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π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Path Traversal Crash #69
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ | ||
| ## 2025-02-21 - Path Traversal in Mix Endpoint API Parameter | ||
| **Vulnerability:** The `/projects/{project_id}/mix` API endpoint in `src/audioformation/server/routes.py` accepted a `music` parameter (meant to specify a filename within the `05_MUSIC/generated` directory) but directly passed it to `mix_project` without sanitization. This allowed directory traversal payloads like `../../../etc/passwd` to be used for background music resolution. | ||
| **Learning:** Even internal API inputs that map strictly to filenames inside an expected directory must be sanitized. A simple check for file existence (`if not bg_music_path.exists():`) is insufficient as it confirms existence but allows looking outside the bounded directory. | ||
| **Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization. | ||
| **Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization. | ||
| ## 2024-05-20 - Fix Path Handling Bug in SafeStaticFiles | ||
| **Vulnerability:** SafeStaticFiles incorrectly used `Path(path).lower()` instead of `Path(path.lower())`, leading to an AttributeError that crashed the process instead of returning a 403 Forbidden. This effectively circumvented the security gate mechanism and caused a DoS via Unhandled Exception. | ||
| **Learning:** Method calls on standard library types like pathlib.Path shouldn't be confused with string operations. | ||
| **Prevention:** Convert path strings to lower case before instantiating Path objects (e.g. `Path(path.lower())`) to avoid AttributeError, and ensure tests mock API routing layers properly. |
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While this change correctly fixes the
AttributeErrorby lowercasing the string before creating thePathobject, the subsequent security check for.envfiles (on line 28) only inspects thep.nameproperty. This means that if.envis used as a directory name (e.g.,.env/secrets.json), the check will be bypassed becausep.namewould besecrets.json. To improve the robustness of this hardened class, consider checking if any component of the path starts with.env, similar to how00_configand.gitare checked usingp.parts.