.1 and RD-C20/C21. The new public kind is not a fallback for the retained post-C provider violation, nor permission to bypass complete membership, source protection, the original live owner or the guarded handoff.
4. Ownership and approval boundaries remain explicit
Section 15.2 pins the corrected public owner at 907b934b44617fba01cd81b4ddb4ab8ca6979190 and retains Scope A at e9052efcf3c673360d939e856ac866cb27d709ae. The consumer does not redefine public fields, modify transaction facts or transfer earlier review/approval to the amended bytes.
The alignment diff is limited to the expiry-handling paragraph, RD-C16 and owner-reference/review-lineage updates. No active-baseline patch, new storage mechanism or broader protocol rewrite is requested by this review.
Verification and remaining limits
Both inspected GitHub jobs passed at 33abbe3c413a33ae38ba5ce189850c1d8556c4bd:
I did not rerun them locally or execute runtime, concurrency, durability or privacy tests. The paired cases remain specifications, not demonstrated provider behavior.
Recommendation: proceed to renewed exact-head semantic approval of this consumer alignment, with the public owner's approval handled separately. OFARM2 #392/B1, RD-BIND03-W, and the actual provider and later-stage gates remain open; this correction does not establish the missing implementation guarantees. Keep PR #37 draft/unmerged and preserve the separate acceptance, conformance, promotion, extraction, implementation and merge gates.
Renewed task-user Phase A semantic approval — 2026-09-15The task user replied “i approve” immediately after the review summary explicitly requested Phase A semantic approval of PR #11 at e9052ef, PR #31 at 907b934 and PR #37 at 33abbe3. This comment records the user's decision for PR #37 only. It is not AI-granted approval, a new review or a formal GitHub APPROVE action. Approved exact head: Approved scopePrimary trust boundary: governed-read transaction integrity and protected disclosure. The approval covers the current Scope A/B read-owner alignment, including the corrected public-expiry projection and cross-expiry pair in §8.3.1/RD-C16 and the exact owner references in §15.2. The separately approved owner inputs are PR #11 at e9052ef and PR #31 at 907b934. Complete observation/coverage, atomic evidence, one original live owner, strict protected handoff, no replay and truthful commitment knowledge remain intact. The positive hidden-writer obligation starts at actual C, before acknowledgement. The consumer does not take ownership of the public projection or establish that a provider can enforce these rules. The timing, public-disclosure and read-protocol decisions remain separately owned. The user's approval covers all three listed revisions explicitly; approval of one owner is not being used to infer approval of another. Exact bytes and retained limitsThe live PR head and clean local worktree were verified before recording this approval. The reviewed candidate bytes remain unchanged: blob RD-BIND03-W, OFARM2 #392/B1 and every actual source, transaction and egress binding remain open. This approval does not prove writer deferral, protected progress or implementation feasibility. Keep this PR open, draft and unmerged and its existing issue open. Phase A semantic approval does not authorize accepted-law adoption, machine/profile/registry materialization, admission/currentness promotion, conformance completion, extraction, runtime implementation, source/writer activation, merge or deployment. Existing later-stage gates and separate authority requirements remain. This recording step changes only approval/navigation metadata, within the existing boundary; no candidate file, runtime, authority, storage or custody behavior changes. No repository, runtime, concurrency, durability or privacy tests were run for this recording step. What is next: return to the bounded OFARM2 #392 mechanism-design work using these exact approved semantic inputs; preserve the open provider/progress obligations and obtain the separately required authority before materialization or implementation. |
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Current status — renewed Phase A semantic approval recorded, 2026-09-15
Approved exact head:
33abbe3c413a33ae38ba5ce189850c1d8556c4bd.Task-user approval record · No-blocker exact-head review · Reviewed amendment/correction diff.
The task user replied “i approve” to the explicit request for Phase A semantic approval of the three reviewed revisions. This records the user's decision for this PR, not AI-granted approval or a formal GitHub APPROVE review. The other two owner decisions have their own records. Earlier drafting/publication permission is not being treated as semantic approval.
Primary trust boundary: governed-read transaction integrity and protected disclosure. Scope stayed inside that boundary. The approval covers the current Scope A/B read-owner alignment, including the corrected public-expiry projection and cross-expiry pair in §8.3.1/RD-C16 and the exact owner references in §15.2. The separately approved owner inputs are PR #11 at e9052ef and PR #31 at 907b934. Complete observation/coverage, atomic evidence, one original live owner, strict protected handoff, no replay and truthful commitment knowledge remain intact. The positive hidden-writer obligation starts at actual C, before acknowledgement. The consumer does not take ownership of the public projection or establish that a provider can enforce these rules.
The approved candidate bytes and head are unchanged. In-file proposed/pending text is retained as publication history; the linked external record supplies the subsequent exact-head approval. This turn changes only approval/navigation metadata, not canonical source files, runtime behavior or adjacent authority.
RD-BIND03-W, OFARM2 #392/B1 and every actual source, transaction and egress binding remain open. This approval does not prove writer deferral, protected progress or implementation feasibility. Keep this PR open, draft and unmerged and its existing issue open. Semantic approval does not authorize accepted-law adoption, contract materialization, provider admission, conformance completion, current/default promotion, extraction, implementation, source/writer activation, merge or deployment. No prior approval or runtime binding transfers automatically.
Verification for this recording step: live heads, exact candidate blob/hash bindings, clean local worktrees and the posted approval records were checked. No repository, runtime, concurrency, durability or privacy tests were rerun; no implementation proof is claimed.
What is next: return to OFARM2 #392's bounded mechanism-design work using these exact approved inputs, preserving the open initiation, observation, protection and progress obligations and all later-stage authority requirements.
Historical PR record — earlier heads only
The record below is retained as history. Its earlier “current status” and approval labels refer to their named predecessor heads, not the new amendment above.
Current status — Phase A version 2 approved, 2026-09-14
The task user replied “i approve” to the explicit version 2/exact-head approval request. Approval record; no-blocker re-review. Approved head:
41cd45b90fb8e133f6377d8f389858b89c3dd7ae.This is design approval within governed-read transaction integrity and protected disclosure. Scope stayed inside the existing design and approval/navigation recording. No candidate bytes or head changed. All actual bindings, including RD-BIND03-W, and later-stage gates remain open; PR #37 remains draft/unmerged and issue #36 remains open. It is not merge or implementation authorization.
Purpose
Phase A for issue #36: propose the missing governed-read transaction, result-coverage and buffered-disclosure protocol required by #21 and PR #11 §18.5, and consumed by PR #35 HSP-BIND03 and OFARM2 PR #359.
Head:
41cd45b90fb8e133f6377d8f389858b89c3dd7ae.Base:
71ca724a8b6ec23f1655b086a6f549496d10a47f.One new file:
package_meta/history/clean_baseline_migration/phase_reports/governed_read_transaction_coverage_and_disclosure_protocol_rfc_candidate_v0_1.md.B1 correction — version 2 design approved
Review 5194803845 found that version 1 at
c2c52fa27bec24e72285564057cab198e4654e36could reveal hidden history by suppressing a sealed WITHHELD reply only when a new hidden qualifier appeared. The user authorized this bounded correction with “go.” Re-review 5196618462 cleared B1 at the protocol-design level, and the task user's version 2 approval is now recorded at this same head. No further corrective patch is requested.The revision selects the review's explicit required guarantee option:
RD-BIND03-W remains unbound. This document does not establish that any existing provider can supply the guarantee. A provider admitting the forbidden race fails the contract; fail-closed suppression is not called C38 compliance. Any needed source/storage implementation or PR #31/#35 semantic change requires separate owner work. No approved owner candidate changed.
Revision diff: one file, 96 insertions and 35 deletions; total candidate 525 lines. Four repository checks, source pins, structure/traceability/whitespace and exact remote text read-back passed. Seven unaffected sections were compared byte-for-byte with the reviewed head. No live provider/concurrency/privacy/durability tests ran.
Boundary and proposed choices
Primary trust boundary: governed-read transaction integrity and protected disclosure. Scope stays inside that boundary.
These choices now have the exact-head design review and task-user Phase A approval linked above; mentioning a requirement still does not establish its implementation. The earlier issue's no-blocker re-review reviewed only the amended issue framing; the user's “no blockers, go” then authorized this separate draft.
Design-review scope
The review covered the positive sharing/content coverage rule; the one-live-attempt model and exact C-to-L guard; preparation/outcome truth claims; real qualification ordering; the historical refresh/limited-reply path; and retention/uncertainty handling. Actual binding and any needed new authority remain separate owner work. All ten issue criteria map to thirteen invariants and twenty-one symbolic positive/hostile cases.
PR #11's ranked authorization coverage/trace failures remain distinct from unranked runtime persistence failures. The compatibility ledger explicitly distinguishes PR #11's historical unapproved PR #34 input at
69682c2from approved version 2 atc59fdbc. No adjacent candidate is edited.Verification
Passed:
validate_repo_hygiene.pycheck_generated_currentness.pycheck_repository_cross_references.pycheck_repository_steward_guardrails.pygit diff --cached --check.The checks above are the author's static document/repository checks from preparation. The subsequent protocol re-review is linked in the current status; it did not rerun those checks. No new package, database, concurrency, delivery, privacy or hosted runtime tests ran in the approval-recording turn.
Approval limits and next step
Decision
OFARM-ISSUE36-GOVERNED-READ-TRANSACTION-COVERAGE-DISCLOSURE-001, version 2, has task-user Phase A semantic approval at41cd45b90fb8e133f6377d8f389858b89c3dd7ae. The candidate bytes and their historical proposed/pending wording remain unchanged; the external approval record supplies the subsequent decision. Version 1 was not approved.The release remains exactly ASSERT_OPERATION_CLAIM and RECEIVE_READ_DATA, with both full unchanged rules. Seven read binding groups (including the required, open RD-BIND03-W sealing sub-obligation), HSP/QG/CP2A dependencies and OFARM2 G2/G3/G4 remain open. No writer activation or proven writer deferral, new access grant, database change, schema materialization, accepted law, currentness/promotion, extraction, runtime implementation, merge or deployment is authorized. All eleven delivery stages remain required.
What is next: prepare the bounded next-stage binding plan against the approved owner designs, including the actual source/transaction/egress mapping and RD-BIND03-W. Obtain separate authorization before materialization or implementation. Keep PR #37 draft/unmerged and issue #36 open; preserve OFARM2 #353 / PR #359 → #178 → bounded #176.
What is next: review the bounded amendment at
56e549df954245b31f5cfd530479f765f071a860and obtain renewed semantic approval of its wording. Do not merge or implement from this publication authorization.