-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix SafeStaticFiles path validation AttributeError #76
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. Weβll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Changes from all commits
File filter
Filter by extension
Conversations
Jump to
Diff view
Diff view
There are no files selected for viewing
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ | ||
| ## 2025-02-21 - Path Traversal in Mix Endpoint API Parameter | ||
| **Vulnerability:** The `/projects/{project_id}/mix` API endpoint in `src/audioformation/server/routes.py` accepted a `music` parameter (meant to specify a filename within the `05_MUSIC/generated` directory) but directly passed it to `mix_project` without sanitization. This allowed directory traversal payloads like `../../../etc/passwd` to be used for background music resolution. | ||
| **Learning:** Even internal API inputs that map strictly to filenames inside an expected directory must be sanitized. A simple check for file existence (`if not bg_music_path.exists():`) is insufficient as it confirms existence but allows looking outside the bounded directory. | ||
| **Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization. | ||
| **Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization. | ||
| ## 2024-05-24 - Fix SafeStaticFiles path validation AttributeError | ||
| **Vulnerability:** The application was throwing an `AttributeError` during static file path validation because it was trying to call `.lower()` on a `Path` object in `src/audioformation/server/app.py` (`Path(path).lower()`). This resulted in an unhandled exception, causing the application to crash or return a 500 error when serving any static files. | ||
| **Learning:** `PosixPath` objects do not have a `lower()` method. Path strings should be normalized *before* being passed to `Path()`. This code would fail on the first request for a static file and completely break the frontend or block valid operations. | ||
| **Prevention:** Always ensure string operations are performed on string types before casting them to Path objects, and include integration tests that actually make requests to the running application to catch obvious typos in core middleware/routing. | ||
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
|
|
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ class SafeStaticFiles(StaticFiles): | |
|
|
||
| async def get_response(self, path: str, scope) -> Response: | ||
| # Normalize path for check | ||
| p = Path(path).lower() | ||
| p = Path(path.lower()) | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. The security logic on line 28 is inconsistent: |
||
| if "00_config" in p.parts or p.name.startswith(".env") or ".git" in p.parts: | ||
| raise HTTPException( | ||
| status_code=403, detail="Access denied to sensitive resource" | ||
|
|
||
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
While the prevention section correctly identifies the need for integration tests, this PR does not include any new tests, and the verification steps suggest skipping existing server tests. Adding a regression test that specifically verifies the blocking logic of
SafeStaticFileswould ensure this critical path remains functional and secure.