Proton Mail MCP is an independent, community project (unofficial — not affiliated with Proton AG). It handles email credentials and can read, send, and delete mail, so security reports are taken seriously.
For vulnerabilities in Proton Mail, Proton Mail Bridge, or any Proton product itself, report to Proton — not here. See https://proton.me/security/disclosure. This policy covers only this MCP server.
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:
- Go to the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability.
- Describe the issue, affected version, and steps to reproduce.
This routes the report privately to the maintainer. You'll get an acknowledgement, and once a fix ships, credit in the advisory if you'd like it.
In scope and useful to report:
- Credential leakage (e.g. secrets written to logs, error messages, or tool responses).
- Path-traversal or arbitrary file read/write via the attachment download tools.
- Prompt-injection paths where untrusted email content can drive the server into an unintended action (beyond the known, documented surface).
- Bypasses of the safety controls (
READONLY,RESTRICT_OUTBOUND_TO_SELF, thefromNamespoofing guard, HTML sanitization).
- Vulnerabilities in Proton Mail / Proton Mail Bridge themselves (report to Proton, link above).
- Issues that require the operator to deliberately misconfigure the server in a
way the docs warn against (e.g. enabling
ALLOW_EMPTY_FOLDER). - Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies already tracked upstream (Dependabot handles routine dependency bumps).
A reminder for operators, not a vulnerability class: use a Proton SMTP password (the app-specific one), not your main login password; keep it in your MCP client's env config, not in source control.