Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email security reports to: alexandar.zhang@mail.utoronto.ca
Include: a clear description, reproduction steps, the affected version, and any proof-of-concept code. We aim to acknowledge within 5 business days and to release a fix within 90 days from confirmation.
In scope:
- Code-execution, injection, or sandbox-escape vulnerabilities in the
ehrextractlibrary or CLI. - PHI-leakage paths -- anywhere note text could be persisted, logged, or transmitted other than to the configured provider destination.
- Bugs in the egress-warning machinery (
ehrextract/providers.py) that suppress the PHI egress notice without--ack-egressorACK_EGRESS=1.
Out of scope:
- Vulnerabilities in third-party providers (OpenAI / Anthropic / HuggingFace) -- please report to those vendors.
- Issues that require a malicious schema YAML provided by the operator (the operator is trusted).
- Provider model behavior, hallucinations, or factual inaccuracies -- these are research-quality concerns, see NOTICE section 6.
The egress warning is informational -- it nudges operators toward BAA / Zero-Data-Retention awareness but does not technically block PHI from leaving the machine. The user must enforce data-handling policy themselves. See NOTICE section 4 and docs/ehrextract/data-handling.md for full caveats.