Skip to content
Closed
Show file tree
Hide file tree
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
5 changes: 4 additions & 1 deletion .jules/sentinel.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
## 2025-02-21 - Path Traversal in Mix Endpoint API Parameter
**Vulnerability:** The `/projects/{project_id}/mix` API endpoint in `src/audioformation/server/routes.py` accepted a `music` parameter (meant to specify a filename within the `05_MUSIC/generated` directory) but directly passed it to `mix_project` without sanitization. This allowed directory traversal payloads like `../../../etc/passwd` to be used for background music resolution.
**Learning:** Even internal API inputs that map strictly to filenames inside an expected directory must be sanitized. A simple check for file existence (`if not bg_music_path.exists():`) is insufficient as it confirms existence but allows looking outside the bounded directory.
**Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization.
**Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization.## 2025-02-21 - SafeStaticFiles Bypass via AttributeError
Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

medium

The new vulnerability entry is appended directly to the end of the previous line without a newline. This breaks the markdown structure and makes the security log difficult to read. Please ensure there is a blank line between entries.

Suggested change
**Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization.## 2025-02-21 - SafeStaticFiles Bypass via AttributeError
**Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization.
## 2025-02-21 - SafeStaticFiles Bypass via AttributeError

**Vulnerability:** The custom `SafeStaticFiles` class designed to block access to sensitive files (like `.env` and `00_config`) failed closed improperly due to an `AttributeError` when doing `Path(path).lower()`. A 500 error on the server side could prevent the static files middleware from properly functioning or bypass the security check completely in certain scenarios depending on exception handling.
**Learning:** Type assumptions must be rigorously checked in security controls. An `AttributeError` in a security blocklist check can render the entire control ineffective or create an accidental DoS. Path string normalizations must happen *before* instantiating pathlib objects.
**Prevention:** Always normalize strings before converting them to strongly-typed objects when using methods that are string-specific (`.lower()`, `.upper()`), and write tests that specifically verify the failure path of security controls.
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion src/audioformation/server/app.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ class SafeStaticFiles(StaticFiles):

async def get_response(self, path: str, scope) -> Response:
# Normalize path for check
p = Path(path).lower()
p = Path(path.lower())
if "00_config" in p.parts or p.name.startswith(".env") or ".git" in p.parts:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403, detail="Access denied to sensitive resource"
Expand Down
Loading